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Chulin, 3

1) THE KNIFE USED FOR THE "SHECHITAH" OF A KORBAN

QUESTION: Rabah bar Ula (2b) explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who is Tamei may slaughter an animal of Chulin that was prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" even l'Chatchilah, since he can slaughter the animal with a long knife and avoid touching the meat. When the Mishnah continues and says that "their Shechitah is valid," implying that it is valid only b'Di'eved, it is referring to a Tamei person who slaughters an animal of Kodshim. He is not permitted to slaughter Kodshim l'Chatchilah because of the possibility that he might touch it and make it Tamei. However, if, b'Di'eved, he slaughtered an animal of Kodshim and he attests that he is certain that he did not touch the animal, then the Shechitah is acceptable and the animal is not Tamei.

The Gemara asks that if the person is Tamei with Tum'as Mes, then it does not help to use a long knife. The principle of "Cherev Harei Hu k'Chalal" would cause the animal to become Tamei even without the person touching it. This principle teaches that a "Cherev" or other utensil that touched a corpse acquires the same degree of Tum'ah as the corpse, and it becomes an Avi Avos ha'Tum'ah. Similarly, if the utensil touched an Av ha'Tum'ah (such as a person who is Tamei with Tum'as Mes), it also becomes an Av ha'Tum'ah.

The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is discussing a Tamei person who examined the encasing of a reed ("Keromis Shel Kaneh") and slaughtered the animal with it. Such an object (a "Peshutei Kli Etz") does not transfer Tum'ah from the person to the animal, because it is not a proper utensil ("Kli") and cannot become Tamei.

How can such a Shechitah be acceptable? The Gemara in Zevachim (97b) and Menachos (82b) teaches that the Shechitah of a Korban requires a Kli, a proper utensil, such as a metal knife, and not a sharpened stone or reed. How, then, can the Gemara here say that the Shechitah performed with a sharpened reed is acceptable?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (DH Kegon) answers that the Gemara here is referring to a reed that was prepared as a proper Kli. (Accordingly, Tosfos must hold like Rashi and Rabeinu Tam who say that the rule of "Cherev Harei Hu k'Chalal" applies only to metal utensils and not to utensils made of other materials; see following Insight.)

Tosfos says, however, that a Kli Shares -- a consecrated utensil -- is *not* required for Shechitah.

Tosfos here quotes RABEINU EFRAIM who cites proof from the Mishnah in Zevachim (47a) that Shechitah does not require a Kli Shares. The Mishnah there states that "the Shechitah of Kodshei Kodashim is done in the northern part of the Azarah, and their blood is received in a Kli Shares in the northern part." From the fact that the Mishnah does not say that the Shechitah is done with a Kli Shares, we can infer that a Kli Shares is not necessary for the Shechitah.

Rabeinu Efraim gives a number of other proofs (as cited in his name by Tosfos in Zevachim 47a, DH Kodshei Kodashim). One of his proofs is the Gemara here that says that a person who is Tamei can slaughter a Korban with a sharpened reed, which clearly is not a Kli Shares. He also cites the Gemara in Pesachim (66a) that says that the people used to bring ordinary knives from their homes to slaughter the Korban Pesach.

(b) TOSFOS in Zevachim (ibid.), however, disagrees with Tosfos here and with Rabeinu Efraim and maintains that not only must a Korban be slaughtered with a proper Kli, it must be slaughtered with a Kli Shares. Tosfos brings a number of proofs for this. One of his proofs is the Gemara in Sotah (14b) that states that the blood of the Korban becomes sanctified through the knife. This implies that the knife is a Kli Shares. Similarly, the Gemara in Menachos (78b) says that the knife used for the Shechitah of the Korban Todah is Mekadesh the Lachmei Todah, just as a Kli Shares is Mekadesh the blood that is put into it.

RASHI in Zevachim (98a, DH Ela Sakin) also says that Shechitah requires a knife that is a Kli Shares. (See, however, Rashi in Menachos 82b, DH Sakin, who implies that only a Kli is necessary for Shechitah (as opposed to performing Shechitah with one's hands, in the manner that Melikah is done), but a Kli Shares is not necessary. This might provide support to those who assert that Rashi Kesav Yad in Menachos is the authentic commentary of Rashi, and not the commentary that appears on the upper half of the page).

How, then, can the Gemara here say that Shechitah with a sharpened reed is valid? Tosfos answers that the Gemara here is following the view of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah (Sotah 14b and Sukah 50b) who says that a Kli Shares may be made of wood. Accordingly, the sharpened reed that the Tamei person uses is indeed a Kli Shares.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 4:7) rules that, l'Chatchilah, a Kli Shares should be used for the Shechitah of a Korban, but, b'Di'eved, the Shechitah is valid even if the Shechitah is performed without a Kli at all, but rather with a sharpened reed (see LECHEM MISHNEH there). The Rambam learns that when the Gemara implies that a Kli Shares is necessary for Shechitah, the Gemara means that it is required only l'Chatchilah.

The MINCHAS CHINUCH (#95) quotes the ruling of the Gemara (and the Rambam in Hilchos Klei ha'Mikdash 1:14-15) that any of the consecrated utensils of the Beis ha'Mikdash that became cracked or broken should not be mended, but rather new Kelim should be made and the old ones should be placed in Genizah. Similarly, the Gemara says that a knife that became dented or blunted should not be sharpened, but rather it should be placed in Genizah and replaced with a new knife. This is because of the principle, "Ein Aniyus b'Makom Ashirus" (the Beis ha'Mikdash is a place of honor and veneration, and thus only the finest utensils should be used). The fact that old knifes used for Shechitah of Kodshim must be placed in Genizah implies that the knife used for Shechitah must be a Kli Shares.

However, the Minchas Chinuch concludes that it is possible to refute this proof ("Yesh Lidchos"). Perhaps this proof is refutable because when the Gemara says that an old knife should be placed in Genizah, it is referring to a knife that happened to be a Kli Shares. It does not mean, though, that *only* a knife that is a Kli Shares may be used for Shechitah. (D. Bloom)

(Refer to DAF's Audio Shi'ur to Zevachim 47, "The Shechitah Knife of Korbanos," for further discussion of these opinions.)

OPINIONS: The Torah teaches that certain objects acquire the same level of Tum'as Mes as the object which they touched and which gave them the Tum'ah. This principle is called "Cherev Harei Hu k'Chalal" (literally, "a sword is like a corpse"; see previous Insight). It is derived from the verse, "And whoever touches... a corpse slain with a sword (ba'Chalal Cherev) or a dead body... shall be Tamei for seven days" (Bamidbar 19:16). This principle teaches that a "sword" or other utensil that touched a corpse acquires the same degree of Tum'ah as the corpse, and it becomes an Avi Avos ha'Tum'ah. Similarly, if a utensil touched an Av ha'Tum'ah, it becomes an Av ha'Tum'ah.

Does this principle apply only to metal utensils, such as a sword, or to other types of utensils?

(a) RASHI here (DH Cherev) explains that this principle applies only to metal objects, similar to the "Cherev" mentioned in the verse from which this principle is derived. This principle does not apply to any type of utensil which is not metal, and thus all other types of objects that touch a corpse (or an Av ha'Tum'ah) descend a degree of Tum'ah from the Tum'ah of the object they touched. This is also the opinion of RABEINU TAM (Nazir 54b, Tosfos DH Ta Shema) and the RASH (Ohalos 1:3).

(b) The RAMBAM (Perush ha'Mishnayos in Ohalos 1:3; Hilchos Tum'as Mes 5:3) and RABEINU YITZCHAK M'SIMPONTI assert that this principle applies to all types of utensils. Even non-metal utensils acquire the same degree of Tum'ah as the object they touched. These Rishonim cite proof from the Toras Kohanim, which derives from the law of the clothing upon a person who touches a corpse that one utensil that touches another utensil which is an Av ha'Tum'ah also becomes an Av ha'Tum'ah. The Torah teaches that the clothing of a person who touches a corpse becomes an Av ha'Tum'ah, just like the person himself who touches the corpse. We see from this law that even non-metal utensils (clothing) become an Av ha'Tum'ah when they touch an Av ha'Tum'ah. (Rabeinu Tam in Nazir (54b), who maintains that only metal utensils become Tamei with the same Tum'ah as the object that they touched, argues that when the Toras Kohanim says that the clothing of the person becomes an Av ha'Tum'ah, it is referring to metal ornaments and jewelry that the person is wearing.)

(c) The GE'ONIM (cited by Rabeinu Chananel in Pesachim 14b) and RABEINU YITZCHAK M'SIMPONTI in his second explanation (as cited by the Rash in Ohalos 1:3) explain that the principle of "Cherev Harei Hu k'Chalal" applies only to the object that actually *killed* the person. That object becomes Avi Avos ha'Tum'ah. No other object (not even a metal object) becomes Tamei with the same degree of Tum'ah as the object it touches.

This opinion obviously holds that the principle of "Cherev Harei Hu k'Chalal" does not apply to an Av ha'Tum'ah, since an Av ha'Tum'ah has not been murdered (a dead body is always an Avi Avos ha'Tum'ah). However, the Mishnah in Pesachim (14a) clearly says that even a utensil that touches an Av ha'Tum'ah becomes an Av ha'Tum'ah! How does this opinion explain the Mishnah there?

From the words of Rabeinu Chananel and the Rash it appears that according to this opinion, it is not the principle of "Cherev Harei Hu k'Chalal" that makes the utensil an Av ha'Tum'ah when it touches an Av ha'Tum'ah. Rather, it is a different principle -- the principle of "Chiburin." This principle teaches that while an object is still touching an Av ha'Tum'ah (and not after it is removed from the Av ha'Tum'ah), it is considered an Av ha'Tum'ah to make whatever touches it at that moment a Rishon l'Tum'ah. This Halachah applies to all utensils except earthenware (similar Halachos exist with regard to touching an object that is presently touching a Zav or a Mishkav). This is the Tum'ah that the Toras Kohanim derives from the clothing on a person who touches a corpse; since his clothes were touching him at the time that he touched the corpse, they acquire the Tum'ah that he has, an Av ha'Tum'ah. This also appears to be the opinion of the RA'AVAD (Hilchos Tum'as Mes 5:3). (See also Insights to Pesachim 14:2.)

3b

QUESTION: Ravina explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who is known to be an expert in the laws of Shechitah ("Mumcheh") may slaughter an animal even if he is not yet "Muchzak" to slaughter an animal without fainting (a Shochet becomes Muchzak by slaughtering three animals in front of us). RASHI (DH Af Al Pi) explains that there are two problems with a person who is not Muchzak as a Shochet. First, if he is not Muchzak, he might become queasy and feel faint, and thereby ruin the Shechitah. Second, his hands might not be proficient in the skill of slaughtering.

The Gemara later explains that the Amora'im who argue with Ravina's explanation of the Mishnah maintain that we are not concerned that the Shochet will faint. The Gemara, however, does not mention how those Amora'im address the second concern of not being Muchzak -- that the Shochet's hands might not be proficient in slaughtering. Even if there is no fear that he will faint, there should still be a concern that his hands might slip and ruin the Shechitah! Why, then, do the other Amora'im not agree with Ravina's explanation?

ANSWER: The BEIS YOSEF (YD 1) explains that when the Gemara says that the other Amora'im are not concerned that the Shochet will faint, it means that they hold that since the Shochet is a Mumcheh, he will inform us if there is any problem with his Shechitah. Therefore, unless he notifies us otherwise, we may assume with certainty that there was no problem with his Shechitah, and that he did not faint, nor did his hands slip.

(However, a more basic question on Rashi still remains. The fact that the Gemara makes no mention of the Shochet's physical control over the motions of Shechitah implies that the *only* concern is that the Shochet might faint. Why, then, does Rashi find it necessary to introduce a second concern for why the Shochet must be Muchzak?) (Z. Wainstein)

QUESTION: Ravina explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who is known to be an expert in the laws of Shechitah may slaughter an animal even if he is not yet "Muchzak" to slaughter an animal without fainting (a Shochet becomes Muchzak by slaughtering three animals in front of us). When the Mishnah continues and says that "their Shechitah is valid," implying that it is valid only b'Di'eved, it is referring to a person who is not known to be an expert in the laws of Shechitah. He is not permitted to slaughter an animal l'Chatchilah, but if he did slaughter one, then we test him for knowledge of the laws of Shechitah, and if he shows himself to be erudite in the laws of Shechitah then his Shechitah is valid.

The Gemara later explains that the reason why the other Amora'im do not explain the Mishnah as Ravina does is because they hold that there is no need to determine the expertise of a Shochet; there is a principle that "Rov Metzuyin Etzel Shechitah Mumchin Hen" -- most people who are involved with Shechitah are experts. Apparently, Ravina does not hold of this principle. However, this principle is recorded in a Beraisa later (12a). The Beraisa states that if one finds a slaughtered chicken in the public marketplace, he may assume that the chicken was slaughtered properly, because of the principle that "Rov Metzuyin Etzel Shechitah Mumchin Hen" -- most people who are involved with Shechitah are experts. How can Ravina argue with a Beraisa?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS (DH v'Im) answers that the Gemara later records the opinions of other Tana'im who argue with the Beraisa and who do not hold of the principle of "Rov Metzuyin Etzel Shechitah Mumchin Hen." Ravina follows the view of those Tana'im, and not the view of the Beraisa.

(b) The SHACH (YD 1:5) cites the RA'AVAN who states that Ravina requires that the Shochet be tested only when the Shochet is readily available, and we are able to test him. If the Shochet is not present, and it is not feasible to retrieve him, then Ravina agrees that it is permissible to eat the meat, because of the principle of "Rov Metzuyin Etzel Shechitah Mumchin Hen."

We can understand the intention of the Ra'avan based on the words of the MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 437:4). The Halachah is that one who rents a house on Erev Pesach (the fourteenth of Nisan) -- and does not know whether or not the house was checked for Chametz -- is required to ask the landlord if the house was checked. However, if the landlord is out of town, then the tenant may rely on the Chazakah that the landlord checked the house, since he rented it *after* the night of the fourteenth of Nisan (when the Mitzvah of Bedikas Chametz applies). The reason why the tenant is required to ask the landlord if possible is because we do not rely on a Chazakah when it is possible to clarify the situation. The Magen Avraham states that this principle is found in the laws of Shechitah, which require that the Shochet's knowledge be tested if possible, even though the majority of Shochtim are experts. Since it is possible to clarify his expertise without relying on a Rov, we are required to do so.

However, the requirement to clarify the situation without relying on a Rov applies only when the situation, in its present states, presents a Chazakah that would prohibit the object. That is, there is a Chazakah that every house contains Chametz, since it is used for Chametz throughout the year. Therefore, if possible, the tenant must clarify with the landlord that Bedikas Chametz was performed and not rely on the Rov. Similarly, we must determine that the Shochet was an expert, and not rely on the Rov, because before the animal is slaughtered it had a Chazakah that it is forbidden to eat (before Shechitah, the animal is Asur to eat because of Ever Min ha'Chai). Since there is a Chazakah that prohibits the item, and this Chazakah opposes the Rov that permits the item, we must clarify that the Shechitah was done properly by testing the Shochet. In contrast, when an animal was slaughtered by an expert Shochet, there is no requirement to examine all of the limbs and innards of the animal to make sure that it is not a Tereifah. This is because every animal has a Chazakah that it is *not* a Tereifah, and therefore there is no requirement to clarify through examination that the animal is not a Tereifah. (D. Bloom) (See CHIDUSHEI CHASAM SOFER here, DH Rov; see also Insights to Bava Kama 99:3.)

QUESTION: The Gemara records a second version of Ravina's explanation of the Mishnah. According to this version, Ravina explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who has become "Muchzak" to slaughter an animal without fainting may slaughter l'Chatchilah, even though we do not know whether or not he is an expert in the laws of Shechitah. However, he must have become Muchzak by having performed Shechitah "two or three times" in front of us.

Why does Ravina say that a Shochet becomes Muchzak by performing Shechitah "two or three times" in front of us? If he becomes Muchzak by performing Shechitah two times in front of us, then why does the Gemara add "or three times"?

Moreover, the number that is generally necessary in order to establish a Chazakah is three; two times does not suffice (Yevamos 64b). Why, then, should two times suffice to prove a Shochet's capability?

ANSWERS:

(a) The RITVA answers that the Gemara is using a colloquial terminology, and it really means that the Shochet must perform Shechitah three times in order to become Muchzak.

(b) The Ritva answers further that the Gemara says that the Shochet becomes Muchzak by slaughtering "two or three" times because it does not want to take sides in the argument between Rebbi and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who argue (in Yevamos 64b) how many times an event must occur in order to establish a Chazakah. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that a Chazakah is established after three times, and Rebbi says that a Chazakah is established after two times.

(c) The MA'ADANEI YOM TOV (5:1) answers that a certain type of Shochet becomes Muchzak after performing Shechitah twice, while another type of Shochet becomes Muchzak only after performing Shechitah three times. If the Shochet is a strong person, then it suffices for him to perform Shechitah twice. If he is a weaker person, then he needs to perform Shechitah three times in order to become Muchzak.

It is interesting to note that the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shechitah 4:2) writes that the Shochet must perform Shechitah "four or five" times. It is not clear why the Rambam requires four or five acts of Shechitah in order to become Muchzak when the Gemara mentions only two or three. Perhaps the Rambam maintains that one must keep practicing until he feels absolutely no queasiness at all. The Halachic mechanism of Chazakah does not apply; a Shochet becomes Muchzak only when, in reality, he has no queasiness. This might happen after only "two or three" times, or after "four or five" times. Perhaps this is also the intention of the Ma'adanei Yom Tov as well. (M. Kornfeld, Z. Wainstein)

QUESTION: The Gemara says that the reason why the other Amora'im do not explain the Mishnah as Rabah bar Ula does (who says that the Mishnah is teaching that a person who is Tamei may slaughter, l'Chatchilah, an animal of Chulin that was prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh") is because they maintain that Chulin prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" is *not* treated like Kodesh, but rather it is like ordinary Chulin, and thus it is obvious that a Tamei person may slaughter such an animal. The Mishnah would not teach us something that is obvious.

Perhaps, though, this itself is the Chidush of the Mishnah. Perhaps the Mishnah is teaching that Chulin that was prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" is not treated like Kodesh, and that is why a Tamei person may slaughter such an animal! (PORAS YOSEF, TIFERES YAKOV, CHIDUSHEI RAV YESHAYAH BERLIN)

ANSWER: The Chidush of the Mishnah cannot be that Chulin that was prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" is not treated like Kodesh. If the Mishnah is saying that a Tamei person is allowed to slaughter such an animal l'Chatchilah, then we would not know whether it is because Chulin prepared "Al Taharas ha'Chodesh" is not like Kodesh (and a Tamei person may use a short knife, and we are not concerned that he might touch the animal), or whether it is because it *is* like Kodesh (and he must use a long knife to avoid touching it). The Mishnah would have to make it clear that it means that the Tamei person may use a short knife, in order to contrast this Halachah with the Halachah mentioned at the end of the Mishnah regarding a Tamei person who slaughters real Kodshim. The Mishnah's words imply that the only difference between the two Halachos is that one type of animal may be slaughtered by a Tamei person l'Chatchilah, while the other is valid only b'Di'eved, and not that the Tamei may use a short knife for one but must use a long knife for the other. (M. Kornfeld)