Previous daf

1)

(a) Rav Ashi suggests the reason that Ma'amad Sheloshtan applies even to a loan is because, due to the extended time period, the debtor gladly obligates himself to the new creditor. But Rav Huna the grandson of Rav Nechemyah refutes this suggestion by referring to people the likes of Bei bar Elyashiv - who were tough guys, and who, in the above circumstances, would claim the money immediately (allowing no extension of the loan).

(b) This creates a problem with Rav Ashi's explanation - inasmuch as this would mean that whenever the third person belonged to that caliber of people, Ma'amad Sheloshtan would not apply (whereas in fact, no such distinction exists).

(c) We cannot differentiate between the majority of people and people of the caliber of Bei bar Elyashiv - because of the principle 'Im Kein, Nasata Devarecha le'Shi'urin' (Chazal did not make such distinctions in their decrees, applying them to some, but not to others).

(a) Mar Zutra finally explains - that Ma'amad Sheloshtan is not based on logic at all, but is 'ke'Hilchesa be'Lo Ta'ama' (as if it was a Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai).

(b) The right to institute Halachos without any real reason - is based on the principle 'Hefker Beis-Din Hefker' (the free hand in transferring money from one person to another, whenever they see fit to do so).

(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel said that if someone writes all his property to his wife - he has appointed her a manager over it (but she does not acquire it).

(b) And Rav Chananyah said that if someone marries off his eldest son in a house that belongs to him but in which he does not reside - the son acquires the house.

(c) What these two Halachos have in common with Rav's Din of Ma'amad Sheloshtan is - that Mar Zutra lists all three as 'Hitches be'Lo Ta'ama'.

(a) Having instructed the trustee (or the debtor) to hand the deposit (or the loan) to a third person, the owner (or the creditor) - is not permitted to retract.

(b) Rav deposited - a Kaba de'Morika (a Kav of spice called safflower) by Rav Acha Bardela.

(c) When, in the presence of the recipient, Rav instructed Rav Acha Bardela to hand it to him, adding that he would not retract - he meant that since the third person was present, he could not retract even if he wanted to.

(d) Despite the fact that he had already stated this with regard to someone who deposited (or lent) a Manah, he nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it here - to teach us that, even a deposit as small as a Kav of Morika also requires the presence of the recipient to finalize the transaction.

(a) One of a group of gardeners thought that he owed his colleagues five Istiri Zuzi - meaning five Sela Medinah (each of which is an eighth of a Sela Tzuri, or half a Dinar [see Rashash]).

(b) His colleagues instructed him to give the money to the owner of the land (for whom they worked).

(c) When the gardener came before Rav Nachman initially (in order to retract) - he initially cited Rav's ruling of 'Ma'amad Sheloshtan', from which he could not retract. And besides, he pointed out, the gardeners had made a Kinyan, which further weakened his hand.

(d) He changed his mind however - when the gardener told him that he was not going back on the transaction, but that he did not owe them the money in the first place. Consequently, Rav Nachman absolved him from having to pay, because it was a Kinyan made in error.

(a) Rav says that if one man asks another to take a Manah to his creditor, he remains responsible to replace it should anything happen to the money, yet he cannot retract. Shmuel says - that since he is responsible to replace it, he also has the right to retract.

(b) Even if, as we suggest, they argue over whether 'Holech ki'Z'chi (Rav) or not (Shmuel), he will nevertheless be held responsible in the event of an accident occurring according to Rav - because the creditor did not ask for the money to be returned to him.

(c) We conclude that both Rav and Shmuel hold 'Holech ki'Z'chi', and the basis of their Machlokes is - whether we say 'Migu' ( since he is responsible to replace it, he also has the right to retract [Shmuel]) or not (Rav).

(d) Shmuel will agree that he cannot retract - in the case of a gift, where for obvious reasons he cannot be held responsible.

(a) In the previous case (of Holech ki'Z'chi), we will rule like Rav, despite the principle 'Halachah ki'Sh'muel be'Dini' ('the Halachah is like Shmuel in money-matters') - because there is a Beraisa which supports Rav.

(b) We obligate a trustee who gives a deposit to a second person to look after - because the owner can say 'I do not want my article to be in the hands of another person!' (i.e. 'I gave it to you to look after, and to you only!').

(c) The Tana, who rules that if a trustee says 'Holech Manah li'P'loni Pikadon she'Yesh Lo be'Yadi', he cannot retract - is speaking when the trustee has already been proven to be dishonest, in which case we can take for granted that the owner will be only be too pleased for the article to change hands.

(a) Rav Sheishes had sold coats to businessmen in Mechuza on credit (and it seems that they had retracted from the sale) and he now wanted them back.

(b) He asked - Rav Yosef to bring them back with him when he returned from there.

(c) The businessmen asked to make a Kinyan from him before he set out on his return journey - in order to obligate him to accept liability, should anything happen to the coats on the way. He said he would comply, but evaded having to do it.

(d) When, upon Rav Yosef's return, Rav Sheishes quoted the Pasuk "Eved Loveh le'Ish Malveh" - he meant ...

1. ... either to commend Rav Yosef on his astuteness in evading the accepting responsibility (because "a debtor is a slave to the creditor").
2. ... to rebuke him for not accepting his responsibilities.

9)

(a) Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai and Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar undertook to return some silver in a container from Neherda'a on behalf of Rebbi Achi b'Rebbi Yoshiyah. When Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai and Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar declined to make a Kinyan - the men of Neherda'a responded by demanding the silver back.

(b) Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai agreed to return the silver immediately - because he was afraid of them (for reasons that will soon become apparent).

(c) When the men of Neherda'a, who were beating Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar for refusing to return it, complained to him about his colleague's obstinacy - he commented 'Beat him more!' (or 'He deserves to be beaten!')

(d) Rebbi Yossi bar Kipar refused to return the silver - because once the Sheli'ach receives the money, the trustee is not permitted to retract, like Rav on the previous Amud.

(a) When, upon their return, Rebbi Achi b'Rebbi Yoshiyah asked Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai why he agreed to return the silver immediately, he described the frightening appearance of the men of Neherda'a. He described ...

1. ... their size - as men of measure (extremely tall) see Agados Maharsha.
2. ... their clothes - weird and frightening.
3. ... their voices - as deep-sounding (as if they emerged from their navel).
4. ... their names - unusual (and fear-inspiring).

(b) According to Rebbi Dustai b'Rebbi Yanai, if those men threatened to tie somebody up or kill him - then they would.

(c) He therefore feared for his life to cross swords with them, since nobody would be able to provide his father Yanai with a son like him.

(d) Rebbi Achi b'Rebbi Oshaya finally vindicated him - when he added that they were close to the king, and that horses and mules ran behind them (a sign of power).

(a) If the Sheli'ach who brought the Sh'tar was unable to find the recipient, two Tana'im argue over what to do. According to the Tana of one Beraisa, he must return the Sh'tar to the Meshale'ach. According to the Tana of the other Beraisa, he gives it to the heirs of the recipient. We try to establish the Machlokes as to whether 'Holech ki'Z'chi' (the latter Tana), or not (the former Tana).

(b) Rebbi Aba bar Mamal however, maintains that both Tana'im hold 'Holech La'av ki'Z'chi'. The Tana who rules that it should be given to the heirs of the recipient however - is speaking about a Shechiv-Mera (whose 'Holech' is like 'Z'chi'.

(c) According to Rav Z'vid, both Beraisos speak about a Shechiv-Mera, and the reason of the Tana who holds that it should be returned to the Meshale'ach is - because he is speaking in a case when the recipient had already died when the Sh'tar was handed to the Sheli'ach (only the Meshale'ach was unaware of it).

(d) Rav Papa establishes both Beraisos by a healthy Meshale'ach. The Sheli'ach gives the Sh'tar ...

1. ... back to the Meshale'ach - when the recipient died during the life-time of the Meshale'ach (and the Shelichus became Bateil [even if the Meshale'ach died immediately afterwards]).
2. ... to the heirs of the recipient - if the Meshale'ach died after having handed the Sh'tar to the Sheli'ach (when it becomes a Mitzvah to fulfill the command of the deceased).

(a) The Tana Kama in another Beraisa rules that in the case of 'Holech Manah li'P'loni u'Biksho ve'Lo Matz'o', the Sheli'ach must return the money to the Meshale'ach. If the Meshale'ach died, Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi Ya'akov say that he should return the money to his heirs. According to Yesh Omrim - he gives it to the heirs of the recipient.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi Mishum Rebbi Ya'akov Mishum Rebbi Meir cites the principle 'Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis' - and the Chachamim say 'Yachloku'.

(c) The most unusual ruling is that of ve'Ka'an Amru, who hold 'Shuda de'Dayna' - meaning that it is left to the Dayan (in this case, the Sheli'ach) to act according to his assessment of the donor's intentions.

(d) 'Ka'an' - means in Bavel.

(a) Assuming the key issue among the Tana'im in the above Beraisa to be whether we say 'Holech ki'Z'chi' or not, the Tana Kama ('Biksho ve'Lo Matz'o, Yachzero li'Meshale'ach') on the one hand, and Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi Ya'akov ('Meis Meshale'ach, Yachzero le'Yorshei Meshale'ach) on the other, as well as Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi ('Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis') all hold - 'Holech La'av ki'Z'chi'.

(b) Rebbi Ya'akov and Rebbi Nasan argue with Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi - inasmuch as they do not hold 'Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis'.

(c) Yesh Omrim ('le'Yorshei Mi she'Nishtalchu Eilav') clearly holds 'Holech ki'Z'chi'. The Chachamim ('Yachloku') - are uncertain whether 'Holech ki'Z'chi', and whether 'Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Meis'.

(a) The final opinion is that of Rebbi Shimon ha'Nasi, who cites an episode when the ruling was 'Yachzeru le'Yorshei Meshale'ach'. He actually concurs with the opinion of Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi Ya'akov, and - based on the principle 'Ma'aseh Rav' he is coming to prove that they are right.

(b) We conclude however, that the Tana'im argue in the case of a Shechiv-Mera. They all agree with regard to the gift of a healthy man - that 'Holech La'av ki'Z'chi'.

(c) In fact, they argue over the same point as Rebbi Elazar and the Rabbanan in another Beraisa. According to Rebbi Elazar, a Shechiv-Mera who distributes his property requires a Kinyan (Kesef, Sh'tar or Chazakah for property; Meshichah for movable objects); whereas the Chachamim hold - that they are both acquired automatically with his words alone.

(a) The Chachamim attempted to prove their point from the case concerning the dying mother of the B'nei Ruchal - who bequeathed her expensive brooch to her daughter without any form of Kinyan, and whose words the Chachamim fulfilled.

(b) The brooch was worth - twelve Manah.

(c) Rebbi Elazar repudiated the Chachamim's proof - on the grounds that the B'nei Ruchal were Resha'im who were cursed and whose words were therefore not discussed in the Beis-Hamedrash. Consequently, the case became misquoted (because really a Kinyan had taken place).

(d) Rebbi Elazar branded them as Resha'im - because they allowed thorns to grow in their vineyards, thereby transgressing (at least, in his opinion) the La'av of Kil'ayim be'Kerem.