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1)

(a) Rav Nachman bar Papa extrapolates from the Beraisa 've'Chulan she'Amru Tul es she'Lecha ve'Havei Ma'os, Shomer Chinam' - 'ha Gemartiv, Shomer Sachar', clashing with Rav Chisda who just said that once the days of Shemirah have come to an end, the Sho'el is Patur.

(b) We answer that the inference from the Beraisa is 'Ha Havei Ma'os ve'Tul es she'Lecha, Shomer Sachar', but 'Gemartiv' has the same Din as 'Tul es she'Lecha ve'Havei Ma'os'. Nevertheless, the Tana saw fit to present the case of 'Tul es she'Lecha ve'Havei Ma'os' (rather than the bigger Chidush of 'Gemartiv'), to teach us - that even in that case, he remains at least Shomer Chinam (since we might otherwise have thought that, having washed his hands of the Shemirah, he is even Patur from Peshi'ah as well).

(c) The case in our Mishnah requires the Uman to inform the owner 'Gemartiv', whereas a Sho'el does not - because in the former case, the owner needs to be informed that his article is ready, whereas in the latter, the owner knows anyway that the time of Shemirah has terminated.

(a) In the second Lashon, Rav Nachman comes (not to ask a Kashya on Rav Chisda, but) to support his statement, to which end, he asks 'Mai La'av, Hu ha'Din Gemartiv'. We refute his proof however, by responding - 'Lo, Tul es she'Lech Sha'ani'.

(b) Assuming that 'Gemartiv' is equivalent to 'Tul es she'Lecha ve'Havei Ma'os' (like the conclusion of the first Lashon), Huna Mar bar Mereimar asked Ravina how to reconcile this with the Mishnah 've'Chein be'Sha'ah she'Machzirah', which implies that as long as the owner has not asked the Sho'el to return the article, he remains liable. Rafram bar Papa Amar Rav Chisda resolves the problem - by establishing the Mishnah when the Shemirah has not yet terminated (but once it has, he is Patur).

(a) They asked whether, when Rafram bar Papa said 'Patur', he meant Patur from being a Sho'el, but he remains a Shomer Sachar, or whether he is not even a Shomer Sachar either. Ameimar replied - that he remains a Shomer Sachar, because of the S'vara 'Ho'il ve'Neheneh, Mehaneh' (someone who derived benefit gives benefit, meaning that having derived the benefit of being a Sho'el, a person does not withdraw fully from all responsibilities, and remains a Shomer Sachar, to retain the responsibility for Geneivah and Aveidah).

(b) The Beraisa discusses the case of someone who purchases vessels from a factory, intending to send them as gifts to his betrothed. He stipulates with the manufacturer - that, in the event that she accepts his gift, he will pay for it in full; but if she does not, then he will pay for the Tovas Hana'ah (the benefit that he derives from the fact that his betrothed and her family see the gifts that he sent, even if they do not accept them), and return the article.

(c) If the vessels are destroyed by means of an O'nes that occurred ...

1. ... on the outward journey - he is considered to have acquired them and is therefore Chayav.
2. ... on the way back - he is Patur, because he has the Din of a Shomer Sachar (and not a Sho'el), a clear proof for Ameimar.

(d) Shmuel says (in Bava Basra) that if someone buys vessels on the understanding that if, after inspection, they meet with his approval, he will purchase them, and if not, he will return them, then, should an O'nes occur before he had a chance to inspect them, and they are destroyed - he is Chayav (provided their price is fixed) because he is considered the owner until a blemish is found that negates the sale.

(a) In any case, we have proved Ameimar's ruling, as we explained. There even a 'Kal va'Chomer' from there on to the case of a Sho'el - because if the purchaser (who pays something [as stipulated] for the retracted sale) is a Shomer Sachar, then how much more so a Sho'el (who pays nothing for the article's usage).

(b) In a case similar case, where Reuven stipulated that if he was unable to sell a donkey (or wine), he would return it, Rav Nachman - obligated him to pay for Onsin even though it occurred on the return journey.

(c) When Rava asked Rav Nachman how this case differed from the previous one, where he was Patur from Onsin on the return journey - he replied that, here was different, because had he found customers on the return journey, he would have sold them the donkey.

(a) Our Mishnah rules 'Sh'mor Li ve'Eshmor Lach, Shomer Sachar'. What forces Rav Papa to explain this to mean 'You guard for me today and I will guard for you tomorrow' is the fact - that 'You guard for me today and I will guard for you today' would be a case of Shemirah be'Ba'alim (a Shomer for whom the owner is working is Patur, as we shall learn in Perek ha'Sho'el).

(b) We repeat the same Kashya on the Beraisa 'Sh'mor Li ve'Eshmor Lach, Hash'ileini, ve'Ash'ilcha (with reference to borrowing vessels), Sh'mor Li ve'Ash'ilcha ... ', 've'Ha Havi Shemirah be'Ba'alim?' (like we asked on the Mishnah, and Rav Papa repeats the same answer). The Kashya there can only pertain to the first case, and not to the other cases - because someone who guards his friend's vessels is not considered to be working for him.

(a) In the case of those Ahalu'i, it was customary for one of them to bake each day for all of them. Besides a kind of washing soap - the 'Ahalu'i' might have sold spices.

(b) When they asked one of their group to bake that day, he agreed but asked the others to look after his coat.

(c) When the coat was stolen due to the Ahalui's negligence, Rav Papa obligated the Ahalu'i to pay. The coat must have been stolen specifically due to their negligence - based on the fact that it was the appointee's turn to bake (or so we currently think, [in which case, the others were Shomrei Chinam, who would not be Chayav in an ordinary case of Geneivah]).

(a) Rav Papa became embarrassed when the Rabbanan pointed out - that it was a case of Shemirah be'Ba'alim, and that the Ahalu'i should therefore have been Patur.

(b) They then discovered - that the appointee had been drinking beer at the time that they begun guarding his coat (in which case it was not Shemirah be'Ba'alim).

(c) This answer will not work out however- according to those who hold 'Peshi'ah be'Ba'alim is not included in the P'tur of Shemirah be'Ba'alim, because, according to them - there is no reason for Rav Papa to have been embarrassed (since his initial ruling was correct).

(d) We therefore amend the case to turn the 'Ahalu'i' into Shomrei Sachar, rather than Shomrei Chinam - to when it was not really the appointee's turn to bake, in which case the other Ahalu'i were benefiting from his working out of turn, turning them into Shomrei Sachar. Consequently, the Geneivah no longer had to come about through Peshi'ah, and all the other details fit into place.

8)

(a) In the case of the two co-travelers, the tall man was riding a donkey whilst the short one walked. The tall one had 'a Sadina', and the short one, 'a Sarb'la'. When they had to cross a river, the short man put on the Sadin and placed the Sarb'la on the donkey - because a Sarb'la is made of wool, and sinks easily (whereas a Sadin is made of linen).

(b) When they came to him for a Din Torah, after the Sadin sunk - Rava obligated the short man to pay.

(c) If Rava was embarrassed when the Rabbanan pointed out that it was Shemirah be'Ba'alim (because the man on the donkey was transporting his Sarb'la at the time, he subsequently discovered - that the short man had made the exchange without the tall man's consent, in which case it cannot even be considered 'Shemirah (let alone Shemirah be'Ba'alim, setting his mind at rest.

(a) Reuven rented Shimon a donkey, warning him to take the route of Neresh, not of Nahar Pakud - because there was water on that route (making it dangerous for donkeys to travel).

(b) Shimon took the forbidden route and the donkey died. Upon his return however - he claimed that there had been no water along the route.

(c) Rabah wanted to exempt him from paying, on the grounds - of 'Mah Lo Le'shaker' ('a Migu', because he could have said that he took the route of Neresh).

(d) Abaye objected however - because it was a Migu be'Makom Eidim (since we are witnesses that there is water along that route), and even a 'Migu is not believed when it contradicts Eidim.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that 'Sh'mor Li, ve'Amar Lo, Hanach Lefanai Shomer Chinam'. Rav Huna rules - that 'Hanach Lefanecha' is neither a Shomer Chinam nor a Shomer Sachar (because he is only pulling his leg, and is simply telling the owner to guard it himself).

(b) We try and infer from our Mishnah ('Sh'mor Li, ve'Amar Lo Hanach Lefanai, Shomer Chinam') - that if he said 'Hanach' S'tam, he is not a Shomer (resolving our current She'eilah).

(c) We refute the proof from there by citing Rav Huna, who said that 'Hanach Lefanecha' is not a Shomer - from which we can infer the opposite 'ha'Hanach' S'tam, is a Shomer Chinam.

(d) When the inference from the Reisha clashes with the inference from the Seifa - we ignore both inferences (and end up by learning nothing).

(a) We learned in a Mishnah in Bava Kama (concerning a potter who takes his pots into Reuven's field and Reuven's ox subsequently breaks them) 'Im Hichnis bi'Reshus, Ba'al Chatzer Chayav' - because when the owner permits the potter to enter, he means 'Enter, and I will look after them'.

(b) Rebbi - exempts the owner from paying, because, in his opinion, 'Enter' implies that he has permission to enter, but not that the owner undertakes to look after his pots for him.

(c) We try to prove from here - that 'Hanach' S'tam is a Machlokes Tana'im; that according to the Rabbanan it implies an undertaking to look after the object concerned, whereas according to Rebbi, it means that he should place the article in the street and look after it himself.

(d) We refute this proof however, on the grounds that perhaps ...

1. ... the Rabbanan's ruling is confined to the case of Chatzer - because it is a protected place (and it stands to reason that 'Enter' incorporates looking after the article), but will not extend to our case of placing the article in the street, which is not.
2. ... Rebbi's ruling too, is confined to the case of Chatzer - because it is the personal property of the owner, and one needs permission to enter. But it will not extend to our case of placing the article in the street, which does not need the Shomer's permission (so unless he meant 'Put it down and I will guard it', why would he need to tell the owner to put it down there?

(a) Rebbi Eliezer says in a Beraisa 'ha'Malveh es Chaveiro al ha'Mashkon, ve'Avad ha'Mashkon, Yishava ve'Yitol Ma'osav' - because the creditor takes a Mashkon (not to claim from, but) as a lever to force the debtor to pay. He swears that he was not negligent in looking after it, because he is a Shomer Chinam on it.

(b) According to Rebbi Akiva - 'Avad ha'Mashkon, Avad Ma'osav', because the creditor takes a Mashkon in order to claim from, in which case, he is a Shomer Sachar.

(c) Rebbi Eliezer concedes that if he loses the Mashkon, he loses his money - in the event that the loan was documented, because then, seeing as a Sh'tar includes Shibud Karka'os, the creditor has all the property of the debtor to claim from, so why take a security unless he wants to have something in his hand to claim from?

(d) We initially think - that the author of our Mishnah, 'Hilveihu al ha'Mashkon Shomer Sachar,' must then be Rebbi Akiva, and not Rebbi Eliezer (according to whom he is a Shomer Chinam, as we just explained).