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Chulin, 134

1) ONE WHO SELLS A "KEIVAH"

QUESTION: The Mishnah (132a) teaches that if one Yisrael buys the innards (including the Keivah) of the cow of another Yisrael (by weight), the buyer must give the Keivah to a Kohen, and he does not pay the butcher for its weight. In the Gemara, Rav states that the buyer is responsible only when it was he who weighed the meat. If the butcher weighed the meat, then he is responsible for giving the Keivah to the Kohen, since he is the one who is considered to have taken it away from the Kohen.

What difference does it make who put the meat on the scale? The butcher sold the Kohen's portion to the buyer, and he should be responsible whether or not he weighed the meat!

ANSWER: The Halachah does not hold a person responsible for theft (in this case, stealing the Keivah from the Kohen) unless he makes a Kinyan on the object that was stolen. If the butcher simply decides to sell the Kohen's portion at some point, it does not make him a thief. This is why he cannot be responsible for the theft of the Keivah unless he physically picks it up and places it on the scale. (Accordingly, if he picks it up and gives it directly to the buyer, he would also be responsible for the theft, even though he did not weigh the stomach, as long as he picks it up before the buyer does.) (M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: The Mishnah (132a) teaches that if one Yisrael buys the innards (including the Keivah) of the cow of another Yisrael (by weight), the buyer must give the Keivah to a Kohen, and he does not pay the butcher for its weight. In the Gemara, Rav states that the buyer is responsible only when it was he who weighed the meat. If the butcher weighed the meat, then he is responsible for giving the Keivah to the Kohen, since he is the one who is considered to have taken it away from the Kohen.

Rav Asi argues and says that even when the butcher weighed the meat, he is not responsible. The Gemara concludes that Rav Asi maintains that the "Matnos Kehunah cannot be stolen," while Rav maintains that they can be stolen.

Why should Matnos Kehunah be different from any other object? If one is held responsible for stealing another person's animal, then why is he not held responsible for stealing the Keivah of Matnos Kehunah?

ANSWER: The Gemara earlier (130b) quotes Rav Chisda who rules that one who damages the Kohen's portion is exempt from paying for damages. The Gemara gives two reasons for Rav Chisda's ruling. First, the verse (Devarim 18:3) teaches that only the actual Matnos Kehunah must be given to a Kohen, but not compensation for them. Second, since there is no claimant (the owner may give the gifts to any Kohen he chooses), one is exempt from paying for them. Hence, they are "Mamon she'Ein Lo Tov'im" -- a debt that has no legal claimants.

Accordingly, the Gemara here -- which discusses compensating a Kohen for a Keivah of Matnos Kehunah -- must be discussing a stomach that is still present (b'Ein) and has not been eaten or destroyed, as TOSFOS (end of DH d'Mar) points out. As RASHI (DH Aval) explains, the question that the Gemara discusses is whose responsibility is it to bring the Keivah to a Kohen; may the Kohen demand it from the buyer, or is it the butcher's responsibility to go to the buyer, reclaim the Keivah, and return it to the Kohen?

Since this is the subject of the Machlokes between Rav and Rav Asi, Rav Asi's logic for saying that Matnos Kehunah cannot be stolen may be as follows. A thief is responsible to return the *value* of a stolen object to its original owner. If the object is still in existence and can be returned whole to its original owner, it cannot be the responsibility of another person to take that object from the person in whose possession the object presently rests and return it to its owner. This remains the sole responsibility of the one who is in possession of the object. (That is, a Kinyan Gezeilah can make the thief responsible only for the value of the stolen object, but not for the object itself.) (M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that when a Nochri converts and there is a doubt whether his animal was slaughtered before his conversion (and he is exempt from giving Matnos Kehunah) or after his conversion (and he is obligated to give Matnos Kehunah), he is exempt because of the rule, "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah."

Reish Lakish questions this Mishnah from a Mishnah in Pe'ah (4:11). The Mishnah there states that when grain was found in an ant hole in a field that was not yet harvested, the landowner may keep it (and it is not assumed to be Leket that fell during harvesting). When, however, it was found in an ant hole in a field that was already harvested, then the Rabanan rule that the grain resting on top of the ant hole must be left for the poor as Leket, while the owner may keep the grain that is inside the holes. Rebbi Meir argues and says that even the grain inside the holes must be left for the poor, because Safek Leket is considered Leket, and we do not apply the rule of "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah."

Why does Reish Lakish question the Mishnah here from the words of Rebbi Meir? The Rabanan, who argue with Rebbi Meir and exempt the owner from giving the produce from the bottom of the ant holes, presumably because "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah," support the Mishnah here!

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH u'Reminhi) explains that even according to the Rabanan, the owner of the field does not keep the produce at the bottom of the ant holes because of the rule of "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah." Rather, it is assumed that such produce is *definitely* not Leket, and there is no doubt as to its status. The produce on the top of the ant holes must be given to the Kohen, because of a *doubt* whether it is Leket or whether it was brought there by the ants before the harvesting. Therefore, both Rebbi Meir and the Rabanan seem to contradict Rebbi Yochanan's statement.

QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that when a Nochri converts and there is a doubt whether his animal was slaughtered before his conversion (and he is exempt from giving Matnos Kehunah) or after his conversion (and he is obligated to give Matnos Kehunah), he is exempt because of the rule, "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah." Reish Lakish questions this Mishnah from a Mishnah in Pe'ah (4:11). The Mishnah there states that when grain was found in an ant hole in a field that was not yet harvested, the landowner may keep it (and it is not assumed to be Leket that fell during harvesting). When, however, it was found in an ant hole in a field that was already harvested, then the Rabanan rule that the grain resting on top of the ant hole must be left for the poor as Leket, while the owner may keep the grain that is inside the holes. Rebbi Meir argues and says that even the grain inside the holes must be left for the poor, because Safek Leket is considered Leket, and we do not apply the rule of "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Re'ayah" (see previous Insight)

Rava states that there is a difference between a doubt regarding the Matnos Kehunah of a convert, and a doubt regarding produce found in ant holes. The animal of a convert has a Chazakah that it is exempt from Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah, and therefore, when there is a doubt, he is exempt from giving them to a Kohen. In contrast, the produce of a Jew's field has a Chazakah that it is obligated in Leket, and when there is a doubt one must give the produce to the poor.

How can there be a Chazakah that produce found in ant holes is Leket? While it is true that produce that fell while being harvested becomes Leket, there is no reason to assume that any produce was dropped and that the produce in the ant hole is from that produce!

Moreover, if the produce found in the ant holes must given to the poor because of a Chazakah, then why does Reish Lakish find it necessary to prove that it is given to the poor because of the verse, "You shall not favor a poor person when judging him" (Shemos 23:3), which implies that you shall favor him from your own funds.

ANSWER: It seems that the second question answers the first. Produce found in ant hole indeed has no actual Chazakah of Leket. The reason why it is given to the poor is because of the verse. The only reason why a Chazakah is mention with regard to the produce is to explain why it is more logical to assume that the verse is referring to the produce in ant holes of a Jew's field than to the Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah of a convert's animals. We know that the obligation of Leket rests on the field, while we are not sure that any obligation of Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah applies to the convert's animal. Therefore, it is more logical to apply the verse to the case of produce in ant holes. (M. Kornfeld)

134b

QUESTION: The Gemara relates that in Levi's area, there were no poor people to take Leket from his field. Levi came before Rav Sheshes and asked him what the Halachah is in such a case. Rav Sheshes answered that we learn from the verse, "l'Ani vela'Ger Ta'azov Osam" -- "to the poor and the convert you shall leave them" (Vayikra 19:10), that one is required to leave the Matnos Aniyim only for the poor, but not for ravens and bats.

However, the Gemara in Bava Metzia (21b) derives this ruling from a different source. The Gemara there quotes the Mishnah in Pe'ah (8:1) that teaches that everyone is permitted to take Matnos Aniyim after the "Nemushos" have already passed. According to Rebbi Yochanan there, "Nemushos" refers to the old, poor people who comb the field slowly to make sure that they did not miss anything. According to Reish Lakish, "Nemushos" refers to the ones who pile everything in front of them. The Gemara in Bava Metzia is discussing the issue of whether "Yi'ush she'Lo mi'Da'as" is considered Yi'ush or not (that is, whether or not a person may keep for himself a loss object that he found before the owner realizes that he lost it). The Gemara there cites this Mishnah as proof that Yi'ush she'Lo mi'Da'as *is* considered Yi'ush, since the Leket is the money of all poor people, in all places. Even though the poor people who do not live in this area do not know about the Leket such that they should despair of getting it, the Mishnah says that anyone, even those who are not poor, may take it once the Nemushos have passed. This apparently shows that Yi'ush she'Lo mi'Da'as is considered Yi'ush.

The Gemara there answers that the poor people in other places have Yi'ush *earlier*, since they know that the poor people in that place will take whatever grain is there, just as they take whatever is available in their area.

The Gemara there seems to be saying that the reason why one may take Matnos Aniyim is because all of the poor people already had Yi'ush and it is now Hefker, while the Gemara here says that it is because of the verse, "l'Ani vela'Ger Ta'azov Osam"! How are we to reconcile these Gemaras?

ANSWER:

(a) The KOVETZ SHI'URIM (2:17) writes that in order to answer this question, we must understand how Matnos Aniyim work. Are Matnos Aniyim the property of all poor people, collectively, and if a wealthy person takes it he is effectively stealing from the poor, just as a non-Kohen who takes Matnos Kehunah is stealing from the Kohanim? Alternatively, are Matnos Aniyim property of Hefker, but which only poor people are permitted to take? The Kovetz Shi'urim proves from a Yerushalmi that Matnos Aniyim are not owned by the poor people, but are Hefker that only poor people may take. Consequently, a wealthy person who improperly takes such Matanos is not stealing from the poor, but rather he is transgressing the verse of "l'Ani vela'Ger Ta'azov Osam."

Since Matnos Aniyim is not the property of the poor, why does the Gemara in Bava Metzia attempt to prove from the Mishnah regarding Matnos Aniyim a law with regard to Yi'ush? Yi'ush is relevant only when the person *owns* the object. It is obvious that giving up hope of retrieving one's object can be considered as a form of relinquishing one's ownership only when one *owns* the object! Why, then, does the Gemara in Bava Metzia say that the Yi'ush of poor people relinquishes their right to collect Leket?

The Kovetz Shi'urim explains that this is not the intention of the Gemara in Bava Metzia. The Gemara there realizes that the argument regarding Yi'ush she'Lo mi'Da'as is relevant to a much broader extent than merely to the laws of relinquishing ownership. It is relevant to any situation in which a person's attitude can effect a change in a status, such as poor people deciding not to collect Leket, whereby their decision removes the status of the Leket from the produce (because of the verse of "l'Ani vela'Ger"). In such a situation, is it enough to know that the person would have that attitude if he was aware of the situation, or does he actually need to have that attitude in order for it to have an effect? In an attempt to resolve this question, the Gemara in Bava Metzia discusses the case of Leket, where it seems that the poor people do not actually need to think that they will no longer collect the Leket. The true source for the termination of their rights to collect is the verse of "l'Ani vela'Ger," as the Gemara here says. (See also Insights to Bava Metzia 21:2.) (Y. Montrose)

OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes the "Dorshei Chamuros" (those who expound the difficult verses) who explain that the Matnos Kehunah correspond to the actions of Pinchas. When he killed Zimri and Kozbi, he took a spear in his right hand, to which the Zero'a -- the right foreleg -- corresponds. The Lechayayim (jaw) corresponds to the prayer of Pinchas that he uttered with his mouth. The Keivah (stomach) corresponds to his act of stabbing the sinners with his spear through their stomachs.

Are the "Dorshei Chamuros" answering the Gemara's earlier question, how do we know that the Zero'a that is given is the *right* foreleg, or are they giving an unrelated Derashah?

(a) RASHI DH (Hayu Omrim) explains that the Gemara is giving another source for giving the right foreleg, and not the left, to the Kohen. They are called "Dorshei Chamuros," because they explain difficult verses, which, in this case, is the verse that does not specify which foreleg to give. It is assumed that Pinchas used his right hand to kill the sinners, since most people are right-handed. (Moreover, Pinchas was a Kohen, and the Gemara in Bechoros (45b) says that a left-handed Kohen may not serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash.)

(b) TOSFOS (DH Dorshei Chamuros) translates quotes the ARUCH in the name of RAV SA'ADYAH GA'ON who explains "Dorshei Chamuros" differently. These words mean "those who explain the consequences of actions," such as the action of Pinchas when he killed the sinners. According to Tosfos, the Derashah is merely explaining how Pinchas merited to receive the Zero'a, Lechayayim, and Keivah, and it is not related to the previous discussion of the Gemara. (M. Kornfeld)