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1)

(a) From the next Mishnah 'ha'Nosen Tzemer le'Tzove'a ve'Hikdicho Yoreh, Nosen Lo D'mei Tzimro' - we extrapolate that the dyer pays the owner for his wool, but not for the Sh'vach, a proof for Rav Asi, who holds 'Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li'.

(b) Shmuel refutes this proof - by establishing the Beraisa when the wool got burned as soon as it fell into the cauldron, in which case there is no Sh'vach.

(c) Shmuel appears to argue with Rav Asi (and to hold 'Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li'). It is important to know his opinion in this matter - because when he argues with Rav Asi, we rule like him.

(a) We initially reject the suggestion that Shmuel argues with Rav Asi, by establishing the Mishnah when the wool and the dye both belong to the owner - in which case, 'Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li' is not applicable, because the dyer only has the status of a paid worker.

(b) We reject this answer however, on the grounds that, if that was the case - then the Tana should have said 'Nosen Lo D'mei Tzimro ve'Samemanim'.

(c) We nevertheless reconcile Shmuel with Rav Asi - inasmuch as he may only be suggesting that is might be what the Tana says (meaning that there is no proof for Rav Asi for here), but not that this is what he actually says (in which case there would be is a proof against Rav Asi).

(a) The La'av of "Lo Salin" is - the transgression of not paying night workers by the end of the following day, and day workers by the end of the following night.

(b) The owner does not transgress this La'av even if the laundryman to whom he handed his cloak for cleaning informs him that it is ready for collection, and he fails to pay until ten days later - because "Lo Salin" in such a case will only take effect once he receives his finished article.

(c) According to the Tana of the Beraisa (who is clearly speaking about a night-worker), if the owner collects his cloak at midday - he will transgress "Lo Salin" already at sunset.

(d) This Beraisa appears to pose a Kashya on Rav Asi - according to whom, he ought not to transgress "Lo Salin" at all, because the laudry-man will acquire the cloak as soon as he finishes laundering it.

(a) We try to answer that he handed the laudry-man the cloak, not to wash, but to comb, in which case there is no Sh'vach. This suggestion is unacceptable however - because there is no reason for a combed garment not to be considered a Sh'vach any less than a washed one.

(b) Rav Mari B'rei de'Rav Kahana finally establishes the Beraisa 'de'Agra li'Bitushi ... ' which means - that he hired the laundryman to beat the garment ...

(c) ... 'Bitcha Bitcha be'Masa' - at one Ma'ah per stroke, which places him in the category of a 'Schir Yom', who (even Rav Asi will agree) does not acquire the article that he completes.

(a) Originally, we thought that the laundryman is a Kablan - who gets paid for the job (rather than for the time).

(b) This interpretation of the Beraisa supports Rav Sheishes who rules - that a Kablan, like a S'chir Yom, is subject to the La'av of "Lo Salin".

(c) Rav Sheishes appears to argue with Rav Asi, according to whom, the laundryman in the Beraisa ought to acquire the cloak (and be Patur from the damage). Rav Shmuel bar Acha however, reconciles Rav Sheishes with Rav Asi - by establishing "Lo Salin" according to him, by a postman who gets paid for delivering a letter by hand, in which case there is no Sh'vach.

(a) If a woman asks a man to betroth her with the bracelets, nose-rings and finger-rings that he makes her, Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa validates the Kidushin as soon as they are completed. The Chachamim - invalidate the Kidushin until he gives her 'money'.

(b) When the Chachamim say 'Ad she'Yagi'a Mamon le'Yadah', they cannot be referring to the finished product - because if Rebbi Meir, who argues, does not even require that, with what would she be Mekudeshes?

(c) We assume therefore, that they mean other money, and the basis of their Machlokes is - whether 'Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li' (Rebbi Meir), or 'Ein Uman Koneh ... ' (the Rabbanan). We are trying to prove that Rav Asi holds like Rebbi Meir.

(d) According to this interpretation of the Beraisa, both Tana'im hold ...

1. ... 'Yeshnah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah ve'Ad Sof'.
2. ... 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milvah Einah Mekudeshes'.

(a) We counter this by establishing the Machlokes by 'S'chirus' (Rebbi Meir holds 'Ein li'Sechirus Ela be'Sof', and the Rabbanan, 'Yeshnah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah ve'Ad Sof') - and both will agree that 'Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li '.

(b) Alternatively, both Tana'im hold 'Yeshanah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah ve'Ad Sof', and they argue over 'Mekadesh be'Milveh' - Rebbi Meir holds Mekudeshes, the Rabbanan, 'Einah Mekudeshes'.

(c) According to Rava, both Tana'im hold 'Yeshanah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah ve'Ad Sof', ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh Einah Mekudeshes' andd Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li'. The source of their Machlokes is - whether 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh u'P'rutah, Da'ato a'Milveh' or 'Da'ato a'P'rutah' (as we shall now see).

8)

(a) According to Rava, Rebbi Meir holds 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh u'Perutah, Da'atah a'P'rutah'. The Rabbanan say - 'Da'atah a'Milveh'.

(b) In another Beraisa, the Tana Kama differentiates between 'bi'S'char she'Asisi Imach' and 'bi'S'char she'E'eseh Imach'. They say ...

1. ... 'Einah Mekudeshes', in the former case - because of the principle 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh, Einah Mekudeshes'.
2. ... 'Mekudeshes', in the latter case - because they hold 'Einah li'Sechirus Ela li'be'Sof', and as soon as he gives her the article, she is Mekudeshes.

(c) Rebbi Nasan says that in the case of 'bi'S'char she'E'eseh Imach', she is not Mekudeshes (even though we might have said 'Einah li'Sechirus Ela li'be'Sof'), how much more so, in the case of 'bi'S'char she'Asisi Imach' (where it is not applicable).

(d) He argues ...

1. ... with the Tana Kama - inasmuch as he holds 'Yeshnah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah ve'Ad Sof'.
2. ... with Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi, who concedes that she is not Mekudeshes in either of the two case - but adds that if he gives her something in addition, she is Mekudeshes (because 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh u'Perutah, Da'atah a'Perutah'), whereas Rebbi Nasan holds that even then, she will not be Mekudeshes, because he holds ' ... Da'atah a'Milveh'.

(a) Shmuel says that if a skilled Shochet rendered an animal Neveilah with his Shechitah - he is obligated to pay, because 'Mazik Hu, Poshe'a Hu, Na'aseh ke'Omer Lo, Sh'chot Li mi'Ka'an, ve'Shachat Lo mi'Ka'an'.

(b) Having said 'Mazik Hu', he nevertheless needs to add 'Poshe'a Hu' - to teach us that he is even Chayav to pay if he Shechted for free (i.e. because he is a Poshe'a, and not just an O'nes).

(c) In a case where the Shochet was not skilled - he would most certainly be liable to pay.

(d) A Beraisa quoted by Rav Chama bar Guri'a discussing the above case - exempts a skilled Shochet from paying, but obligates an unskilled one.

(a) When ...

1. ... Rav Chama bar Guri'ah asked on him from this Beraisa - he was extremely annoyed.
2. ... another Talmid-Chacham asked him the same question - he informed that he too, would feel the brunt of his wrath, just like his colleague.

(b) He was annoyed with them - because, he pointed out, had they studied his words more carefully ('Mazik Hu Poshei'a Hu, Na'aseh ke'Omer Lo ... ') they would have noticed that he was speaking according to the opinion of Rebbi Meir (as we will now clarify), whereas the Beraisa they quoted, follows the opinion of the Rabbanan (Rebbi Yehudah).

(c) Shmuel could not have been referring to Rebbi Meir in the Mishnah ...

1. ... in 'Shor she'Nagach Daled ve'Hey' 'Kashro Bes'alav be'Moseiro ve'Na'al be'Fanav Kara'uy ve'Yatza ve'Hizik, Bein Tam Bein Mu'ad Chayav' - because his reason there is based on a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, and has nothing to do with our case.
2. ... later in this Perek 'Litz'bo'a Lo Adom, ve'Tzav'o Shachor ... Rebbi Meir Omer Nosen Li D'mei Tzimro' - because there he us Chayav to pay because he performed the damage deliberately (whereas in our case, he certainly did not intend to render the animal a Neveilah).

(d) In fact, he was referring to the Mishnah in ha'Meni'ach, where Rebbi Meir said - 'Nishberah Kado ve'Lo Silko, Nafal Gamlo ve'Lo He'emido Chayav', because he holds 'Niskal Poshe'a' (someone who walks without due care and slips and falls, is considered negligent, and we now see that the same applies to someone who Shechts without due care and renders the animal a Neveilah.

(a) Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan says - that 'Tabach Uman she'Kilkel Chayav, va'Afilu Hu Uman ke'Tavchei Tzipori'.

(b) We reconcile this ruling with the episode in the Beis ha'Kenesses of Ma'on, where Rebbi Yochanan told a Shochet who rendered an animal a Neveilah, that if he could prove that he was a skilled Shochet, he would be Patur from paying - by establishing the latter case when he Shechted free of charge (because unlike Shmuel, he does not consider him to be a Poshei'a), whereas the former refers to a case where the Shochet gets paid (and he is Chayav because he is a Mazik).

(c) Rebbi Zeira advises anyone who wants to ensure that the Shochet accepts responsibility, should he render the animal a Neveilah - to pay him a small fee.

(a) The Beraisa rules - that a grinder who failed to soak the grains in boiling water, and ended up making inferior-quality bread, and a Shochet who rendered the animal a Neveilah - is Chayav to pay.

(b) The Beraisa concludes 'Mipnei she'Hu *ke*'Nosei Sachar' - implying that this is the Halachah even if he did take a fee, a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan.

(c) We amend the Beraisa to read - 'Miknei she'Hu Nosei Sachar' (absolving him from the obligation to pay should he Shecht free of charge).

(a) A Magrumta came before Rav - meaning that the Shochet had Shechted the Taba'as (one of the laryngeal cartilage's) on top of the animal's neck, but the knife slipped and he cut the last bit outside the Taba'os before he finished cutting it. Rav ruled that the animal was T'reifah but that the Shochet was Patur from paying.

(b) The Safek was whether to rule like the Chachamim who renders the animal a Neveilah, or like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who renders it Kasher as long as he Shechted the majority of the Taba'as before the knife slipped.

(c) Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to the owner of the animal 'Avid Bach Tarti', which for a fleeting moment, we take to mean that Rav issued two incorrect rulings - 1. that he should have declared the animal Kasher, like Rebbi b'Rebbi Yehudah; 2. that having declared the animal T'reifah, he should have obligated the Shochet to pay.

(d) They cannot possibly have meant that however - since (based on the Pasuk in Mishlei "Holech Rachil u'Megaleh Sod"), the Beraisa expressly forbids a Dayan to inform the losing party that, had it been up to him, he would have ruled in his favor, but what could he do now that he was in the minority?

(e) So they must have meant that Rav did him two favors - 1. that he stopped him from eating a Safek Isur (by ruling like the Rabbanan; 2. that he prevented him from Safek Gezeilah (by absolving the Shochet from paying [in case the Halachah is like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah]).

(a) We learned two Beraisos regarding a banker who validates a coin which is later found to be Pasul. One Beraisa rules that an expert banker is Patur, whereas one who is not an expert is liable.
The second Beraisa says - that either way, he is Chayav?

(b) In establishing the first Beraisa, Rav Papa mentions Danku and Isur - two supreme experts who had nothing more to learn about coins.

(c) In spite of their expertise, they could err in their assessment - assuming that the coin that they inspected had just been withdrawn and replaced and they were not yet aware of the change.

(d) The woman whose coin Rebbi Chiya (who was an expert banker) had declared to be a good coin, informed him the following day that it had been proven to be Pasul (under circumstances similar to those that we described by Danko and Isur). Despite the fact that Rebbi Chiya was no less an expert than Danko and Isur, he instructed Rav to replace the Dinar and to mark in his ledger that this had been a bad deal - because he went Lif'nim mi'Shuras ha'Din (beyond the letter of the law).