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Bava Metzia, 106

1) AGADAH: INEXACT PRAYER

The Gemara says that when a sharecropper ("Chocher") does not plant the type of crop that he told the owner that he would plant, and then the crop that he planted is smitten by blight, even if all of the surrounding fields are also smitten he may not pay a reduced fee for the land. The Gemara explains that the reason is because the owner can claim, "I prayed that Hashem would protect the type of crop that I wanted you to plant there. Had you planted that type of crop for which I prayed, then Hashem would have listened to my prayers. Now that you planted a different crop, my prayers were meaningless!" (RASHI DH v'Sigzar Omer).

The MESHECH CHOCHMAH (Parshas Chukas) finds a source for this concept in the Torah. The Torah says that when Amalek came to attack Yisrael in the year before they entered Eretz Yisrael, the Amalekim spoke the language of the Kena'anim in order to confound the prayers of the Jewish people. The Jewish people would think that the approaching enemies were Kena'anim and would pray to Hashem to vanquish the Kena'anim. The Jewish people, however, saw that something was amiss when they saw the Amaleki clothing and heard the language of Kena'an. They decided to pray to Hashem to save them from the approaching enemy without specifying a name, but by praying that Hashem should defeat "that nation." We see from here that prayers are not answered if a person prays for one thing thinking that it is something else.

We might ask that according to this, the sharecropper should reply to the field owner that he should not have prayed for a specific crop, but rather he should have prayed for whatever crop is planted in the field! The answer is that TOSFOS (DH l'Nisa) writes that it takes a much greater Nes for a person's prayers to be answered if he does not articulate the specific item for which he is praying. Tosfos' source might be based on the question that we asked. The reason why the field owner can justify his praying for a specific type of crop is because he did not feel himself worthy of being answered if he would not specify the crop, because that would require a much greater Nes.

QUESTION: The Gemara says that when a sharecropper ("Chocher") does not plant the type of crop that he told the owner that he would plant, and then the crop that he planted is smitten by blight, even if all of the surrounding fields are also smitten he may not pay a reduced fee for the land. The Gemara explains that the reason is because the owner can claim, "I prayed that Hashem would protect the type of crop that I wanted you to plant there. Had you planted that type of crop for which I prayed, then Hashem would have listened to my prayers. Now that you planted a different crop, my prayers were meaningless!" (RASHI DH v'Sigzar Omer; see previous Insight).

Why does the field owner win with this claim, such that he may force the sharecropper to pay him the full amount of the "Chakirus?" The sharecropper should be able to counter-claim that there was no certainty that Hashem would have answered the field owner's prayers even if the proper crop was planted! Since it is a Safek, the sharecropper should not be forced to pay (since, in any monetary case involving a Safek, we apply the rule of "ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro Alav ha'Ra'ayah"). (D'VAR YAKOV)

ANSWER: The D'VAR YAKOV answers by quoting the RAMACH (as cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) who says that by deviating from the agreement and planting a different crop, the sharecropper is considered to have been "Poshe'a." Therefore, he has the "lower hand" and the burden of proof is shifted to him to prove that the prayer of the field owner would *not* have been answered.

QUESTION: Rav Sheshes cites a Beraisa which a Beraisa which states that if a shepherd leaves his herd to come into the city, and a wolf or lion comes and attacks the herd, we evaluate whether he would have been able to protect the herd had he been there. If we assess that he would have been able to protect the herd, then he is Chayav (see Insights to Bava Metzia 93b), and if we assess that he would not have been able to defeat the lion, he is exempt. Rav Sheshes asks that in either case the shepherd should be Chayav, because the owner can claim, "Had you been there, a miracle would have happened for me and the verse 'Gam Es ha'Ari, Gam ha'Dov, Hikah Avdecha' would have applied to me!" The Gemara answers that the shepherd can counter-claim that had the owner truly been worthy of a miracle, his herd would have been saved even without the shepherd being there. The Gemara asks that the owner should be able to retort, "Had you been there, it would have required only a small miracle to save them, for which I am worthy; but I am not worthy of a big miracle (that they should be saved with no one there!" (The Gemara leaves this question unanswered.)

If the field owner is worthy of a small miracle, as he claims, then why did wild animals come in the first place to attack his flock? The fact that they came to attack in the first place shows that he is not worthy for even a small miracle! (TORAS CHAIM)

ANSWER: The TORAS CHAIM answers that the field owner can still claim that he indeed is worthy of a small miracle, and the reason why his flock was attacked in the first place is because had a small miracle happened and no wild animals attacked the flock, then no one would have known about the miracle that happened. Hashem wanted to do a miracle for him that he would recognize so that he would be able to give thanks and praise to Hashem.

106b

OPINIONS: The Tana Kama of the Mishnah states that if a sharecropper arranged with the field owner that he would plant barley in the field, he is not permitted to plant wheat. If the agreement was that he would plant wheat, though, he is permitted to plant barley. The reason is because wheat weakens a field much more than barley, and therefore he may not plant wheat if the field owner agreed only to barley.

Does the rule of the Mishnah apply to both forms of sharecropping -- "Kablanus" and "Chakirus," or only to one of them?

(a) RASHI (DH Lo Yizranah) explains that the Mishnah's rule applies only in a case of "Chakirus." Since the field owner will receive the same payment regardless of what the field produces, he certainly does not want his field to be weakened by wheat being planted there. However, says Rashi, in a case of "Kablanus," the sharecropper *may* deviate and plant barley instead of wheat. Since the field owner receives a percentage of the yield of the field, we assume that he prefers to receive a superior crop (wheat) and to suffer some weakening of his field than to receive an inferior crop (barley) and not to have proper food to eat.

Rashi proves this from the Gemara earlier (104b), which discusses a case in which a sharecropper agreed to plant sesame (a superior crop) on a field, and then he instead planted wheat, which depletes the land *less* than sesame, and the field produced wheat worth as much as sesame would have been worth. Rav Ashi there rules that the field owner does *not* have to deduct the amount that he saved as a result of the field not being weakened as much, and thus receive a lesser share, since he would prefer to suffer the weakening of his land than a loss of some of his sustenance.

The Acharonim question Rashi's explanation. The field owner is entitled to claim that he prefers that his land be weakened if it means that he will receive more or better sustenance only when the field owner told the sharecropper to plant a *superior* type of crop (like sesame) which weakens the land considerably, and the sharecropper planted a crop (wheat) that does not weaken the field as much. In our case, though, the field owner told the sharecropper to plant an *inferior* crop (barley) in order that his field not be weakened! In such a case, the sharecropper certainly should not be permitted to deviate and plant a crop that weakens the field considerably (even if it is a better crop)! (TORAS CHAIM, CHOCHMAS SHLOMO in Gilyonos to Shulchan Aruch CM 324, as cited by the D'VAR YAKOV)

(b) The RAMBAN (as cited by the Hagahos ha'Gra) explains in the opposite manner, that the Mishnah is referring *only* to a case of "Kablanus" and *not* to a case of "Chakirus." In the case of "Kablanus," the field owner wants *only* the crop that he told the sharecropper to plant, since the owner receives a portion of the produce that grows in the field, and he does not want the sharecropper to plant a different type of crop. In a case of "Chakirus," though, he does not care what the sharecropper plants, since he receives the same payment regardless.

The Acharonim also question the Ramban's explanation. In a case of "Chakirus," the field owner is entitled to receive his set payment from produce that comes from his field itself, as the Gemara earlier (105a) says. He should be able, therefore, to prevent the sharecropper from planting a different type of crop, even in a case of "Chakirus!" (TOSFOS YOM TOV, TAZ to Choshen Mishpat 324)

The TAZ answers that according to the Gemara's conclusion there, the owner cannot claim that he wants only produce from his own land (see also Insights to Bava Metzia 105:1).

The D'VAR YAKOV cites the CHOCHMAS SHLOMO and RASHASH, who answer based on the words of the NIMUKEI YOSEF. They explain that only when there is a crop growing in his field may the owner insist that he receive his payment from the crop from his field. When there is no crop growing in his field, he cannot insist that the sharecropper grow that crop in his field to give to him, but rather he must accept produce bought in the market. Thus, in a case of "Chakirus," the field owner cannot insist that the sharecropper plant barley because he wants barley from his field, since there presently is no barley growing in his field.