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1)

(a) In a case where Reuven gives Shimon five measures of wheat in lieu of the Zuz Ribis that he owes him, when the going price is four measures per Zuz, Abaye rules that Shimon is obligated to return only four measures (or one Zuz - see Shitah Mekubetzes), and the extra measure is a gift.

(b) Rava obligates him to return all five - since he received the extra measure in the form of Ribis.

(c) In a similar case, but where Reuven gives Shimon a coat instead of the four Zuzim Ribis that he owes him, Abaye permits Shimon to return the four Zuzim, and not the coat. Rava insists that he returns the coat itself - so that people should not accuse him of wearing a coat of Ribis.

(a) Rava rules that if Reuven, who owes Shimon twelve Zuzim, then rents him an apartment which normally goes for ten Zuzim, in lieu of the Ribis - Shimon is obligated to return - twelve Zuzim.

(b) When Rav Acha from Difti asked Ravina why Shimon cannot argue that he only agreed to accept the apartment at twelve Zuzim, because he thought it was to his advantage, but not if it will cost him two Zuzim, Ravina replied - that since Shimon accepted the price of twelve Zuzim, he cannot now go back on his original agreement.

(a) Our Mishnah permits 'Marbin al ha'S'char', but not 'Marbin al ha'Mecher'. An example of ...

1. ... 'Marbin al ha'S'char' is - if Reuven rents Shimon his Chatzer at ten Sela'im per annum paid in advance, or one Sela per month.
2. ... 'Marbin al ha'Mecher' is - if Reuven offers to sell Shimon a field, for a thousand Zuz to be paid now, or twelve Manah (one thousand two hundred Zuz) to be paid at the time of the harvest.

(b) Rabah and Rav Yosef explain that ...

1. ... 'Marbin al ha'S'char' is permitted - because of the principle 'Ein Sechirus Mishtalemes Ela be'Sof'. Consequently, the Sela per month is the regular price, whilst the Sela per month is a merely a reduction.
2. ... 'Marbin al ha'Mecher' is prohibited - because seeing as one usually pays for one purchases in advance, it is the thousand Zuz which is the real price, in which case, the twelve Manah includes a fee for having to wait for the money ('S'char Hamtanas Ma'os' - Ribis).

(c) Rava learns from the Pasuk 'ki'S'chir Shanah be'Shanah' - that the rental of this year is only due next year ('Ein S'chirus Mishtalemes Ela be'Sof').

(a) Rav Nachman permits Tarsha - meaning the selling of goods on credit, at above their market price.

(b) Rav Nachman reconciles his opinion with the Seifa of our Mishnah, which forbids this very case - because the Tana speaks when the seller specifically offered it to him at a lower price should he pay immediately, thereby clearly indicating that the more expensive price was 'S'char Hamtanas Ma'os'.

(c) Rav Papa maintained that *his* Tarsha (selling his date-beer in Tishri, when the beer was cheap, on credit, to be collected at market-time in Nisan, when the price had risen). What made him think that it was certainly permitted was - the fact that a. because his beer did not go off (which means that he could just as well have kept the beer that he already had in Tishri until Nisan), and b. he did not need the money in advance.

(d) Rav Shisha B'rei de'Rav Idi disagreed with him however - on the grounds that this is fine if one looks at it from his perspective, but from the purchasers' point of view, if they had had money, they would have purchased the beer at the cheaper price, and they only bought it on credit because they did not have money with which to pay.

(a) Rav Chamah maintained that his Tarsha was definitely permitted. Following the standard procedure of Tarsha (where the purchaser paid the more expensive rate (in this case, of the town where they heading) than the current one, his Tarsha constituted - the purchasers selling his merchandise on credit and using the proceeds of the sale to do business, before returning with their own goods and the money that they owed him.

(b) He nevertheless permitted it - because Rav Acha accepted full Achrayus until the goods were sold, so that the money only became a loan after they were sold.

(c) We counter the argument that it ought nevertheless to be considered Ribis because, as Tosfos explains, they had the trouble of selling the goods that remained his without receiving anything in return - with the fact that the fact that Rav Chama's name was attached to the goods, spared them from having to pay taxes, as well as granting them the first right to sell his goods.

(d) We rule like Rav Chama ...

1. ... Rebbi Elazar - who holds Ribis Ketzutzah Yotz'ah be'Dayanin ...
2. ... and Rebbi Yanai - who holds 'Mah Li Hein, Mah Li Demeihen'.

6)

(a) If Reuven pays Shimon half the cost of his field, on the understanding that the moment he brings the balance he will acquire the entire field (otherwise the sale is cancelled), it is forbidden for either of them to eat the fruit. If the prohibition is to extend to Shimon, we need to add to our Mishnah - that when Reuven brings the balance, he will just acquire the field, but he will acquire it retroactively.

(b) The reason for the prohibition is - because 'Mah Nafshach', should Shimon eat the fruit, then, in the event that Reuven *does* bring the balance, the field will have been Reuven's all the time and what Shimon ate will have been Ribis (compensation for his outstanding money)' whereas should Reuven eat it, then, in the event that he does not bring the money, and the field remains Shimon's, *he* will have eaten Ribis (as compensation for the 'loan' that he made Shimon).

(a) Rav Huna permits Shimon to eat the fruit. Rav Anan says that it should be handed for safekeeping to a third party.

(b) Assuming that they do not argue, we will establish ...

1. ... Rav Huna - when Shimon stipulated that Reuven will acquire the field as soon as he brings the balance (but not retroactively).
2. ... Rav Anan - when Shimon stipulated that he will acquire the field retroactively as soon as he brings the balance.

(c) Rav Safra quotes a Beraisa of 'Ribis de'Bei Rebbi Chiya which cites all possible computation, which Rava explains. We have already explained the cases where Shimon is permitted to eat the fruit (Rav Huna), and where neither is permitted to do so (Rav Anan). The case ...

1. ... in which both are permitted to eat it is - when Shimon stipulates that Reuven immediately acquires what he has paid for, and the rest, when he brings the balance.
2. ... in which Reuven may do so is - when he stipulates that he acquires the field immediately and that the balance is an independent loan.

(d) When Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua says that the Tana who forbids both men to eat the fruit cannot be Rebbi Yehudah, he means that according to Rebbi Yehudah - both parties would be permitted to eat the fruit, because he holds 'Tzad Echad be'Ribis (a Safek Ribis) is permitted.

(a) The Beraisa forbids a creditor to stipulate with the debtor that should the latter wish to sell the house or the field that he gave him as a security, he should sell it to him for a small sum that he will add to the money owing - because it constitutes Ribis.

(b) This would be permitted however - if he stipulated that he should sell it to him at the market price.

(c) The author of this Beraisa (or the next one) cannot be - Rebbi Yehudah, who holds 'Tzad Echad be'Ribis Mutar'.

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa - forbids someone to sell a house or a field and stipulate that the purchaser should return it, should he (the seller) find the money (to redeem it).

(b) The Tana does however, permit *the purchaser* to make the stipulation - provided, says Rava, he adds the clause that the return of the house of the field for the money on his part were only voluntary.

(c) The basic difference between the Reisha and the Seifa is - that whereas the case in the Seifa remains a sale, that of the Reisha becomes a retroactive loan should the seller find the money.

(a) When Reuven, who had sold Shimon a field without Achrayus, perceived Shimon looking dejected (for fear of losing his money), he assured him that he would recompense him from the best of his fields, should the need arise. 'Without Achrayus' in this case means - that these words were actually written in the Sh'tar (because otherwise, we would apply Shmuel's principle 'Acharayus Ta'us Sofer').

(b) Ameimar ruled - that Reuven was merely making an effort to placate Shimon, and that his words carried no Halachic ramifications, because such a stipulation should have been made by Shimon and not by Reuven.

(c) When Rav Ashi asked Ameimar from Rava, who just explained 'Seifa de'Amar Lei mi'Da'atei', he meant - that there too, it is the seller who ought to have made the stipulation, yet, despite the fact that the purchaser made it, Rava holds that if he does not add that his retraction will be voluntary, we accept his stipulation in its entirety.

(d) To which Ameimar replied - that Rava did not mean that he is actually required to state that his retraction will be voluntary, but that, because it was not up to him to issue such an ultimatum, we automatically consider as if he had done so.