The Gemara initially answers that the Tana of the Mishnah is Rebbi Shimon,
who holds that when a person sanctifies an animal to be Kodshim in such a
way that he is responsible for it if it is lost ("Kodshim she'Chayav
b'Achrayusan"), then it is considered to still be his property, and thus the
Ganav has not transferred the ownership of the animal to another domain by
making it Hekdesh. The Gemara refutes this answer by pointing out that the
end of the Mishnah quotes Rebbi Shimon, implying that the beginning of the
Mishnah is not Rebbi Shimon.
This answer is inherently problematic, though, for a different reason. The
Gemara's answer is based on the assumption that Rebbi Shimon holds that
"ha'Gorem l'Mamon, k'Mamon Dami" even for an item that is physically
present. "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" refers to an object which the owner does
not have the right to eat, use, or derive benefit from it in any way, such
as the animal that is Hekdesh, and yet, if this object is destroyed, it
causes its owner a financial loss. Rebbi Shimon holds that such an item is
considered to be the property of the owner. Here, the Korban is not really
the possession of the owner, since it has been sanctified. However, if it is
lost, the owner will have to pay for it (by replacing it with another
animal), and thus this Korban is considered to be the money of the owner,
since he is responsible for it. However, the Gemara in Pesachim (6a) says
that Rebbi Shimon only holds that something which can cause a person a
financial loss is considered to be his property when that item is not
physically present or in existence ("Leisei b'Einei"), and when it has
already caused the owner a loss. For example, where the Ganav stole from
Reuven an animal that was already sanctified as a Korban, Reuven now has a
monetary obligation to replace that Korban, and thus it is considered his
property that the Ganav stole, and thus the Ganav must pay him Kefel. While
the Korban is still physically present in the possession of the person (the
Ganav, in our case), though, it is not considered to be his property,
"k'Mamon!" Why, then, when the Ganav makes it Hekdesh, is it not considered
a transfer of ownership like Mechirah?
(a) RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN (Kovetz Shiurim to Pesachim, #18) writes that
Kodshim for which the owner is Chayav b'Achrayusan is different than other
items that are "Gorem l'Mamon." In the case of other items that are "Gorem
l'Mamon," as long as the item is present, it is not considered the owner's
Mamon, because the owner has no right to use the item. Kodshim for which the
owner is Chayav b'Achrayusan, on the other hand, is considered to be the
Mamon of the owner even when it is still present, because the owner is
permitted to use it for some purpose. He may use it to fulfill a
Neder-obligation of his that existed before he sanctified this animal.
Therefore, Rebbi Shimon holds that this item of Kodshim, too, is considered
the owner's Mamon, even though it is still present.
(b) CHIDUSHEI RABEINU MEIR SIMCHAH here writes that in this case, too, the
Korban is considered "Leisei b'Einei," not physically present. This is
because the Ganav was Koneh it for himself when he made it Hekdesh, through
Shinuy Reshus and Yi'ush. However, the Ganav cannot bring this animal as a
Korban, because this Korban itself is Pasul, because it is a "Mitzvah
ha'Ba'ah b'Aveirah," and because the verse ("Korbano") teaches that it must
be *his* Korban and not a stolen animal. Thus, the Ganav is Chayav to bring
a replacement animal instead of this Korban that he sanctified, and he must
let the one that he sanctified graze until it gets a blemish, and therefore
this Korban is already considered as though it is no longer present, "Leisei
b'Einei," and it is causing the Ganav a financial loss (since he has to
replace it).
(c) The NETZIV (in Meromei Sadeh) answers in a completely different manner,
based on the Gemara in Pesachim (6a). The Gemara there (5b) says that Rava
told the inhabitants of Mechuza to burn the Chametz which Nochri soldiers
had deposited with them, because -- since they had accepted responsibility
should it become stolen or lost -- it was as if the Chametz was theirs. The
Gemara then cites two different versions of a question and answer on Rava's
ruling. The first version asks that Rava's ruling makes sense according to
the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, who holds that "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is
"k'Mamon Dami," for in this case the Chametz is a "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon"
since the Jews will be responsible for it if it is lost or stolen, and thus
it is like the Chametz is their own property. According to the Rabanan,
though, who hold that "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is *not* considered like
Mamon, how are we to understand Rava's ruling? The Chametz is not considered
to be the property of the Jews, so why should they have to destroy it? To
this the Gemara answers that Chametz is different, because the Torah
specifically states, "Lo Yimatzei," teaching that even if the Chametz is not
the monetary property of the one in physical possession of it, nevertheless
since he accepted responsibility for it he is obligated to burn it as if it
belonged to him.
The second version of the Gemara's question there asks that Rava's ruling
makes sense according to the opinion of the *Rabanan*, who hold that "Davar
ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is *not* considered like Mamon. That is why it is
necessary for the Torah to state the extra verse of "Lo Yimatzei" -- to
teach that even when the Chametz is not the Mamon of the one in possession
of it, he is still obligated to burn it. According to Rebbi Shimon, though,
who holds that "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is "k'Mamon Dami," it is logical
that one must burn all Chametz for which one is responsible, since it is
considered to be his own Chametz, so why do we need a special verse of "Lo
Yimatzei?"
The Gemara answers that Rebbi Shimon also requires a special verse in this
case. Without the verse, we would have said that the only time that "Davar
ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is considered like Mamon is when the item is "Leisei
b'Einei," when the item is lost or stolen, and that is why it is considered
Mamon. When the item is still present -- such as the Chametz, which is still
there, though, it is not considered his Mamon since he has not yet become
obligated to pay for it, as it has not been lost or stolen. Consequently,
even according to Rebbi Shimon it would not be considered his property if
not for the verse of "Lo Yimatzei."
The Netziv points out that according to the first version in the Gemara
there, there was no question why the verse of "Lo Yimatzei" was necessary
according to Rebbi Shimon. Why was this not a question according to the
first version? Why indeed is a special verse for Chametz necessary, if Rebbi
Shimon holds that an item for which a person is responsible is considered
his Mamon? The Netziv answers that the Chidush of Rava there was that even
responsibility for Geneivah and Aveidah alone obligates the person to burn
the Chametz of the Nochrim. This implies that the Jews did not accept
responsibility for an Ones that might happen to the Chametz, but only for
Geneivah and Aveidah, and the soldiers indeed would not have held the Jews
responsible for an Ones. Accordingly, without the verse we might have
thought that whenever the one watching the Chametz does not have *full* and
absolute responsibility (which includes responsibility for any Ones that
might happen), he is not obligated to burn the Chametz. This is because the
reason why he would be obligated to burn the Chametz is because it is
considered to be his as a result of his responsibility to pay for it if
anything happens to it. But if he is exempt from paying for it if an Ones
happens to it, then it makes sense that it is not considered to be his,
since with regard to an Ones it is *not* a "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon."
Therefore, the first version in the Gemara knows that it is necessary to
have the verse "Lo Yimatzei," according to Rebbi Shimon, in order to teach
that even if the person watching the Chametz will not be responsible to pay
for it if an Ones happens, nevertheless it is considered his since he is
responsible for Geneivah and Aveidah and he must burn it.
The second version in the Gemara does not agree that this is why we need the
extra verse of "Lo Yimatzei," according to Rebbi Shimon. The second version
holds that indeed -- if the person is only responsible to pay for the
Chametz if it is lost or stolen, but not if an Ones occurs, then he indeed
is *not* required to burn it. He is only required to burn it if he is fully
responsible for the Chametz (including responsibility for any Ones that
might happen). This was the ruling of Rava, and, since this is logical, no
verse is necessary. This is also the view of *Rabah*, as TOSFOS (Bava Metzia
82a) points out. That is why the second version in the Gemara in Pesachim
must find a different reason for why the Torah writes the extra verse.
Our Sugya here in Bava Kama is not following the view of Rabah, because
Rabah holds that the Ganav is Koneh the item through Yi'ush alone. Since our
Sugya is not following the view of Rabah, it must also not hold like the
second version in the Gemara in Pesachim (which is in accordance with
Rabah). Rather, it must be following the first version there. According to
the first version, there is no difference whether the item is present ("Isei
b'Einei") or is no longer present ("Leisei b'Einei") -- in either case,
Rebbi Shimon holds that if it is a "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon," then it is
considered the Mamon of the owner.
(d) The answers mentioned above explain why Rebbi Shimon in our Gemara holds
that "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is "k'Mamon Dami" even when it is "Isei
b'Einei," when, in Pesachim, the Gemara says that he only holds that it is
"k'Mamon Dami" when it is "Leisei b'Einei." The MAHARIT ALGAZI (Hilchos
Chalah, #10) has a completely different approach (see also AFIKEI YAM 2:10).
He writes that the Gemara in Pesachim agrees that Rebbi Shimon holds that a
"Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is "k'Mamon Dami" *even* when it is still present
("Isei b'Einei"). When the Gemara there says otherwise, it is only the
initial assumption (Havah Amina) of the Gemara there. The Maskana of the
Gemara there is that once the Torah states the verse of "Lo Yimatzei" and
teaches that a person must burn Chametz that he does not legally own but for
which he has responsibility, we learn from there to all other cases in the
Torah that a "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is "k'Mamon Dami" even when the item
is still present.
(e) The DEVAR SHMUEL in Pesachim answers based on the words of the OR
SAME'ACH (Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 4:3), who says that there are two
separate Halachos involved with an item that is a "Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon."
The first Halachah is that the person owns only the monetary *value* of the
item, but not the actual *body* of the item itself. The second Halachah is
that the person owns even the actual body of the item itself. The second
Halachah, though, applies only when the item is no longer present, "Leisei
b'Einei."
The Devar Shmuel writes, based on this, that when the Gemara says that a
"Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon" is "k'Mamon Dami" even when it is present ("Isei
b'Einei"), it means that only the monetary value of the item belongs to the
person, but not the actual body of the item itself. With regard to Chametz,
though, in order to transgress the Isurim of "Bal Yera'eh and Bal Yimatzei,"
it does not suffice to own the monetary value of the item; the person must
own the actual body of the Chametz in order for it to be considered his
property such that he must burn it, but he does not own that part of the
item when it is "Isei b'Einei," as the Or Same'ach says.