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Chulin, 73
CHULIN 73 (14 Nisan) - dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Chayah bas Aryeh Leib
Shpira (nee Sole), on the day of her Yahrzeit.
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1) IMMERSING A VESSEL WITH A LONG HANDLE
QUESTION: The Gemara cites the Mishnah in Mikva'os (10:5) that teaches that
when a person intends to shorten the long handle of vessel, he must immerse
the vessel only until the point on the handle at which he plans to cut it.
The Rishonim ask that if he is planning to remove the additional length of
handle, then that length constitutes a "Mi'ut ha'Makpid" -- a small,
intervening substance that one is conscientious about removing. Accordingly,
it is a Chatzitzah when immersing the vessel in a Mikvah, and the immersion
should not be valid! (The RASHBA here leaves this question unanswered.)
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (DH Matbil) answers that the Mishnah in Mikva'os is discussing a
vessel that has a handle that is comprised of numerous links, like those in
a chain, and thus there is no Chatzitzah between each link.
(b) The RASH and ROSH (Mikva'os 10:5) understand that the Mishnah there is
discussing a vessel that has a handle that is one unit, and not links. They
explain instead that with regard to vessels, there is no law of a Chatzitzah
for Beis ha'Setarim (the part of the vessel that is covered by the
intervening substance is concealed).
(c) The OR ZARU'A (Hilchos Nidah #462) answers that only a foreign substance
constitutes a Chatzitzah, such as dough under one's fingernails. In
contrast, additional parts of the same material as the object being immersed
does not constitute a Chatzitzah (this is why one's fingernail, in theory,
could be any length and the additional length would not be considered a
Chatzitzah for the Tevilah).
(d) The CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN (DH Matbil) explains that we consider an object to
be a Chatzitzah only when the person is conscientious about it at the time
of the Tevilah. If, however, he is planning to remove the addition only
later, then he is not considered to be "Makpid" and the object is not
considered a Chatzitzah. (Z. Wainstein)
2) COMPARING A DANGLING LIMB TO A PROTRUDING LIMB
QUESTION: In the Mishnah (72a), Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue about
whether the Shechitah of the mother removes the Tum'ah of the fetus (from
which a protruding limb was cut after the Shechitah). Reish Lakish and Rebbi
Yochanan argue about the extent of the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and the
Chachamim. In the Gemara's first version of the argument between Reish
Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish asserts that their Machlokes applies
to an "Ever ha'Meduldal" (a limb dangling from a live animal) as well. Just
as Rebbi Meir maintains that the Shechitah of the mother is not Metaher the
fetal limb that was protruding, so, too, the Shechitah of an animal is not
Metaher the limb that dangles from it. Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the
Machlokes is only in the case of the limb of a fetus; both Rebbi Meir and
the Chachamim agree that Shechitah makes a dangling limb into Ever Min
ha'Chai ("Nipul"), as if it fell off while the animal was alive, and it is
Tamei.
Rebbi Yochanan's reasoning is that in the case of a protruding limb, the
Shechitah of the mother is Metaher the limb because it could have become
permitted had the fetus returned the limb to the womb before the Shechitah.
In contrast, a dangling limb is irreversible, and thus everyone agrees that
it is considered Neveilah.
RASHI (DH b'Chazarah) explains that Rebbi Yochanan is consistent with his
own view earlier (68b) that when a protruding limb returned to the womb
before Shechitah, the Shechitah permits it to be eaten.
Rashi himself is consistent with his explanation of Rebbi Yochanan's opinion
there. Rashi there (see Insights to Chulin 68:2) explains that Rebbi
Yochanan's opinion in the second version is the same as his opinion in the
first version. Rebbi Yochanan says that the limb that exits the womb and
then returns to it is not prohibited.
However, the other Rishonim there (see Insights there) explain that, in the
second version, Rebbi Yochanan agrees that the limb remains prohibited when
it is retracted back into the womb! How, then, do they explain Rebbi
Yochanan's reasoning here? The protruding limb should be no different than
the dangling limb, since it will never become permitted!
ANSWERS:
(a) The RASHBA (68b, DH b'Pumbedisa) asks this question. He quotes
"Raboseinu Ba'alei ha'Tosfos" who suggest that perhaps Rebbi Yochanan here
means that even though returning to the womb would not permit the limb to be
eaten, returning to the womb would remove Tum'as Neveilah from the limb.
The RASHBA rejects this approach, because Rebbi Yochanan here is discussing
the view of the Chachamim. He says that the Chachamim would be Metamei an
Ever ha'Meduldal, even though they maintain that the protruding limb becomes
Tahor when the mother is slaughtered. The Chachamim maintain that the Tum'ah
of the protruding limb is removed with the Shechitah of the mother, even
without it having to return to the womb! The RASHBA leaves the question
unresolved.
(b) The ROSH (4:1) explains that when the Gemara here says that Rebbi
Yochanan maintains that the limb becomes permitted to be eaten when it
returns to the womb, it is following only the first version of Rebbi
Yochanan's opinion earlier (68b). (Accordingly, the Gemara here is not in
accordance with the Halachic opinion. This is not difficult, though, because
this version of the argument between Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan is not
the conclusive version.)
73b
3) THE PROHIBITION OF "EVER HA'MEDULDAL"
OPINIONS: The Gemara cites a Beraisa that learns from the verse, "Do not eat
meat that is torn in the fields" (Shemos 22:30), that even "a limb and flesh
that dangles" of a domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird that is
slaughtered is forbidden. Rabah bar bar Chanah in the name of Rebbi Yochanan
says that there is "only a Mitzvah to separate from it" ("Mitzvas Perosh
Bilvad").
What is Rebbi Yochanan's intention when he says that there is a "Mitzvas
Perosh Bilvad"?
(a) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 5:6) writes, "The Ever ha'Meduldal
of an animal -- if it cannot return to the animal and heal, even when it
became detached entirely only after Shechitah -- is forbidden, but one does
not receive Malkus for eating it." As the MAGID MISHNEH (Hilchos Ma'achalos
Asuros 5:11) explains, the Rambam maintains that the Isur of Ever
ha'Meduldal is mid'Oraisa, but since it is derived from a Derashah and is
not written explicitly in the Torah, there is no punishment of Malkus (see
Insights to Nedarim 15:2:b). When the Gemara says that there is a "Mitzvas
Perosh Bilvad," this means that there is an Isur d'Oraisa to eat an Ever
ha'Meduldal, but there is no Malkus for one who does.
(b) RASHI earlier (73a, DH v'Es Ever) explains that an "Ever ha'Meduldal" is
a limb that was cut off but still remains partially joined to the animal.
Such a limb is forbidden to eat, even after a proper Shechitah is done to
the animal.
Rashi here (74a, DH Ein and DH Ela) explains that when Rebbi Yochanan says
that there is a "Mitzvas Perosh Bilvad," he means that the Ever ha'Meduldal
is not forbidden by the Isur of Ever Min ha'Chai, but rather it is forbidden
only mid'Rabanan. The Derashah from the verse that the Gemara here quotes is
only an Asmachta.
TOSFOS (DH Mai) also maintains that the Isur to eat an Ever ha'Meduldal is
only mid'Rabanan.
This is also the ruling of the SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 55:5) who writes that an
Ever ha'Meduldal is Asur mid'Rabanan. The SHACH (YD 55:11) writes that since
it is Asur mid'Rabanan, one may be lenient in a case of doubt.
The Shach writes further that there are Poskim who rule that one may not
give an Ever ha'Meduldal to a Nochri, since it is forbidden to him because
of Ever Min ha'Chai. However, the RASHBA and RAN maintain that since the
Isur for a Jew is only mid'Rabanan, for a Nochri there is no Isur at all.
The ruling of the Rashba and Ran seems to contradict the Gemara later (129a)
in which Rebbi Yochanan says that according to Rebbi Shimon, an Ever
ha'Meduldal is Tahor. It is Tahor because only food that one may feed to
others (i.e. Nochrim) is considered to be food (that can become Tamei).
Since an Ever ha'Meduldal may not be fed to Nochrim, it cannot become Tamei
with Tum'as Ochlin. How can it be that Rebbi Yochanan says both that there
is a "Mitzvas Perosh Bilvad," and that it is Asur to give an Ever
ha'Meduldal to a Nochri? (See CHIDUSHEI REBBI AKIVA EIGER to 73b.)
The CHAZON ISH (YD 4:20) answers that Rebbi Yochanan's statement there
(129a) according to Rebbi Shimon means that "Shechitah Osah Nipul" --
through Shechitah, it is considered as though the limb of the animal fell
off while the animal was still alive, and is thus considered Ever Min
ha'Chai. However, the Halachah follows the opinion that "Ein Shechitah Osah
Nipul" (see RAMBAM, Hilchos She'ar Avos ha'Tum'os 2:5), and thus Ever
ha'Meduldal is not Ever Min ha'Chai, and it is permitted for Nochrim.
(According to this, it appears that the Tosefta at the end of Avodah Zarah
(9:4) that says that Ever ha'Meduldal is prohibited to Nochrim is following
the view that "Shechitah Osah Nipul," which is not the Halachah.) (D. Bloom)
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