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1)

(a) Rabah establishes the Machlokes Tana'im (Rebbi and the Rabbanan, whether it is possible to set half an Eved free), in a case where the owner retains the other half of the Eved (but if he sells it, even the Rabbanan will agree that the Shichrur is valid) - provided the Shichrur did not take place first.

(b) The Tana of one Beraisa says that if someone writes all his property to his two Avadim - they share the property and set each other free.

(c) Rav Yosef presumes to reconcile this Beraisa with another Beraisa which, in a similar case, rules that the two Avadim do not even acquire themselves - by establishing the first Beraisa like Rebbi, and the second, like the Rabbanan.

(d) This poses a Kashya on Rabah - since he just explained that as long as the master does not retain any part of his Eved, even the Rabbanan concede that the Shichrur is valid?

(a) We refute Rav Yosef's Kashya, by establishing both Beraisos according to the Rabanan. Nevertheless, the second Beraisa rules that they do not acquire themselves - because the Tana is speaking when the master specifically wrote 'Chatzi' in one Sh'tar and 'Chatzi' in the other.

(b) He could even be speaking in a case where he gave the two Sh'taros to the two Avadim simultaneously, only - because he wrote in each Sh'tar 'Chatzi', he may have been giving the same half (Eved) to each Eved, in which case he has retained part of the Eved.

(c) Rabah explains ...

1. ... the first Beraisa (where the master wrote 'Kulo' in each Sh'tar) - when he handed the two Sh'taros simultaneously.
2. ... the Seifa of the latter Beraisa, which presents the case of 'Chatzi Chatzi', is not an independant case, but comes to explain the Reisha.

(a) It might even be logical to interpret the Seifa as an extension of the Reisha, rather than as a separate entity (in which case the Beraisa would rebound on Rav Yosef, posing a Kashya on him) - because otherwise, having taught us that by 'Kulo Kulo' the Shichrur is invalid, why did he find it necessary to add the case of 'Chatzi Chatzi'?

(b) Rav Yosef replies however - that the Tana might deliberately have added the case of 'Chatzi Chatzi', in order to imply that the Reisha speaks by 'Kulo Kulo', and still the Shichrur is not valid.

(c) An alternative answer to Rav Yosef's initial Kashya on Rabah is that the second Beraisa speaks when the master wrote the two gifts on one Sh'tar. We learn from Get Ishah that such a gift is not valid - because the Torah writes "Lah" 've'Lo Lah ve'la'Chavertah'.

(d) We now explain the Seifa 've'Im Amar Chatzi Chatzi, Lo Kanah' by adding to the Beraisa 'Bameh Devarim Amurim, bi'Sh'tar Echad, Aval bi'Shnei Sh'taros Kanu, ve'Im Amar Chatzi Chatzi, Af bi'Shnei Sh'taros Lo Kanu'.

(a) We reject a third suggestion, establishing the second Beraisa when he did not hand them the Sh'taros simultaneously, but one after the other (even though both Beraisos speak when he wrote 'Kulo') - because that would explain why the second Eved will not acquire anything, but there is no reason for the first Eved not to.

(b) Rav Ashi deduces that the Sh'tar is invalid from the Lashon written in the Sh'tar: 'ha'Omer, Kol Nechasai Nesunin li'P'loni u'Ploni Avadai' - implying that the Avadim do not go free because he did not intend to set them free.

(c) When he wrote the Sh'tar - he (mistakenly) intended them to acquire his property even without acquiring themselves.

(a) In the Mishnah in Pe'ah, Rebbi Shimon, commenting on the Tana Kama's statement 'ha'Kosev Kol Nechasav le'Avdo, Yeitzei le'Cheirus. Shiyer Karka Kol she'Hu, Lo Yeitzei le'Cheirus', writes 'Le'olam Hu ben Chorin ad she'Yomar Kol Nechasai Nesunin li'P'loni Avdi Chutz me'Echad me'Ribu she'Bahen'. If the master left over some land, the Eved goes free, as long as he did not say 'Chutz me'Echad me'Ribu she'Bahen',the Eved goes free, because of the principle 'Palginan Dibura' (even though the Eved does not acquire the property, he does acquire himself - as we explained in Perek 'ha'Meivi Get Kama').

(b) Rafram learns from there - that, when a master refers to his Eved as such, he is not necessarily referring to his current status, but that he might be referring to his paast status (meaning his erstwhile Eved, not his current one).

(a) If, according to Beis Hillel in our Mishnah (who initally holds that an Eved who is half free serves his master one day, and himself the next), an ox gores this Eved - whosoever's day it is receives the damages.

(b) Nevertheless, we do not say that, by the same token, the Eved should 'marry' a Shifchah on the day that he serves his master, and a bas Yisrael on the day that he serves himself - because Mamon can be divided in two (one day for the master one for himself), Isur cannot.

(c) The Tana of a Beraisa says that if a goring ox gored an Eved and killed him - the master receives half the fine, and the Chatzi ben-Chorin's heirs, half the Kofer.

7)

(a) If a goring ox gores and kills ...

1. ... an Eved - the owner must pay thirty Shekalim to the master.
2. ... a free man - he pays Kofer (whatever he is worth, were he to be sold on the slave market) to the man's heirs.

(b) The Din here is different than in the previous case (where the ox only *damaged* the Chatzi-Eved, Chatzi ben Chorin), where the payment depended on the day that the accident occurred - because here, the Keren (the principle) has been destroyed (and both owners suffer a total loss).

(a) The case of damages where the Keren has not been destroyed - would be where for example, he was struck on his hand, which temporarily withered, but later returned to its previous state.

(b) According to Abaye, the Mazik then pays both Sheves Gedolah and Sheves Ketanah.

1. Sheves Gedolah is - the depreciation of the Eved (Nezek).
2. Sheves Ketanah is - daily work-loss (the wages he would receive as a guard in a cucumber-field if he were not bed-ridden due to the wound).

(c) According to Rava, he pays only Sheves Ketanah. The problem this poses on the case that we learned earlier 'Nagcho Shor, Yom shel Rabo, le'Rabo ... ' is - that one only pays Sheves (Ketanah) for the damage that one inflicted personally, but not for that of one's animal.

(a) Rava therefore amends the case from 'Nagcho Shor', to 'Nagcho Adam'. Alternatively, we leave the original case intact, and Rava is not perturbed by it - because it is only a statement of Amora'im, with whom he has the authority to argue.

(b) We ask whether, if an ox gores a freed Eved who still requires a Get Shichrur, the Mazik is obligated to pay thirty Shekalim K'nas or not. The two sides of the She'eilah, based on the Pasuk "Kesef Sheloshim Shekalim Yiten *la'Adonav*" are - that, on the one hand, strictly speaking, he is no longer the Eved's master, but on the other, his initial status remains as long as he has not given him a Get Shichrur.

(c) We try to resolve the She'eilah from the Beraisa quoted above, obligating the owner of a goring ox that killed an Eved to pay half the K'nas to the master - on the assumption that this Beraisa speaks after the Mishnah Acharonah, where Hillel conceded to Beis Shamai that a Chatzi Eved va'Chatzi ben Chorin needs to be set free and requires a Get Shichrur (proving that the Tzad Avdus remains until the master gives the Eved a Get Shichrur).

(d) We refute this proof however - by establishing the Beraisa according to the Mishnah Rishonah, in which case, it is not necessary to set him free.

(a) The Beraisa says that someone who knocked out his Eved's tooth and then blinded him - must set him free for his tooth, and pay for his eye.

(b) Thinking that 'Shen ve'Ayin' requires a Get Shichrur, we prove that nevertheless - he is no longer considered his master, because if he were, considering that others pay him for having knocked out his Eved's eye, it makes no sense to say that he has to pay the Eved for doing so (i.e. he certainly ought to be exempt from having to pay him)?

(c) We refute this proof by establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Tarfon - who hold that Shen ve'Ayin does not require a Get Shichrur.

(d) Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Eliezer hold that Shen ve'Ayin does require a Get Shichrur. Rebbi Akiva quoting ha'Machri'in Lifnei Chachamim, makes a compromise. According to him - Shen ve'Ayin, which the Torah writes specifically, does not require a Get Shichrur, whereas the other twenty-four limbs, which are only learned from a D'rashah, do.

(a) The twenty-four limbs that, if severed by the master, send an Eved out to Cheirus are - the tips of: the ten fingers, the ten toes, the nose, the two ears and the Milah.

(b) These limbs are not subject to Tum'as Tzara'as - because the Kohen cannot see any of them at one time (but needs to move his head to do so) as the Torah requires, when it writes in Tazri'a "le'Chol Mar'eh Einei ha'Kohen".

(c) We ask whether a freed Eved who still requires a Get Shichrur is permitted to eat Terumah. Based on the Pasuk, which refers to an Eved as "Kinyan Kaspo", the two sides of the She'eilah are - that, on the one hand, strictly speaking, the Eved is no longer 'Kinyan Kaspo', but on the other, his initial status remains as long as he has not given him a Get Shichrur.

(a) The Mishnah in Yevamos says that if a the child of a Kohenes became mixed-up with the child of her Eved ...

1. ... they may both eat Terumah -
2. ... they are entitled to receive one portion of Terumah at the granary between them, provided they both go together.
3. ... each one is obligated to set the other one free when he becomes a Gadol.

(b) We ...

1. ... try to prove our current She'eilah from there - because here we have a case where each of the two men require a Get Shichrur, yet they are permitted to eat Terumah.
2. ... refute the proof however - on the grounds that, whereas, in the case of our She'eilah, the Eved who requires a Get Shichrur is no longer the Kinyan Kaspo of the master (as we explained), in the case of the Mishnah, whichever is the Eved, is definitely the Kinyan Kaspo of the Kohenes. The proof of this lies in the fact that if Eliyahu were to come and identify them, then whichever one he would identify as the Eved, would revert to being the full-fledged Eved of the Kohenes.

1. ... Rebbi Meir, who holds that it is possible to be Makneh something that is not yet in the world - because maybe that is only with regard to the fruit of a date-palm (and suchlike), which is bound to grow; perhaps he will not say it in our case, where firstly, the Eved may well not be gored by a goring ox, and even if he is, maybe the owner will admit responsibility, in which case he will be exempt from paying.
2. ... the Rabbanan, who hold that one *cannot* - because maybe that is only with regard to the fruit of a date-palm, but in this case where all the ingredients (the ox and the gored Eved) are there, maybe they will concede to Rebbi Meir that 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba Le'olam'.