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1)

(a) Our Mishnah rules that - although someone who Shechts on Shabbos or on Yom Kipur - is Chayav Kareis, his Shechitah is nevertheless Kasher.

(b) Rav Huna, quoting ... in the name of Rav ruled - that the animal is nevertheless forbidden on that day, causing the B'nei Yeshiva to establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Yehudah.

(c) Even though there is no way in which he will be permitted to cook it, the Tana nevertheless needs to teach us that the animal is forbidden for the duration of Shabbos - where the owner intends to eat it raw.

(d) Rav derives his statement - from the fact that the Tana mentions Yom Kipur together with Shabbos, to teach us that, like Yom Kipur, it may not be eaten for the duration of that day.

(a) Rebbi Aba suggests that Rav is referring to Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah in Beitzah, where the Tana Kama permits cutting up a pumpkin for an animal or a carcass for dogs, on Shabbos. Rebbi Yehudah - forbids it, unless it died before Shabbos.

(b) That ties up with Rav's ruling - inasmuch as here, like there, the animal is Muktzah because it was not ready for human consumption when Shabbos entered, and therefore remains forbidden the whole Shabbos, just like it is there.

(c) Abaye rejects Rebbi Aba's connection however, in that - whereas there, the pumpkin was originally designated for human consumption, and is now being used for animals, in our Mishnah, the animal was originally designated for human consumption, and that is what it is being used for now.

(d) We try to refute Abaye's distinction - by arguing that an animal in its lifetime stands to be used for rearing babies (and not for eating, as we originally thought), which places it on a par with the pumpkin, in that when Shabbos came in, it was designated for rearing children and is Muktzah because it now became fit for human consumption.

(a) The problem with this is - if Rebbi Yehudah really holds that an animal is Muktzah because it is designated for rearing babies, then how could he possibly eat meat on Yom-Tov (which is a Mitzvah de'Rabbanan)?

(b) We answer that an animal is designated both for rearing and for eating. That explains ...

1. ... Rebbi Yehudah eating meat on Yom-Tov - since the moment it is Shechted (before Yom-Tov) it becomes clarified retroactively that it was designated to be eaten ('B'reirah').
2. ... why the animal is Muktzah in our Mishnah, according to Rav - because when Shabbos entered without the animal having been Shechted, it became clarified retroactively that it was designated for rearing babies.

(c) We reject this answer however, on the grounds - that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of 'B'reirah' as we shall now prove.

(a) We try to prove that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of 'B'reirah', by citing a Beraisa, which discusses someone who purchased a hundred Lugin of wine from Kutim just before Shabbos. He is obligated to separate - two Lugin for Terumah Gedolah, a fraction less than ten Lugin for Ma'aser Rishon and a little more than that less than ten Lugin for Ma'aser Sheini.

(b) Rebbi Meir rules that - the purchaser is obligated to separate ...

1. ... Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon - after Shabbos. After designating the Terumah and Ma'aser verbally immediately, he may drink from the wine on Shabbos, leaving over sufficient to separate what he designated, after Shabbos.
2. ... Ma'aser Sheini - by transferring the Kedushah of Ma'aser Sheini immediately on to a Ma'aser Sheini coin.

(c) The Chachamim did not allow him to rely on Bereirah with regard to Ma'aser Sheini, like they do by Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon - since it is possible to redeem it there and then.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Shimon - forbid the purchaser to rely on B'reirah (and if he is unable to separate the Ma'asros before Shabbos comes in, then he is not permitted to drink the wine until after Shabbos), presumably because they hold 'Ein B'reirah'.

(b) We counter this proof however - on the basis of the reason that they themselves gave in the Beraisa - where they asked Rebbi Meir whether he is not afraid that the bottle containing the wine which is left over, breaks before the owner has had a chance to separate Terumah (in which case, he will have eaten Tevel [and not because they do not hold of B'reirah]).

(c) Rebbi Meir replied - that he will worry about that when the bottle breaks.

6)

(a) So we quote Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa cited by Ayo, with reference to another Beraisa. The Chachamim there rule that someone who places an Eruv on the east side of the town and one on the west ...

1. ... because he is not sure on which side the Chacham who will Darshen on Shabbos will arrive - and stipulates that whichever Eruv is required should take effect, the appropriate Eruv will indeed take effect (retroactively, due to the principle of 'B'reirah').
2. ... in a case where two Chachamim are arriving, and he has not yet decided which D'rashah he will attend - again a similar stipulation will take effect, when he makes his choice on Shabbos.

(b) Rebbi Yehudah there disagrees with the latter ruling, but agrees with the former one.

(c) Rebbi Yehudah's distinction is difficult to understand - seeing as the former case involves B'reirah, no less than the latter one.

(d) Rebbi Yochanan therefore establishes the Beraisa when the Chachamim concerned had already arrived when Shabbos came in.

(a) Rebbi Yochanan's interpretation of the Beraisa refutes the proof that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah - because his reason in either case no longer has anything to do with B'reirah (since the stipulation is based on a lack of knowledge, which has nothing to do with B'reirah, and his reason in the Seifa is because one is not permitted to make two contradictory Eruvin simultaneously, only either one or the other.

(b) Rav Yosef connects Rav to a Mishnah in Shabbos, which discusses the Din of broken vessels on Shabbos. The Tana Kama permits the use of such vessels that broke - provided they can still be used (e.g. broken pieces of a kneading-trough to cover a barrel, and broken pieces of glass to cover a jar).

(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah - they must be potentially usable for a task similar to the one for which they were originally made (e.g. broken pieces of a kneading-trough to contain a stew, and broken pieces of glass, oil.

(d) This will explain Rav's ruling, forbidding the Shechted animal for the duration of Shabbos - since in the same way, the Shechted animal too, which was fit for plowing in its lifetime, becomes fit only for eating once it is Shechted, and ought therefore to be Muktzah.

(a) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's explanation however, on the grounds that - whereas on the one hand, a vessel that breaks on Shabbos and that cannot be used for a similar task to its original one, is 'Nolad'; on the other hand, an animal in its lifetime (which is designated for eating, as we explained earlier) is already considered a food, and Shechting it is like breaking up a food into pieces ('Uchla de'Ifras'), which Rebbi Yehudah does not consider Muktzah.

(b) So we turn to a Mishnah in Shabbos. The Tana Kama there rules - that ...

1. ... squeezing fruit is prohibited on Shabbos?
2. ... liquid that seeped out of food by itself on Shabbos is forbidden (to prevent the owner from squeezing it Lechatchilah on Shabbos).

(c) Rebbi Yehudah qualifies the Tana Kama's ruling - by confining it to fruit that was designated for its liquid. Juice that seeped from fruit that was designated to eat, is permitted.

(d) According to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - Rebbi Yehudah concedes to the Chachamim that the juice that seeped out from baskets of grapes and olives is forbidden, even if they were designated to eat - because most people designate them for their liquid (and we are afraid that this owner too, will change his mind and squeeze them for their liquid). By the same token, Rebbi Yehudah will forbid the Shechted animal on Shabbos, to prevent the owner from Shechting it Lechatchilah on Shabbos.

(a) We reject this explanation however, on the basis of the fact that it is Rav's statement that we are attempting to corroborate - and Rav specifically stated that Rebbi Yehudah did not differentiate between other fruit and grapes and olives ...

(b) ... leaving us with the problem as to which Rebbi Yehudah Rav is referring to.

(a) So Rav Sheishes (perhaps it ought to be Rav Shisha) b'rei de'Rav Idi cites a Beraisa in Shabbos, where Rebbi Yehudah allows moving a new earthenware lamp - but not a new one, because it is 'Muktzah Machmas Miy'us'. This is due to the fact that people tend to be Maktzeh it (remove it from their minds [the source of Muktzah]) because it is ugly.

(b) Likewise, we assume that, according to Rebbi Yehudah, they are also Maktzeh live animals when Shabbos enters, precisely because of the Isur Shechitah.

(c) We refute this proof too, however - by suggesting that it is not because Rebbi Yehudah holds 'Muktzah Machmas Miy'us', that he must also hold of 'Muktzah Machmas Isur'.

(d) And similarly, we refute the proof (that Rebbi Yehudah is the one who is stringent with regard to Muktzah), from another Beraisa, where he forbids moving a lamp that was lit on that Shabbos (even after it has gone out, because of 'Muktzah Machmas Mitzvah' - by suggesting that Rebbi Yehudah is stringent there only because the owner was physically Maktzeh the lamp, but it does not follow that he is equally stringent by an animal, whose Muktzah would be automatic.