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Eruvin 37

37b

QUESTION: Rava says that Rebbi Shimon holds of the principle of Bereirah ("Yesh Bereirah"), and that the only reason why it does not work to separate Terumah by saying, "The wine which I separate tomorrow from the rest is now Terumah," is because the Terumah right now is not distinguishable from the rest of the wine. In order for Terumah to be separated, it must be distinguishable from the rest of the produce from which it was taken ("Reishis she'Sheyareha Nikarin"). If one cannot actually see the Terumah as detached from the rest, one's declaration to separate Terumah is meaningless.

Abaye challenges Rava's assertion that the Terumah must be distinguishable at the time that it is separated. If a person has two pomegranates of Tevel and he says that the one on the left will be Terumah for the one on the right if it rains tomorrow, and the one on the right will be Terumah for the one on the left if it does not rain tomorrow, one of them is certainly Terumah even though at the time of his declaration, the Terumah is not distinguishable.

What is Abaye's question on Rava? Prior to Rava's explanation, we assumed that Rebbi Shimon was of the opinion that Bereirah does *not* work ("Ein Bereirah"), because of his ruling in the case of the Terumah in the wine. If Rebbi Shimon holds "Ein Bereirah," though, the same problem with the pomegranates will exist! Abaye's question is not only on Rava's way of understanding Rebbi Shimon, it is on *any* way of understanding Rebbi Shimon! (TOSFOS DH ELA)

ANSWERS:

(a) The TOSFOS HA'ROSH answers that the Gemara thought that if Rebbi Shimon holds "Ein Bereirah," that is only when the future contingency is dependent upon the *person's own* future action. When, however, it is dependent upon another's action, or the weather, then perhaps Rebbi Shimon will agree that Bereirah works (such as in the case of the pomegranates). (The Gemara in Gitin 25b is the source for such a distinction.)

(b) TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ adds that perhaps even if Rebbi Shimon holds "Ein Bereirah," that applies only if one makes the event dependent on something that *man can accomplish*. But if one makes it dependent on something that occurs by natural causes, such as rain, then everyone will agree that Bereirah works.

(c) TOSFOS (DH Ela) answers in the name of the MAHARI that the view of "Ein Bereirah" does not mean that the present event does *not* take effect at all, regardless of whether or not the future contingency occurs. Rather, it *does* take effect, but in such a way that we do not know *how* or on *what* it takes effect.

Therefore, in the case of the two pomegranates, if Bereirah works, then when tomorrow comes (and it rains or does not rain) we will know exactly which fruit is Terumah. If Bereirah does not work, then once again one pomegranate is certainly Terumah for the other, but we do not know *which one* is Terumah. Therefore a Kohen may certainly eat the pomegranates, because one of them is Terumah and the other is Chulin, and neither one is Tevel anymore. However, if there is a requirement that the Terumah be distinguishable in order to be Terumah, then the Terumah does not take effect *at all* because the requirement of "Reishis she'Sheyareha Nikarin" was not fulfilled, and both fruits are still Tevel. That is why Abaye's question was only on Rava, for according to Rava, in the case of the pomegranates the Terumah does not take effect at all and even a Kohen cannot eat them.

RASHI in a number of places appears to be of this opinion. If Bereirah does not work, then the action that the person wants to take effect *does* take effect, but we are not sure in which way it takes effect. (On 37a, in the case of a person who separates Kinim, Rashi DH l'Eizeh says that if Bereirah does not work, we do not say that neither bird is a Chatas nor an Olah, but rather we say that perhaps the one that he thinks is a Chatas is really an Olah, and vice versa. Rashi says this more clearly in Chulin 14a, DH Osrin, and other places.)

QUESTION: According to the Mahari and Rashi, how do we understand the Gemara earlier? The Gemara said that Rebbi Yosi cannot hold "Ein Bereirah," because we find that Rebbi Yosi rules that in a case where someone says "the Ma'aser will be Mechulal on whichever coin that will come up in my hand," the Chilul takes effect on whichever coin comes up. The Gemara understands from there that it must be that Rebbi Yosi holds that Bereirah works. How does the Gemara know that? According to the explanation of the Mahari and Rashi, even if he holds that Bereirah does *not* work, the Ma'aser is certainly Mechulal -- we just do not know on which coin it is Mechulal! Why does the Gemara say that since Rebbi Yosi says the Ma'aser is Mechulal then he must hold of Bereirah?

ANSWER: RASHI (DH Rebbi Yosi Omer) implies that when the person says "whichever coin that comes up" will be Ma'aser, he does not mean that *any* coin in his pocket may become Ma'aser Sheni and whichever one he happens to pick out is the one that becomes Ma'aser Sheni. Rather, he means, "I have a few coins in my pocket that I want to be used for Chilul Ma'aser Sheni; if one of them comes out of my pocket the first it should be Mechalel the Ma'aser. However, I have other coins in my pocket which I do not want to be used for Ma'aser at all. Even if these come out of my pocket first I do not want them to become Ma'aser."

As a result, the question is not only on *which* coin the Ma'aser was Mechulal, but whether it was Mechulal *at all*, since there is a possibility that he will take out a coin which he did not want to become Ma'aser at all. Since Rebbi Yosi holds that Chilul of the Ma'aser does take effect, it must be that he indeed holds "Yesh Bereirah." (M. Kornfeld)