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1)

(a) According to the Neherda'a, one is not permitted to write an Urch'sa on Metaltelin.
What is an 'Urch'sa'?

(b) Ameimar explained to Rav Ashi that the reason for this is a statement issued by Rebbi Yochanan.
Which statement?

(c) What are the ramifications of the Neherdai's ruling?

(d) The second Lashon qualifies the statement, limiting it to Metaltelin which the guardian denied.
What is then the reason for the ruling?

(a) The Neherda'a also insist that an Urch'sa must contain the statement 'Zil Don ve'Zachi ve'Apich Lenafshech'.
Why is that?

(b) Abaye validates the Urch'sa even if the owner restricted this to a half, a third or a quarter.
Why is that?

(c) According to Ameimar, if he seized the article, he is permitted to retain it. This appears to pertain to the Sheli'ach who claimed the article on behalf of the owner, even though the owner had failed to add the required wording on the Sh'tar.
What is the preferred explanation however?

(d) Rav Ashi disagrees with Ameimar in this point.
What does he say?

(a) According to others, the owner makes him a partner.
What are the ramifications of this ruling?

(b) What is the Halachah?

(a) A Ganav who Shechts or sells a sheep or an ox pays Daled ve'Hey. Will it make any difference whether the witnesses who testify that he Shechted or sold the animal are the same ones who testified that he stole it, or different ones?

(b) What does our Mishnah say about ...

1. ... 'Ganav u'Machar be'Shabbos', 'Ganav u'Machar la'Avodah-Zarah', Ganav mi'shel Aviv ve'Tavach u'Machar, ve'Achar-Kach Meis Aviv'? What do all of these have in common?
2. ... 'Ganav ve'Tavach, ve'Achar-Kach Hikdish'?

(c) According to the Tana Kama, the Ganav is also obligated to pay Daled ve'Hey in the following cases 'Ganav ve'Tavach li'Refu'ah O li'Kelavim', 'ha'Shochet ve'Nimtza'as T'reifah' and 'ha'Shochet Chulin ba'Azarah'.
What does Rebbi Shimon say with regard to this list?

(d) What is the basis for the Halachic distinction between the first two cases in the list and the last two?

(a) Who was Aba Chalafta?

(b) When Aba Chalafta went to learn by Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, or vice-versa, what did they unanimously agree with regard to someone who ate one year's produce in a field (on which he was making a three-year Chazakah) in front of one set of witnesses, a second year's produce in front of a second set and a third year's produce in front of a third set?

(c) He quoted Rebbi Akiva, who disagreed? On what grounds should this not constitute a Chazakah?

(d) How does this prompt us to suggest that the author of our Mishnah cannot be Rebbi Akiva? With which section of our Mishnah would Rebbi Akiva appear to be arguing?

6)

(a) We answer the previous Kashya by citing a case where one set of witnesses testify that a woman is betrothed and a second set, that she sis married.
Why do we take for granted that Rebbi Akiva will agree that this case is not one of Chatzi Eidus?

(b) On what basis do we compare our case (of Eidei Geneivah) to that case?

(c) Initially, we try to say that Aba Chalafta and Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri use "Davar" to preclude where one witness testifies that a girl has one hair on the back of her hand, and another, that she has one on her stomach.
On what basis do we refute this suggestion?

(a) Then what *do* the Rabbanan learn from "Davar"?

(b) What makes this case worse than that of Chazakah?

(a) We learned in our Mishnah 'Ganav u'Machar be'Shabbos, Chayav Daled ve'Hey'.
How does Rami bar Chama reconcile this with a Beraisa which exempts him? How must the Beraisa be speaking?

(b) On what grounds do we initially reject his explanation?

(a) Rav Papa establishes the Beraisa when the buyer instructed the Ganav to throw the stolen article into his Chatzer on Shabbos.
Why is this case better than the previous one? Why is the sale now valid?

(b) We try to establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Akiva.
What does Rebbi Akiva say about 'K'lutah'? What is 'K'lutah'?

(c) What is the problem with establishing the Beraisa like the Rabbanan of Rebbi Akiva? What would they say in the case of the Beraisa?

(d) How do we finally establish the Beraisa even like the Rabbanan?

(a) Rava concurs with Rami bar Chama, and he answers the Kashya we asked (from the fact that the sale is not valid anyway) by saying 'Esnan Asrah Torah, va'Afilu Ba Al Imo'.
What does he mean by that?

(b) How does he consider our case similar to that of Esnan? On what grounds will the purchaser be Chayav Daled ve'Hey, even if the sale came into effect by his picking a fig on Shabbos, where the sale is invalid?

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