Ask A Question about the Daf

Previous daf

Chulin, 16

1) THE SOURCE THAT ONE NEEDS TO USE "TALUSH" FOR "SHECHITAS CHULIN"

QUESTIONS: The Gemara quotes Rebbi who teaches that the instrument used for Shechitah must be "Talush," detached from the ground. He learns this from the verse describing the knife that Avraham Avinu intended to use, which states, "va'Yikach Es ha'Ma'acheles li'Shechot" -- "and he took the knife to slaughter" (Bereishis 22:10).

TOSFOS (DH Minayin) asks that the Gemara in Zevachim (97b) and in Menachos (82b) says that this verse is the source that *Kodshim* -- animals that are being offered Korbanos -- must be slaughtered with a "utensil" (meaning a knife, as opposed to a rock). The Gemara there understands that the verse is referring specifically to Kodshim, in accordance with Yitzchak's status as a Korban Olah. If the verse is discussing Kodshim, then how can we learn from there the laws of how *Chulin* -- which are treated more leniently than Kodshim -- must be slaughtered?

ANSWERS:

(a) Tosfos quotes RABEINU TAM who answers that we can learn from the verse that a knife that is Talush must be used for Chulin, because the wording of the verse is "li'Shechot Es *Beno*" -- "to slaughter *his son*," and it does not say, "li'Shechot Es *ha'Olah*" -- "to slaughter the *Olah*." However, since his son was also an Olah, we learn from the verse that a utensil is also necessary for the Shechitah of Kodshim, just as a utensil, a Kli, is necessary for the other Avodos of the Korban.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES explains that Tosfos is working with the logical premise that it makes sense that an object that is attached to the ground should not be used for any Shechitah. If a verse possibly can refer to Chulin, and it prohibits Shechitah with an object attached to the ground, then we may assume that the verse is talking about Chulin as well, since such a Halachah is logically sound. (The logic alone is not enough to prohibit using an attached object, because we might think that perhaps the Shechitah -- if done properly with the attached object -- should be valid. Therefore, a verse is still necessary to prohibit such a Shechitah.) This is why we assume that the verse of "va'Yikach Es ha'Ma'acheles" is discussing Chulin as well, and that had it been referring only to Kodshim it would have said "li'Shechot Es ha'Olah."

In contrast, we have no logical premise to say that an object that is not a Kli should be invalid for the Shechitah of Chulin. Therefore, we learn from the fact that Avraham Avinu took a Kli for the Shechitah that a Kli is required for Kodshim (just as the other Avodos of Kodshim also require a Kli), but not that a Kli is required for Chulin.

Rabeinu Tam adds a seemingly cryptic statement. He says that from the fact that the verse says "va'Yikach" ("and he took") and not "va'Yachin" ("and he prepared"), we see that one needs to use an object that is Talush, detached, for Chulin. Moreover, from the fact that the verse says "Ma'acheles" ("knife") and not "ha'Mechatech" ("the thing that cuts"), we see that one must use a Kli for slaughtering Kodshim. What is Rabeinu Tam adding? He already explained how we learn from the verse that Shechitah of Chulin requires Talush and Shechitah of Kodshim requires a Kli!

1. The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that Rabeinu Tam is addressing an unspoken question in Tosfos. Just because we have reason to assume that the verse wants to include a logical law regarding Chulin from the fact that the verse does not refer to Yitzchak as an Olah does not tell us that this logical law is Shechitah with an object that is Talush! Perhaps the intention of the verse is to teach a different law, such as the requirement of "Ko'ach Adam" (a person's direct power) when performing Shechitah! How do we know that the verse intends to teach this specific law of Talush?

Rabeinu Tam answers this question. Had the verse not been teaching that Talush is necessary, the verse should have said that Avraham Avinu "prepared" what he was going to use. This wording does not imply that Talush is included. Why does the verse use the wording "and he took," which implies that the object was not attached to the ground? It must be that the verse is teaching that an object that is "Mechubar," attached to the ground, cannot be used for Chulin. From the strong indication of the verse that Chulin cannot be slaughtered with Mechubar, we might have thought that the verse is referring only to Chulin. How, then, do we know that a Kli must be used for Kodshim? Rabeinu Tam explains that since the verse says "ha'Ma'acheles" instead of "ha'Mechatech," it is teaching that a Kli must be used for the Shechitah of Kodshim.

2. The MAHARAM proposes a slightly different approach. Once we have established that the verse can be teaching that even Shechitah of Chulin must be done with Talush, and that only Shechitah of Kodshim requires a Kli, we have to discern which words in the verse indicate these specific Halachos. Rabeinu Tam therefore continues to tell us the exact words in the verse from which we learn these two Halachos. While "ha'Ma'acheles" seems to be a source for both laws (Talush and a Kli), one word cannot be teaching both Halachos. We cannot say that the Talush aspect of "ha'Ma'acheles" applies to Chulin, while the Kli aspect of "ha'Ma'acheles" applies only to Kodshim. It must be that there is another word in the verse which tells us that Talush is required for Chulin. This is why Rabeinu Tam says that we learn Talush from "va'Yikach," and not from "ha'Ma'acheles," from which we learn that a Kli is required for Kodshim. (Y. Montrose)

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Rebbi who teaches that the instrument used for Shechitah must be "Talush," detached from the ground. He learns this from the verse describing the knife that Avraham Avinu intended to use, which states, "va'Yikach Es ha'Ma'acheles li'Shechot" -- "and he took the knife to slaughter" (Bereishis 22:10). This verse is also the source for the requirement to us a utensil (a knife, and not a rock) for the Shechitah of Kodshim (see previous Insight).

How can we learn Halachos from the conduct of Avraham Avinu? The RAMBAM (Hilchos Avel 1:1) rules that only the first day of the seven days of Aveilus is mid'Oraisa. He adds that "even though we find that the Avos observed seven days of Avelus, as it is written, 'And he mourned for his father for seven days' (Bereishis 50:10), [those days of Aveilus were observed before the giving of the Torah, and] only when the Torah was given was the Halachah established (Nitnah Torah v'Nischadshah Halachah)." (See also Rambam in Perush ha'Mishnayos to Chulin 100b.) TOSFOS in Moed Katan (20a, DH Ma) quotes a similar principle from the Yerushalmi. The b(Erech Shachar, based on the Gemara in Yoma 28b) records this principle as well.

How, then, can we learn that the knife used for Shechitah must be Talush from the knife of Avraham Avinu? We cannot derive Halachos from events that took place before the Torah was given!

ANSWER: The MAHARATZ CHAYOS explains that there is a difference between the acts that the Avos did on their own accord, and the acts that Hashem commanded the Avos to perform. Any act that Hashem commanded the Avos to perform can be used as a source for a Halachah. Since Hashem had given the commandment to bring Korbanos even before the time of Avraham (see Bereishis Rabah 16:5), Avraham's use of a certain type of knife can serve as a source for what type of knife we are supposed to use when slaughtering a Korban. The words of the SEFER HA'CHINUCH (Mitzvah 3) support this answer. The Sefer ha'Chinuch writes that the source for the prohibition against eating the Gid ha'Nasheh is the verse, "Therefore, *Benei Yisrael* do not eat the Gid ha'Nasheh" (Bereishis 32:33). He then adds, "This verse is not simply a narrative of what our forefathers did. Rather, it is an explicit commandment from Hashem not to eat the Gid ha'Nasheh." This implies that we can learn from what the Avos were *commanded* by Hashem before the giving of the Torah, but not from what they practiced on their own accord. (See also CHASAM SOFER on Yerushalmi Moed Katan ch. 3; TOSFOS to Moed Katan 8b, DH Lefi.) (Z. Wainstein)

16b

QUESTION: Rava asks whether or not Shechitah may be performed with an object that was originally detached ("Talush") from the ground and then was attached ("Chibro") to the ground.

What is Rava's question? This issue was clarified by the Gemara earlier (15b)! According to Rebbi Chiya, even an object that was always attached to the ground ("Mechubar") may be used. According to Rebbi, an object that was originally detached and then was attached may not be used l'Chatchilah, but a Shechitah performed with such an object is valid b'Di'eved. What, then, is Rava's question? (See RASHBA to Yevamos 12b, as cited here by the YOSEF DA'AS.)

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI and the BA'AL HA'ME'OR explain that the Gemara earlier (15b) is discussing a case of an object that was detached and then attached that one intends to remove from the ground. Rebbi validates a Shechitah with such an object. Rava is asking about an object that a person attached to the ground permanently, with no intention to remove it.

(b) TOSFOS and the RAMBAN (in Milchamos) explain that Rava argues with the earlier Gemara that explains that the Mishnah is expressing the view of Rebbi. Rava maintains that the Mishnah is expressing the view of Rebbi Chiya, who permits Shechitah even with an object that is Mechubar. Therefore, he is asking what *Rebbi* would hold with regard to an object that was detached and then attached to the ground. The RAMBAN (in Milchamos) explains that the Gemara concludes that even an object that was detached and then attached to the ground *permanently* may be used for Shechitah. This is also the view of the RIF and RAMBAM, as well as the Halachah as recorded by the SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 6:2). The SHACH (YD 6:6), however, quotes the opinion of many authorities who are stringent not to use such an object for Shechitah. (Z. Wainstein)

OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the statement of the Mishnah (15b) that "ul'Olam Shochtin." The Gemara first suggests that the Mishnah is expressing the view of Rebbi Yishmael, who maintains that it was forbidden for the Jewish people to eat meat when they were traveling in the Midbar, before they entered Eretz Yisrael, unless the animal was offered as a Korban. When they entered Eretz Yisrael, eating meat (that was not from a Korban) became permitted. However, now that the Jewish people are in Galus, we might have thought that the prohibition to eat meat that is not part of a Korban is reinstated. The Mishnah therefore teaches, "ul'Olam Shochtin" -- we may slaughter animals and eat meat.

What is the source for Rebbi Yishmael statement that the Jewish people were forbidden to eat meat while in the Midbar unless it was part of a Korban?

(a) RASHI (DH Ne'esar) explains that according to Rebbi Yishmael, the source of the prohibition is the verse that prohibits slaughtering Kodshim outside of the Mishkan (Vayikra 17:4). The verse states that such an act is punishable with Kares. TOSFOS (DH shebi'Techilah) has difficulty with Rashi's explanation. The verse that Rashi quotes is discussing only the act of slaughtering Kodshim outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. It is not discussing the act of slaughtering ordinary animals of Chulin.

However, there is an explicit proof to Rashi's explanation from the Midrash. The Midrash (Devarim Rabah 4:6) says that Hashem prohibited many things to the Jewish people, and then He permitted those things. He prohibited them from slaughtering and eating unless the animal was brought (as a Korban) to the Ohel Mo'ed, as it says, "And he does not bring it to the entrance of the Ohel Mo'ed, to offer an offering to Hashem" (Vayikra 17:4, the verse that Rashi quotes). Later, Hashem permitted this to them, as it says, "Whenever your soul desires you may eat meat" (Devarim 12:20). The Midrash certainly seems to be expressing the opinion of Rebbi Yishmael. This is stated explicitly by the RAMBAN (to Vayikra 17:4).

(b) TOSFOS explains that Rebbi Yishmael derives his prohibition from the verse that permits eating meat *after* entering Eretz Yisrael (Devarim 12:20-21). It is inferred from this verse that there was a prohibition against eating such meat *before* entering Eretz Yisrael. The RASHBA explains that Rashi actually agrees with Tosfos that the source of Rebbi Yishmael's prohibition against eating meat in the Midbar is the verse permitting the eating of meat in Eretz Yisrael. However, while Tosfos remains with the implication of the verse as his source, Rashi applies the implication to the verse in Vayikra (17:4) prohibiting the slaughter of Kodshim outside of the Mishkan. The verse in Vayikra is discussing a person who slaughters a Korban outside the Mishkan, "And he does not bring it to the entrance of the Ohel Mo'ed, to offer an offering to Hashem" (Vayikra 17:4). Once we know from the verse in Devarim that ordinary meat of Chulin was forbidden in the Midbar, it must be that the verse in Vayikra also includes the slaughtering of Chulin. This is why Rashi quotes only the verse in Vayikra. Once we know that it is prohibited to *eat* properly slaughtered meat of Chulin from the implication of the verse in Devarim, we also know that the explicit prohibition against *slaughtering* an animal outside the Beis ha'Mikdash in Vayikra applies to Chulin as well. (See HE'OROS B'MASECHES CHULIN.)

However, the mechanism of the prohibition still needs explanation. How can Rashi assert that these two prohibitions (the Isur of Shechutei Chutz, and the Isur of slaughtering Chulin in the Midbar) are included in the same verse? They are two separate prohibitions which need two separate verses!

The CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN explains that once we know that there is no permission to slaughter an animal unless one is slaughtering a Korban, his act of Shechitah is tantamount to an explicitly declaration that the animal is dedicated to Hekdesh. RAV ELYASHIV shlit'a comments that this is likely the intention of the Rashba as well, who writes that "according to Rebbi Yishmael, once the Torah forbids even eating animals of Chulin unless they became Hekdesh, they are also included in the category of Kodshim." (Y. Montrose)