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Chulin, 39

1) THE EFFECT OF AN IMPROPER THOUGHT DURING SHECHITAH OF "CHULIN"

QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to prove from the Mishnah that with regard to an animal of Chulin, having intention to perform one act for Avodah Zarah with the animal while doing another act does not prohibit the animal. Rebbi Yosi in the Mishnah (38b) states that there is a Kal v'Chomer from which we learn that when one slaughters an animal for an idolater, the Shechitah is valid. The Kal v'Chomer is as follows. For Kodshim, an improper thought can disqualify the Korban, and yet when one who slaughters a Korban for a person who has improper intentions, the Korban is valid, because we are concerned only with the intention of the one who slaughters the Korban. Accordingly, with regard to the Shechitah of Chulin, which does not become invalidated through an improper thought, certainly we should be concerned only with the intention of the slaughterer!

The Gemara asks what Rebbi Yosi means when he says that a "Machshavah does not disqualify an animal of Chulin." The Gemara asks that this cannot mean that Machshavah never invalidates the Shechitah, because we know that if the slaughterer intends to slaughter the animal for Avodah Zarah, then the animal certainly becomes prohibited.

The TIFERES YAKOV asks why the Gemara does not ask a much more basic question. Rebbi Yosi learns from a Kal v'Chomer from Kodshim that just as we are concerned only with the intention of the one offering the Korban, so, too, we are concerned only with the intention of the one slaughtering the Chulin animal. The basis of the Kal v'Chomer, though, is that Machshavah does not disqualify the Shechitah of Chulin. If Machshavah does not disqualify the Shechitah of Chulin, then how can Rebbi Yosi say that we *do* follow the Machshavah of the slaughterer? Machshavah does not affect the Shechitah of Chulin at all!

ANSWER: The TIFERES YAKOV learns from here an important principle involving the Pesul of Machshavah with regard to Chulin. He writes that there are two ways to understand how an animal of Chulin can become prohibited through a Machshavah of Avodah Zarah. The first way is that the Machshavah makes the animal into *Tikroves Avodah Zarah*, an object that is offered as a sacrifice to an idol. When it is offered to an idol, the animal becomes "Zivchei Mesim" (Tehilim 106:28), which is Asur b'Hana'ah.

The second way in which an animal becomes prohibited through a Machshavah of Avodah Zarah is that the Machshavah *invalidates the Shechitah*, leaving an animal that was not slaughtered properly. While the Heter of Shechitah does not take effect to permit the animal, there is no actual Isur of Avodah Zarah that takes effect on the animal. Consequently, it is forbidden to eat the animal, but it is permitted to derive benefit from the animal. The Tiferes Yakov finds support for these two ways of invalidating a Shechitah through Machshavah for Avodah Zarah in the words of the RAN (8b of the pages of the Rif, DH Garsinan b'Gemara Rav Nachman).

The Tiferes Yakov proves this from the opinion of Rebbi Yosi in our Mishnah. Rebbi Yosi says that we follow only the Machshavah of the Shochet, implying that a Shochet can prohibit the animal with his thought of Avodah Zarah even though he is not the owner of the animal. However, Rebbi Yosi himself says in Kil'ayim (7:4) that if one spreads his grapevines over the wheat field of his neighbor, the field does not become prohibited as Kil'ayim, because "a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him" ("Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo"). How, then, can Rebbi Yosi say that the Shochet can prohibit another person's animal?

It must be that, indeed, the animal does not become Asur b'Hana'ah as Tikroves Avodah Zarah according to Rebbi Yosi, because "Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo." However, the animal will still not be permitted to eat because the Shechitah was not a valid Shechitah due to the invalidating thought of the Shochet.

Based on this, we can understand why the Gemara is not bothered with the inherent contradiction in the words of Rebbi Yosi in the Mishnah. When Rebbi Yosi says that Machshavah does not disqualify the Shechitah of Chulin, he may simply mean that Machshavah cannot make the animal into a Neveilah by disqualifying the Shechitah. However, Machshavah *can* actively prohibit the animal by making it Asur b'Hana'ah as Tikroves Avodah Zarah. Rebbi Yosi is trying to prove that Machshavah can make Tikroves Avodah Zarah only when it is the slaughterer's Machshavah, and not the Machshavah of the one for whom he is slaughtering. His proof is from a Kal v'Chomer. If the Shechitah of a Korban -- which becomes invalidated by a Machshavah ha'Poseles -- can be invalidated only by the one who slaughters it, then certainly the Shechitah of Chulin -- which cannot become invalidated by a Machshavah of Avodah Zarah (such that it will be considered a Neveilah) -- can be made into Tikroves Avodah Zarah only by the one who slaughters it.

The Gemara asks, however, that if Machshavah of Avodah Zarah cannot make an animal of Chulin into a Neveilah, then why does Rebbi Yosi prohibit the animal when the Shochet intends to slaughter the animal for Avodah Zarah, if the animal is not his? According to Rebbi Yosi, a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him, so he cannot make someone else's animal into Tikroves Avodah Zarah! If Rebbi Yosi prohibits it, then it must be because the Shechitah is not valid and the animal is a Neveilah. Thus, his words in the Kal v'Chomer (where he states that Shechitah for Avodah Zarah does not make an animal into a Neveilah, but rather the animal becomes Tikroves Avodah Zarah) contradicts his words at the end of the Mishnah (where he implies that the Shochet *can* prohibit another person's animal by slaughtering it for Avodah Zarah).

It is because of this that the Gemara concludes that indeed Chulin can become Asur as a Neveilah according to Rebbi Yosi, and Rebbi Yosi means only that there is no concept of "Mechashev me'Avodah l'Avodah" for Chulin.

39b

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that when an animal is slaughtered for Avodah Zarah it becomes prohibited. However, this applies only when the animal is *slaughtered* for Avodah Zarah, or when its blood is *sprinkled* for Avodah Zarah. If a person has intention to offer the animal for Avodah Zarah at any other time during its preparation -- such as while collecting its blood in a cup or while carrying its blood -- the animal does not become prohibited.

The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that teaches that if a person performs the *Shechitah* of an animal with the intention of *sprinkling its blood* for Avodah Zarah, then the animal becomes prohibited even if its blood was not actually sprinkled for Avodah Zarah. However, if the person announced his intention to sprinkle the blood for Avodah Zarah only *after* the Shechitah was completed, then the animal is prohibited only mi'Safek, out of doubt, for the following reason. If the person decided to sprinkle the blood for Avodah Zarah only after the Shechitah was completed, then the animal is not prohibited (since there was no intention of Avodah Zarah during the Shechitah, and the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah never actually took place). However, we are concerned that perhaps "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" -- his final action reveals his original intent. Since the person announced (after the Shechitah) that he intends to perform Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, perhaps we should assume that he already had this thought in mind at the time of the Shechitah, and the animal should therefore be forbidden.

How can we say "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" with regard to a person who sins? We never assume that a person who sinned now was also a sinner previously. A Jew has a "Chezkas Kashrus" and is assumed to be a G-d-fearing Jew until the moment that we know for certain that he transgressed. If we were to assume that the person who sins now always was a sinner, than *all* of the animals this person ever slaughtered should retroactively become prohibited! (SEFER HA'ESHKOL)

ANSWERS:

(a) The SEFER HA'ESHKOL asserts that we apply "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" only in this case, because the person intended to sprinkle *this same* animal's blood for Avodah Zarah. Since, at some point, he intended to perform the Zerikah of this animal for Avodah Zarah, we may assume that the Shechitah was done with this intention as well.

The OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Shechitah 2:16) explains this point further. The Sefer ha'Eshkol means to say that we are not assuming that the Shochet had a second intention to sin just because he had one intention to sin. Rather, when the person announces his intention to perform the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, although we do not assume that the Shechitah was performed with intention of *performing the Shechitah* for Avodah Zarah, we do assume that when the Shechitah was performed he planned to do the *Zerikah* for Avodah Zarah, just as he later announced. Obviously, this logic cannot be applied to invalidate the person's earlier Shechitos, since we can assume only that he wanted to perform *this* Zerikah for Avodah Zarah.

(b) HA'GAON RAV Y. S. ELYASHIV shlit'a (quoted in He'oros b'Maseches Chulin) points out another reason why we can apply "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" in this case. RASHI in Sanhedrin (61a, DH v'Ovdeihem) explains that an animal becomes prohibited if its Shechitah is performed with the intention to perform Zerikah of its blood for Avodah Zarah because "Shechitah is a necessary prelude to Zerikah," and "Zerikah cannot be done without Shechitah." That is, we view the Shechitah as the *beginning* of the Zerikah process.

Accordingly, perhaps we apply "Hochi'ach Sofo Al Techilaso" only in this case because the Shechitah and Zerikah are considered part of the same, single act. Therefore, if we know that the one who performed the Shechitah had intention to perform the Zerikah of this animal for Avodah Zarah at some time, we may assume that he had this intention from what is considered to be the beginning of the Zerikah process (i.e. from the time of the Shechitah). In contrast, we cannot assume that a person had intention to perform a sin at an earlier time, before he started the sinful act in which he is presently involved. (M. Kornfeld, Mordechai Zvi Dicker)