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1)

(a) According to Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, it is a Sitton (Chaver) exclusively who is permitted to sell to Chaverim without separating Ma'asros first. A Sitton is a wholesaler who buys from many producers, and sells to the stores in large quantities ('be'Midah Gasah').

(b) Rebbi Meir allows him this concession - because everyone knows that what he is selling he bought from Amei ha'Aretz.

(c) He distinguishes between a Sitton and a Balabos who purchases from Amei ha'Aretz and sells wholesale - because since he is not known to be a Sitton, people will think that he is selling his own crops, and because he is a Chaver, they will assume it all to be Ma'asered.

(d) The Chachamim - permit anyone who sells large quantities like a Sitton does to sell without Ma'asering first (on the assumption that, whoever sells in such large quantities, has not Ma'asered).

(a) The Shiur of 'Midah Gasah', that defines Sittoni'us is - three Kabin of dry produce (twenty-four egg-volumes) and a Dinar (192 P'rutos)'s worth of wine.

(b) We have proved that when it comes to *eating* Ma'aser Sheini of D'mai, Rebbi Meir is more stringent than the Rabbanan.

(a) Rebbi Meir says in a Beraisa that someone who purchases hot loaves and loaves that already cooled down from a baker - can Ma'aser the former to cover the latter and vice-versa ...

(b) ... and he adds - that this even applies if they are of various shapes.

(c) There is no problem with Ma'asering a cold loaf on hot ones, due to a statement of Rebbi Alai, who proves from the Pasuk "ve'Lo Sis'u Alav Chet, be'Harimchem es Chelbo Mimenu" - that if one took T'rumah from inferior produce to cover superior produce, one is Yotze (because otherwise, what sin would he have performed?).

(d) Ravina has a problem with Rebbi Meir permitting the Ma'asering of one shape loaf to cover another, because maybe the Nachtom (the retail bakery) purchased his wares from different bakers, some of whom Ma'asered, and some of whom did not. If he were to separate ...

1. ... min ha'Chiyuv al ha'P'tur - then he would be giving the Kohen Tevel.
2. ... min ha'P'tur al ha'Chiyuv - he would subsequently eat Tevel.

(a) Abaye will deal with Ravina's problem after he has reviewed the entire Sugya. He justifies Rebbi Elazar's asking how it is that the Chachamim decreed the same stringency on T'rumas Ma'aser shel D'mai as the Torah decreed on T'rumas Ma'aser. The problem he has with ...

1. ... Shmuel, who established our Mishnah like Rebbi Meir, because we have seen that he is stringent by Gitin is - that perhaps Rebbi Meir's stringency is confined to Gitin, whose basic Chiyuv involves Miysah bi'Yedei Shamayim, but not to Terumah, whose basic Chiyuv is only Miysah bi'Yedei Shamayim.
2. ... Rav Sheishes, who then asked from Pidyon Ma'aser Sheini, where Rebbi Meir is lenient - that perhaps Rebbi Meir is only lenient there, because the basic Chiyuv is a La'av ("Lo Suchal Le'echol bi'She'arecha"), but not in a case which the basic Chiyuv is Miysah bi'Yedei Shamayim.

(b) About Rav Yosef, who answers Rav Sheishes Kashya by differentiating between Pidyon and Achilah - he concedes that, even though Rav Sheishes' Kashya was not justified, having asked it, the answer Rav Yosef gave is correct.

(a) Concerning Ravina's Kashya from a Nachtom (where Rebbi Meir is lenient), Abaye says that he should rather have cited the Mishnah in D'mai concerning a Palter - a wholesale bread merchant, who buys from many bakers and sells to the stores (the equivalent of a Sitton regarding wheat).

(b) Rebbi Meir says there - that someone who buys different shape loaves from a Palter, must Ma'aser from each shape that he buys individually.

(c) We will then answer Ravina's Kashya from a Nachtom - by differentiating between him and a Paltar, because, whereas the latter buys from many different bakers, the former only buys from one (irrespective of the fact that his breads are a variety of shapes).

(d) Rava disagree with Abaye's statement regarding Shmuel. According to him - there is no difference between Miysas Beis-Din and Miysah bi'Yedei Shamayim. If they decreed on the one, they also decreed on the other.

(a) Our Mishnah lists three things, besides Hekdesh, that are not subject to Ona'ah - Avadim, Sh'taros and Karka'os.

(b) 'Hekdesh' either refers to the treasurer of Hekdesh who sold a Tamei or blemished animal, or the owner of a Hekdesh animal that the owner sold after it became blemished.

(c) Besides Tashlumei Kefel of a Ganav, these four things are not subject to -Tashlumei Arba'ah va'Chamishah, should the Ganav then sell or Shecht the stolen animal.

(d) Seeing as Arba'ah va'Chamishah are confined to an ox and a lamb, the Tana needs to mention that these four things are not subject to it - because of Hekdesh.

(a) The Tana says ...

1. ... that a Shomer Chinam - is exempt from swearing (that he was not negligent) over the four things listed in the Mishnah, and ...
2. ... that a Shomer Sachar is exempt from paying (should they get stolen or lost).

(b) Rebbi Shimon disagrees with the Tana Kama's statement precluding all Kodshim from Ona'ah - because he includes Kodshim she'Chayav be'Achariyusan' (when the owner declared 'Harei Alai', and designated the animal afterwards, in which case he will be responsible to bring another animal, should anything happen to it).

(c) And he concede to the Tana Kama - Kodshim she'Eino Chayav ba'Achariyusan (when he declared 'Harei Zu', in which case he will not be responsible to replace it).

(d) Rebbi Yehudah lists three things that are not subject to Ona'ah. One of them is a Seifer-Torah, the other two are - an animal and a jewel.

8)

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah derives the four things in our Mishnah from from the Pasuk in Behar "ve'Chi Simkeru Mimkar la'Amisecha, O Kanoh mi'Yad Amisecha, Lo Sonu ... '. He learns from ...

1. ... "mi'Yad" - that Karka, which cannot be held in the hand, is not subject to Ona'ah.
2. ... "Mimkar" - that Sh'taros, which do not have an intrinsic value, are not subject to Ona'ah.
3. ... "Al Tonu Ish es *Achiv* - that Hekdesh is not subject to Ona'ah either.

(b) The Tana learns that Avadim are not subject to Ona'ah - from the fact that Avadim are compared to Karka (in Behar, where the Torah writes "ve'Hisnachaltem Osam li'V'neichem ... ").

(c) It is sometimes possible for Sh'taros to be subject to Ona'ah if - they are sold as paper (for example, if one sells them to a spice-merchant, who uses them to wrap his powdered spices).

(d) The Chachamim deemed it necessary to teach us this - based on the fact that the spice-merchants would only pay P'rutos for them, to preclude from the opinion of Rav Kahana, who holds 'Ein Ona'ah li'P'rutos (as that is all the spice-merchant would usually pay for the Sh'taros).

(a) Rabah bar Mamal asks from the Pasuk "va'Yikach es Kol Artzo *mi'Yado*" - from which we see that the Torah's use of the word "Yad" is metaphorical (meaning 'possession'), on the previous D'rashah, which precludes Karka from Ona'ah, from the word "mi'Yad".

(b) We counter that by citing two other Pesukim. We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Im *Himatzei Simatzei* be'Yado ha'Geneivah" - that one even has to pay Kefel for a stolen animal that the Ganav acquired by leading it on to his roof, into his courtyard or into his enclosure.
2. ... "*ve'Nasan* be'Yadah" - that a woman is divorced even if her husband places her Get in her garden, courtyard or enclosure.

(c) We now learn from these Pesukim - that "Yad" per se means specifically 'hand'.

(d) And we answer Rabah bar Mamal's Kashya - by pointing out that in that particular instance (by "va'Yikach es Kol Artzo mi'Yado") only, 'Yad' is not literal, because it is impossible to be, but wherever it can be, it is.

(a) Rebbi Zeira asks whether Sechirus is subject to Ona'ah or not - whether "Mimkar" in the Pasuk must be taken literally (to preclude Sechirus, which is not generally referred to as a sale) or not.

(b) Abaye resolves it - by interpreting "Mimkar" as an all-embracing word, which incorporates a temporary sale (Sechirus) no less than a permanent one.

(a) Rava asked whether planted wheat is subject to Ona'ah. His She'eilah is whether we consider planted wheat as a separate entity (as if it was placed in a jar), or whether it is Batel to the ground (and Karka, as we have already learned, is not subject to Ona'ah). The She'eilah applies specifically to seeds that have not yet taken root; once they have, they are certainly considered Karka.

(b) The She'eilah cannot pertain to a case where the seller claims to have planted six Sa'ah, whereas witnesses testify that he planted only five, because of another statement of Rava, where he said - 'Kol Davar she'be'Midah, ve'she'be'Mishkal ve'she'be'Minyan Afilu Pachos mi'Ch'dei Ona'ah Chozer' (in other words, even though Ona'ah does not apply to them, Bitul Mekach does).

(c) The case of Rava's She'eilah of Ona'ah regarding the seeds is - if Reuven agrees to sell Shimon a plot of land which is sown in the conventional manner, but in which he had planted only five Sa'ah instead of the conventional six.

(d) Rava also asks whether the Din Shevu'ah applies to planted seeds - where Reuven claims that he gave Shimon six Sa'ah to plant and that he only planted five, whereas Shimon counters that he planted five and a half.

(a) And finally, he asks whether the Omer (which was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan) would permit planted seeds or not. He cannot be referring to Gidulin - that grew from the seeds, because we know already from the Mishnah in Menachos, that if the seeds took root before the Omer, they are permitted, and if not, they are forbidden.

(b) He must therefore be referring to the seeds themselves, that have neither taken root nor grown into wheat.

(c) The seeds might be ...

1. ... permitted - because we consider them as if they were lying in a jar (as we explained earlier) and are permitted.
2. ... forbidden - because they are Batel to the ground, in which case the Omer will not permit them.

(d) The outcome of the She'eilah is - 'Teiku'.