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1)

(a) Rabah answers that the Mishnah sees fit to repeat here the Din (quoted as the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer) that anything can be used for Eruvei Chatzeros except for water and salt - in order to preclude the opinion of Rebbi Yehoshua, who holds that only a loaf of bread is eligible.

(b) In tht case, the author of the Beraisa: 'ba'Kol Me'arvin Eruvei Chatzeros, u'va'Kol Mishtatfin Shitufei Mavu'os, ve'Lo Amru Le'arev be'Pas Ela be'Chatzer Bilevad' which requires bread, according to Rabah, can only be Rebbi Yehoshua; yet at the same time, he permits 'anything' ('Bakol')? What Rebbi Yehoshua must therefore mean, is that all kinds of bread are permitted? In that case, argues Abaye, the 'Bakol' of Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah can also mean all kinds of bread (and it is for Shituf Mavu'os exclusively, that anything but water and salt is eligible). In fact, he disagrees with Rebbi Yehoshua only as regard using a *whole* loaf, which Rebbi Yeshua requires, and *he* does not.

(c) Having said that, the author of the Beraisa can also be Rebbi Eliezer, who permits any kind of *bread* for Eruv Chatzeros, but *any food* for Shitufei Mavu'os.

(a) Rebbi Yehoshua requires whole loaves only - because otherwise, those residents who provide whole loaves will say to those who provide pieces, 'We gave whole loaves; why did you give pieces'? So it is better, he claims, that everyone gives whole loaves, in order to avoid disharmony.

(b) Nor does he permit all the residents to give pieces of bread - because eventually, some people will revert to giving whole loaves, and we will be landed with the same situation as we began with.

(a) When Rebbi Yonoson ben Shaul permits a loaf from which Challah has been taken, he is referring to the Shiur Challah (i.e. one forty-eighth) of a baker, who bakes the bread to sell ; whereas the Beraisa, which invalidates it, is referring to the Shiur Challah (i.e. one twenty-fourth) of an individual, who bakes it to eat.

(b) He also permits an Eruv from which a Kedei Dimu'a was taken - this refers to a dough which is made from Chulin into which more than a hundredth of Terumah fell. If, after baking the dough, the hundreth is removed, Rebbi Yonoson ben Shaul maintains that Rebbi Yehoshua will permit it.

(c) Rebbi Yehoshua agrees that a loaf that is joined together using a splinter of wood, is eligible for Eruvei Chatzeros - provided the joint is not discernable.

(a)

1. A rice-loaf is eligible for Eruvei Chatzeros ...
2. a millet-loaf is not.

(b) They threw a loaf made of lentils to a dog - who declined to eat it. Fom there they contended that a lentil-loaf is invalid for Eruvei Chatzeros.

(c) The Gemara rejects that proof - either because the bread concerned, contained other kinds of grain too - e.g. millet and spelt; or because that particular loaf had been roasted in excrement, either of which render it most distasteful even for canine consumption.

(d) When Hashem said to Yechezkel "ve'Ugas *Se'orim* Te'achlenah" - he did not mean a barley-cake (as would appear at first sight). What he was telling him was - to take a cake and to eat it 'le'Shiurin' (i.e. in small measured quantities, hungrily and not to satisfaction). Alternatively, Hashem meant that Yechezkel should prepare the cake in the way that they would prepare barley-cakes (not nicely formed, since it was generally considered animal-food), not in the form of well-shaped and nicely-rounded wheat-cakes.

(a) The Chachamim disagree with Rebbi Eliezer (who permits a resident of a Mavoy to give a Ma'ah to a store-keeper or to a baker to acquire for him his portion in the Shituf Mavu'os) - because they hold that money does not acquire.

(b) Nor will it make any difference if the store-keeper specifically includes him in the Eruv together with the other residents - since the store-keeper is not giving *him* a free gift (although this may well be the case with reagrd to the other residents), but his money's-worth, and the fact remains that money does not acquire.

(c) 'u'Modim be'Sha'ar Kol Adam she'Zachu Lo Ma'osav' - means that by by a Sheli'ach who is *not* a store-keeper, under exactly the same circumstances, he *will* acquire a portion in the Eruv.

(d) This is because someone who is not a store-keeper, and who is not accustomed to selling loaves, really means to be Mezakeh him in the Eruv - not just for his money, but to do him a favor. Consequently, we consider it as if he would have said to the Sheli'ach 'Please be Me'arev on my behalf' (without mentioning the money) - a Lashon that would have been effective even by a store-keeper.

6) Rebbi Eliezer renders the Eruv valid for someone who has merely given money for it - because since, min ha'Torah, money *is* Koneh, Chazal reinstated the Din Torah for the sake of Tikun Shabbos. This is similar to the Mishnah in Chulin, where, four times a year, the Tana obligates a Shochet (butcher) to Shecht for even *one* purchaser who bought no more than a Dinar's worth.

7)

(a) The four days in the year when one obligates the butcher to Shecht the animal -irrespective of its value - even if only *one* person purchased a small part of it, are Erev Pesach, Erev Shavu'os, Erev Rosh ha'Shanah and Erev Shemini Atzeres.

(b) If, as Rav Huna claims, he actually made a separate Kinyan on the animal - why should the Din be confined to these four days? Why should it not extend to all the days of the year?

(c) On those four days, explains the Gemara, it is a Zechus for the purchaser, since everybody eats meat then (despite the fact that it now obligates him to pay); whereas during the rest of the year, it cannot be considered purely a Zechus, since against the advantage of acquiring meat, he becomes obligated to pay, and one cannot obligate someone without his consent.

(d) Rebbi Yochanan holds that on these four days, Chazal reinstated the original Torah-law - that money is Koneh (and it is only mi'de'Rabbanan that 'Meshichah' - moving the object - is required).

9) When Shmuel says that if, instead of giving the store-keeper *money*, he gives him *a vessel* - he means that he made a Kinyan Sudar (also known as Chalipin). Since this is a valid Kinyan, he will acquire a part of the Eruv.

10)

(a) When Rav Yehudah quoting Shmuel, rules like Rebbi Yehudah throughout Eruvin - he meant literally, with regard to the Dinim of Eruvin, but not to the Dinim of 'Mechitzos'. Consequently, his ruling will not incorporate the Machlokes concerning a Mavoy whose' Koros' broke on Shabbos, which, according to Rebbi Yehudah, remains permitted for that Shabos.

(b)By ruling like Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah, who adds to the opinion of the Tana Kama 'Bameh Devarim Amurim', he insinuates that the Tana Kama argue. Now, according to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, the Lashon 'Bameh Devarim Amurim' signifies that Rebbi Yehudah is not disputing the words of the Tana Kama, but only qualifying them?

(c) The Gemara retorts 'Gavra a'Gavra Karamis'? How can one ask a Kashya from Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi on to Shmuel, who has the right to disagree with him? According to Shmuel, 'Bameh Devarim Amurim' does not necessarily mean that Rebbi Yehudah comes to qualify and not to argue.

(d) In our Mishnah, explains the Gemara (according to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi), the Tana Kama agrees with Rebbi Yehudah, that Eruv Chatzeros does not need the participants' consent; the Mishnah above, 'Nisosfu Aleihen (Diyurin) Mosif, u'Mezakeh ve'Tzarich le'Hodi'a' - is speaking when the Chatzer lies between two Mavu'os. There, the consent of the residents is required, because how do we know which Mavoy they want to join?