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Chulin, 22

1) DERIVING THREE LAWS FROM ONE VERSE

QUESTION: The Gemara states that we learn two Halachos from the verse, "And Aharon will offer the Par ha'Chatas which is his (Asher Lo), and he will attain atonement for himself and for his household, and he will slaughter the Par ha'Chatas which is his (Asher Lo)" (Vayikra 16:11). First, the verse teaches that the Par ha'Chatas that the Kohen Gadol brings on Yom Kipur must be his own, and it cannot be bought with public funds. Second, the verse teaches that Korbanos cannot be brought from Ma'aser, but they must be brought from Chulin. RASHI (DH mi'Shelo v'Lo mi'Shel Tzibur) explains that we learn these two Halachos from the fact that the verse says the words "Asher Lo" twice. Rashi apparently is explaining the Gemara is able to learn two Halachos from one verse because the phrase "Asher Lo" is written twice.

The TUREI EVEN in Chagigah (8a) and other Acharonim question this approach of Rashi. The Gemara in Yoma (51b) and in Shevuos (14a) teaches that three Halachos are learned from the *three* occasions that it says "Asher Lo" (the two in Vayikra 16:11, and one in Vayikra 16:6). These three Halachos are that the Par ha'Chatas cannot come from public funds, it cannot come from the funds of the Kohanim, and this Halachah is absolute (it is "Me'akev"), such that if the Par ha'Chatas is not brought from the private funds of the Kohen Gadol, it is invalid.

The problem is that there are too many laws being derived from the verses. While the Gemara here agrees with the Gemara there that one verse is used to exclude bringing the Par ha'Chatas from public funds, there are three more Halachos (that the Par ha'Chatas not be brought from the funds of the Kohanim, that it is Me'akev, and that it not come from Ma'aser) that are being learned from only two phrases of "Asher Lo"! How can one verse be used to teach more than one Halachah?

ANSWERS:

(a) The MITZPEH EISAN quotes the NACHALAS AZRIEL who says that it must be that the Gemara here argues with the Gemara in Yoma and in Shevuos. While the Gemara here maintains that we learn from the third "Asher Lo" that Korbanos cannot be brought from Ma'aser, the Gemara in Yoma and in Shevuos (which do not mention the Halachah of Ma'aser) learn instead that the third "Asher Lo" teaches that if the Par ha'Chatas does not belong to the Kohen Gadol, it is not a valid Korban even b'Di'eved. Accordingly, the Nachalas Azriel points out, the Gemara here holds that if the Par ha'Chatas does not belong to the Kohen Gadol, it nevertheless is valid b'Di'eved.

The Mitzpeh Eisan is not satisfied with this answer, though, because we generally try to refrain from making a new argument between two statements of the Gemara.

(b) The Mitzpeh Eisan prefers to explain that there is a different argument between the Gemara here and the Gemara in Yoma and Shevuos. The Gemara in Yoma (3b) records an argument about the meaning of the word "Lecha" in the verse, "Aseh Lecha" -- "Make for you" (Bamidbar 10:2), written with regard to the making of the Chatzotzeros. Rebbi Yoshiya says that this verse teaches that the Chatzotzeros must be made from private, and not from public, funds. Rebbi Yonasan says that the word "Lecha" there means that they may be made from either private or public funds. However, even Rebbi Yonasan agrees that the Par ha'Chatas of Aharon must be bought by Aharon himself. The Mitzpeh Eisan explains that although they agree about the general principle, Rebbi Yoshiya and Rebbi Yonasan differ about how to explain the three phrases of "Asher Lo." Rebbi Yonasan maintains that although we know that it may not come from public funds, we might have thought that it may come from the funds of the Kohanim, who also gain atonement with the Korban of Aharon. This is why we need another verse of "Asher Lo" to exclude the funds of the Kohanim, and another verse of "Asher Lo" to tell us that this is an absolute Halachah which is Me'akev the Korban. The Gemara in Yoma and Shevuos is following this opinion of Rebbi Yonasan. The Gemara here, in contrast, is following the opinion of Rebbi Yoshiya, who maintains that whenever the verse uses wording of "Lecha" or "Lo" ("to you" or "to him") we may infer that the subject of the verse is supposed to be brought by the person himself and *not* from public funds. Rebbi Yoshiya understands from only *one* verse of "Asher Lo" that the Korban may be brought neither from public funds nor from the Kohanim. This leaves two phrases of "Asher Lo," from which we may learn that this Halachah is Me'akev, and that the Korban cannot be brought from Ma'aser. (Y. Montrose)

QUESTION: The Gemara asks why the Tana Kama needs the word, "ka'Mishpat" (Vayikra 5:10), to teach the Halachah that an Olas ha'Of is brought only during the day. There is another verse, "b'Yom Tzavoso" (Vayikra 7:38), that teaches that bird offerings may be brought only during the day!

RASHI (DH mi'b'Yom) explains that the verse of "b'Yom Tzavoso" is discussing all forms of Korbanos.

Rashi here seems to contradict his words earlier. Rashi (21b, DH Rebbi Yishmael) explains that according to the Tana Kama, the verse, "Zos ha'Torah" (Vayikra 7:37), which immediately precedes the verse of "b'Yom Tzavoso," is discussing animal offerings alone and *not* bird offerings! How are we to reconcile the words of Rashi? (TOSFOS to 21b, DH Mah Chatas).

ANSWER: Perhaps Rashi understands that the verse of "Zos ha'Torah" has two connotations. The first is the simple meaning of the verse, a concluding statement following the laws of all of the different types of Korbanos. The second is the Hekesh; the verse compares all of the different types of Korbanos to each other. Rashi learns that the simple meaning of the verse applies even to bird offerings. Therefore, the words "b'Yom Tzavoso" that are written in the following verse also refer to *all* offerings -- even birds. In contrast, the Derashah of the verse (that is, the Hekesh that compares all Korbanos to each other) refers only to the Korbanos that are mentioned *explicitly* in the verse, and not to bird offerings. (M. Kornfeld)

22b

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that Torim (turtledoves) and Benei Yonah (pigeons) are valid to be offered as Korbanos at opposite ages. A Tor must be brought when it is older, and a Ben Yonah when it is younger. The Gemara explains that Benei Yonah are no longer valid for Korbanos once their feathers begin turning yellow, while Torim are valid only when their feathers begin turning gold. The Gemara says that both a Tor and a Ben Yonah is Pasul when its fathers turn yellow (a Ben Yonah because it is too old, and a Tor because it is too young).

Rebbi Zeira asks what the Halachah is in a case in which a person pledges to bring a Korban Olah from either Torim or Benei Yonah, and he brings one of each bird when it starts to turn yellow. Has the person fulfilled his pledge or not? The answer depends on why birds are Pasul when they begin turning yellow. Perhaps they are Pasul because, when they begin turning yellow, we do not know whether they are young or old, and out of doubt we cannot bring them as a Korban. If this is the reason, then the person *does* fulfill his pledge to bring a Korban Olah, because the two birds that he brings -- that have turned yellow -- are either both older or both younger, and thus he has brought either one valid Tor, or one valid Ben Yonah. However, perhaps the reason why birds that have turned yellow may not be offered is because birds at this stage are considered like a different creature entirely, which is neither a Tor nor a Ben Yonah. According to this reason, the person does not fulfill his pledge to bring a Korban Olah, since neither of the birds that he brings is a valid Korban when it is yellow.

TOSFOS (DH v'Hevi) asks that the first part of this question seems strange. The Gemara entertains the possibility that one fulfills his pledge by bringing two birds, one Tor and one Ben Yonah, which are both beginning to show signs of turning yellow, since one of these birds definitely is valid. How, though, can we permit a person to bring both birds? If one bird is definitely valid, then the other bird is definitely *invalid*, since it is either too old or too young! How can we let a person bring two Korbanos in the Beis ha'Mikdash when one of the Korbanos will definitely be Pasul?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS answers that it is obvious that, in practice, we do not permit a person to bring a Korban that is Pasul. The question involves a case in which a Kohen already offered the two birds, even though he was not supposed to do so.

(b) Alternatively, Tosfos answers that the case can even refer to a situation in which we permit, l'Chatchilah, the person to bring both birds. The person's pledge was to "bring" a Korban Olah to the Beis ha'Mikdash. Once he brings both of the birds to the Kohen, he has fulfilled his obligation, since one of the birds is indeed valid, and he has "brought" them to the Beis ha'Mikdash! (The Kohen, of course, does not offer them in the Beis ha'Mikdash, since one of them is certainly Pasul.) This also seems to be the case according to the opinion of RASHI later (139a, DH d'Michsar Hakravah), who states that when a person makes a pledge and says that a certain Korban is "upon me" ("Alai") to bring, his pledge means that he must bring the Korban to the Azarah, and not that he actually must offer the Korban.

The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 14:5) asks that this is difficult to understand. The Gemara in a number of places (see beginning of Zevachim) often discusses the Halachah in a case in which a person brings a Korban which the Kohen proceeds to slaughter with intention that it is a different Korban. Although, in the case of most Korbanos, the Korban remains valid, it is valid only as the type of Korban that the Kohen had in mind, and it does not fulfill the owner's obligation (and the owner must bring a new Korban to fulfill his obligation)! According to the proposition of Tosfos -- that one merely needs to bring his Korban to the Azarah in order to fulfill his pledge -- then why should the Korban that was slaughtered with the wrong intention not fulfill his pledge?

1. RAV YOSEF SHALOM ELYASHIV shlit'a (cited in HE'AROS B'MASECHES CHULIN)
suggests that Tosfos is discussing a case in which the person specifically stated in his Neder that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a Korban to the Gizbar (treasurer), or to the Kohen. In such a case, he indeed fulfills his obligation by bringing the birds to the Gizbar or to the Kohen, since that was the extent of his obligation.

However, Rav Elyashiv is not entirely satisfied with this answer. First, it is difficult to read this intention into the words of Tosfos. If this indeed is the intention of Tosfos, then Tosfos should have explicitly stated so. Second, Rashi in Me'ilah (19a, DH Ad she'Yatza) says that even when a person must bring a Korban Asham or Chatas, he is no longer responsible for the Korban once he brings it to the Azarah. This implies that one discharges his obligation with *all* Korbanos by bringing them to the Azarah, and not merely when he specifically limited his obligation (in the case of Neder).

2. Rav Elyashiv therefore suggests an alternative answer. He explains that there are two parts to every obligation to bring a Korban. The first part is an obligation to fulfill the Neder by bringing a Korban, or to fulfill one's obligation to attain atonement by bringing a Korban. The second part is an obligation to fulfill a monetary obligation to give Hekdesh what one owes to Hekdesh. This second part, the monetary obligation, is fulfilled once the person brings to Hekdesh whatever he owes (i.e. the animal).

This second part of the obligation is evident from the Gemara in Kidushin (13b), which states that when a person accepted upon himself to bring a Korban and then he died before he fulfilled his pledge, his heirs are obligated to bring his Korban in his place (according to the opinion that maintains "Shi'abuda d'Oraisa"). We see from there that when a person accepts upon himself to bring a Korban, he has a monetary obligation to bring the Korban even if it can no longer atone for his sins.

Tosfos and Rashi agree that until a person's Korban is offered on the Mizbe'ach, he does not fulfill his obligation to bring a Korban and he does not attain atonement for himself by just giving it to the Kohen. Nevertheless, by bringing the Korban to the Kohen, one *does* fulfill his monetary obligation to Hekdesh. (Therefore, when one brought his Korban to the Kohen and then died the person before it was offered on the Mizbe'ach, his heirs do *not* need to bring a Korban for him, because he has fulfilled his monetary obligation by bringing the Korban to the Kohen). (See AVI EZRI, Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 14:5.) (Y. Montrose)

3. The TZELACH suggests another answer. The Gemara in Nedarim (35b) discusses the question of whether the Kohanim who offer our Korbanos for us in the Beis ha'Mikdash are considered to be our agents (Sheluchim), or they are considered to be the agents of Hashem. The Tzelach explains that Tosfos, in his second answer, accepts the opinion that the Kohanim are the agents of Hashem. Consequently, once a person gives his Korban to a Kohen, he has discharged his responsibility to bring a Korban. The Kohen who accepts the Korban to offer it in the Beis ha'Mikdash is accepting the Korban on behalf of Hashem. (In contrast, if the Kohanim are our agents, then the owner of the Korban is responsible to make sure that the Kohen, his Shali'ach, offers it on the Mizbe'ach, and he cannot discharge his obligation by merely giving the Korban to a Kohen.) (See also EVEN HA'AZEL, Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:2:2.) (Z. Wainstein)