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Bava Kama, 23

1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REBBI YOCHANAN AND REISH LAKISH WITH REGARD TO "ESH"

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that even Rebbi Yochanan, who says "Isho Mishum Chitzav," agrees that Esh is also considered "Mamono." Therefore, according to Rebbi Yochanan, if someone lights a fire in a walled area, and the wall falls down by itself, and the fire spreads to another field and burns grain because the owner was negligent and did not rebuild the wall, the owner of the fire will be Patur for damage done to Tamun (damage done to items that were hidden), since in such a case the fire is not considered to be Adam ha'Mazik, and yet he will be Chayav to pay for the field because of "Isho Mishum Mamono."

The Gemara asks that if Rebbi Yochanan agrees that "Isho Mishum Mamono," then what is the practical difference between Reish Lakish who says Esh is *only* "Mishum Mamono," and Rebbi Yochanan who says that Esh is *also* "Mishum Chitzav." The Gemara answers that the difference is whether the person is Chayav for Arba'ah Devarim. According to Rebbi Yochanan, a person must pay compensation of Tza'ar, Ripuy, and Sheves for damage done to another person by one's fire, because it is considered like Adam ha'Mazik (in a manner that is "Karov l'Mezid;" see Rashi 27a, DH v'Niska. RABEINU CHANANEL writes that the one who lit the fire is also Chayav to pay compensation of Boshes according to Rebbi Yochanan, since it is considered like a person who caused damage with full intent, completely "b'Mezid").

Why is the Gemara asking what the difference is between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish? The Gemara already mentioned a number of differences in the previous Sugya (22b), such as when a person's animal takes someone else's fire and causes it to burn down a field. According to Rebbi Yochanan, the owner of the animal pays Chatzi Nezek for the damage done to the entire field, while according to Reish Lakish, the owner of the dog is exempt for the damage done to the field (see Rashi, DH v'Chi me'Achar).

Also, if a person lights a fire that burns a bound slave, Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the one who lit the fire is Chayav Misah, since it is considered as though he killed the person directly, while Reish Lakish exempts him from Misah since he did not kill the person directly.

An even greater problem is why the Gemara does not use the practical difference that it mentions just one line earlier. According to Rebbi Yochanan, one is usually *Chayav* when his Esh burns something that is Tamun, since it is like Adam ha'Mazik (unless the fire is lit in a walled area, and the wall fell down on its own after the fire was lit, as we mentioned above). According to Reish Lakish, one is always exempt for Esh that burns Tamun, since it is never considered "Chitzav." (TOSFOS DH Mai Beinaihu)

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS answers that the Gemara could have suggested these differences as well. However, this answer is very forced, especially with regard to the last difference that we mentioned, which the Gemara has just discussed. Why should the Gemara search for a difference when it is in the middle of discussing one? (BI'UR HA'GRA, Choshen Mishpat 418:33)

Perhaps Tosfos means to say what the RA'AVAD, RASHBA and RI MI'GASH write (as cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes). The Gemara was looking for an *additional* practical difference, besides the ones that were mentioned earlier in the Gemara. (This is somewhat forced in the wording of the Gemara.)

RABEINU YEHONASAN and the RI MI'GASH add that the difference that the Gemara here suggests has much broader applications than the differences of "Tamun" and burning something with another person's fire have, since it theoretically could apply to any fire that was lit, and not just to certain fires in specific cases.

(b) RASHI in our Sugya answers that the words of Rebbi Yochanan, "*Isho* Mishum Chitzav," imply that he argues with Reish Lakish even with regard to a fire that belongs to the person who started it. That is why the Gemara does not use the difference of the dog that took someone else's coal and started a fire with it. Rashi does not address the differences of "Tamun" and of killing a person with one's fire. How will Rashi answer why the Gemara does not mention those differences when it asks for the practical difference between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish?

Perhaps the Gemara was not satisfied with giving the difference of "Tamun," since it was looking for a case in which Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue about *all* of the damage that the fire caused. With regard to a case of "Tamun," they both agree that one is obligated to pay for the wheat that hid the object, and even for the object that was Tamun they agree that one pays as though it were wheat. The argument in such a case is only whether one pays the *full* value of the object that was Tamun.

Regarding the difference of being Chayav Misah for killing the Eved (see MAHARAM SHIF), that difference was not sufficient because the Gemara was looking for a difference with regard to the Halachos of *monetary* damages and obligations (Nizkei Mamon), since Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish were discussing the Esh of our Mishnah, which is a case of monetary damages. (TALMID RABEINU TAM V'RABEINU ELIEZER).

(c) RABEINU PERETZ answers that the Gemara is looking for a difference between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish with regard to the case of Esh that is discussed in the Torah ("Ki Setzei Esh...," Shemos 22:5). The Esh of the verse is referring, first of all, to a person's own Esh that he lit. Second, it is not discussing Chiyuvei Misah. Third, it is not discussing Tamun, since one is exempt for Nizkei Tamun. Therefore, the Gemara gives the difference of Arba'ah Devarim, which applies to the Esh that the Torah discusses according to Rebbi Yochanan but does not apply to the Esh that the Torah discusses according to Reish Lakish.

(d) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Nizkei Mamon 14:15) seems to take a different approach to our Sugya. The Rambam rules like Rebbi Yochanan and writes that even though one is Chayav for Esh "Mishum Mamono," it is also considered as though one was Mazik directly, with his "Chitzav," meaning that Esh is considered both "Mamono" and "Chitzav."

The MAGID MISHNAH asks that if the Rambam rules like Rebbi Yochanan, then why does he write (Hilchos Nizkei Mamon 14:8-9) unequivocally that a person is exempt for damages of Tamun caused by Esh? The Gemara says that according to Rebbi Yochanan, a person is exempt from Tamun *only* in a case where he lit the fire in a walled Chatzer and then the wall collapsed by itself, and the fire went to another field and damaged items that were Tamun!

The Magid Mishnah concludes that the Rambam must have learned the Gemara differently, or that he preferred to explain all of the Mishnayos that exempt one from damages of Tamun in their most straightforward sense.

The VILNA GA'ON favors the first suggestion of the Magid Mishnah. The Rambam learned our Gemara's question differently from the other Rishonim.

The other Rishonim explain that if lighting a fire is tantamount to shooting an arrow, the Torah would not exempt one for damage done by fire to objects that are Tamun, just like it does not exempt one from damage done to objects that are Tamun that one damages directly, with his hands. However, the Rishonim ask why the Gemara assumes that the Torah cannot exempt one from damages of fire to Tamun if "Isho Mishum Chitzav?" We know that one is Patur for damage done by fire to Tamun from an inference in the verse (see 60a). Even if Adam ha'Mazik is Chayav for Tamun, the verse exempts one from damages of Esh to Tamun! (TOSFOS HA'ROSH, RASHBA; see TOSFOS DH Tamun.)

In addition, the Vilna Ga'on asks why does the Gemara ask "*where do we find* a case of Tamun for which one is Patur [according to Rebbi Yochanan]?" The Gemara should have phrased its question, "*Why* is one Patur for Tamun [according to Rebbi Yochanan]?"

Because of these questions, he explains that the Rambam understood the Gemara differently. The Gemara (61b) teaches that when a person lights a fire in someone else's field, he is not exempt for all items that are Tamun in the field. He is exempt only from paying for anything that is Tamun when he lights the fire in his own field and the fire spreads to someone else's field. The Gemara's question here is that if lighting a fire is like shooting an arrow, then whenever the fire causes damage in another field, it should be as if the person placed the fire in the other field directly, and he should be *Chayav* for Tamun! When the Gemara concludes that Rebbi Yochanan holds that Esh is also "Mishum Mamono," it means to say that with regard to this particular point, even though Esh is like shooting an arrow, it cannot be considered as though he lit the fire in the other person's field, but rather it is like property of his that wandered into another person's field by itself. The reason for this is that even after the fire is lit, the person can enclose his field with a fence such that the fire will not spread to the other person's field.

However, this difference between fire and an arrow applies only with regard to the exemption of Tamun (because of the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that teaches that one is Patur for Tamun). With regard to being Chayav for Arba'ah Devarim (and Chayav Misah for killing someone), the one who lit the fire is Chayav just like one who shoots an arrow at someone, according to Rebbi Yochanan.

This answers the question that we asked -- why the Gemara does not give Tamun as the difference. It does not give Tamun as the difference because Rebbi Yochanan indeed exempts one from *all* cases of Tamun damaged by Esh.

(e) According to Rashi's first Lashon, our questions may be answered in a simple way. See next Insight.

QUESTIONS: The Gemara concludes that even Rebbi Yochanan --who says "Isho Mishum Chitzav" agrees that when the fire that a person lit cannot be compared to an arrow, the owner will be Chayav because Esh is also "Mamono." The Gemara asks that if Rebbi Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish that "Isho Mishum Mamono," then what is the difference between the views of Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish (see previous Insight)?

RASHI explains the Gemara's question at length. There are a number of problems with Rashi's explanation in this Sugya.

(a) RASHI (22a, DH Mishum Mamono) writes that the Gemara "originally thought" that Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue with regard to a fire that does not belong to the person who caused it to destroy someone's field. Why does he write that this was the Gemara's "original" assumption? Rashi himself writes in our Sugya that even in the conclusion, Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue about such a case! (MAHARAM 22a, SHITAH MEKUBETZES 22a and 23a in the name of GILYON, NIMUKEI YOSEF; see also MAHADURA BASRA of MAHARSHA, PNEI YEHOSHUA, and NACHALAS DAVID.)

(b) Rashi here explains that Rebbi Yochanan uses the word "Isho" ("his fire," as opposed to "Esh," "[anyone's] fire") because he is referring specifically to a fire that belongs to the person who caused the damage. However, Rashi earlier (22a, DH Mishum Mamono) explains that Rebbi Yochanan is referring to a person who causes damage with a fire that does not belong to him! (NETZIV in Meromei Sadeh)

(c) Rashi (in the beginning of DH Mai Beinaihu) explains why the Gemara did not suggest that the difference between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is a case where the fire did not belong to the person who caused it to do damage. However, later (end of DH Lechayavo), Rashi again asks why the Gemara did not give as a difference the case of a fire that did not belong to the person who caused it to do damage! (LECHEM ABIRIM)

(d) What does Rashi mean when he concludes (in DH Lechayavo) that he prefers the "Lashon Rishon," the first Lashon? Rashi does not mention two Leshonos!

ANSWERS: The MAHARAM points out that the MAHARSHAL (in Yam Shel Shlomo) quotes a version of Rashi in which Rashi indeed presents two different Leshonos. These two Leshonos are also quoted by RABEINU YESHAYAH in the Shitah Mekubetzes and by the CHIDUSHEI HA'RA'AVAD. The first Lashon of Rashi was that Rebbi Yochanan only obligates one for Esh "Mishum Chitzav" in a case where the fire belongs to the one who caused it to do damage. If the fire does not belong to him, then the fire is not considered "Chitzav." According to this understanding, Rebbi Yochanan does not literally compare a fire to shooting an arrow, and in the case of a fire that is not his, or when someone kills another person with a fire, Rebbi Yochanan will exempt the one who lit the fire, just like Reish Lakish exempts him. Also, Rebbi Yochanan will exempt a person for damage done with fire to Tamun, since it is not literally like Adam ha'Mazik. It is similar to "Chitzav" only with regard to paying Arba'ah Devarim (that is, for this it is as if the person did the damage directly). The reason Rebbi Yochanan rules that one is Chayav for Arba'ah Devarim even though Esh is not considered Adam ha'Mazik in any other way is because the verse which writes the word "ha'Mav'ir" (Shemos 22:5) implies that there is at least one way in which lighting a fire is comparable to Adam ha'Mazik, to a person who damages directly.

This not only answers the questions that we asked in the previous Insight, but it also answers all of the questions that we asked on Rashi here.

(a) Rashi (22a) writes that the Gemara "originally thought" that Rebbi Yochanan obligates a person to pay for damages that he caused with a fire that does not belong to him, because those words in Rashi are from Rashi's first Lashon, when he learned that -- according to the Gemara's conclusion -- Rebbi Yochanan does not obligate one to pay unless the Gacheles belongs to the person who damages with it. (MAHARAM)

(b) The reason Rashi there writes that Rebbi Yochanan is not necessarily discussing a fire that belongs to the person who damaged with it is because, according to Rashi's first Lashon, even if Rebbi Yochanan was discussing a fire that was not owned by the person who damaged with it, there is a good reason why the Gemara did not give such a case as the difference between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. The Gemara's conclusion is that Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish do *not* argue about such a case, since Rebbi Yochanan also holds that "Isho Mishum *Mamono*."

(c) It seems that Rashi originally added his second explanation (the explanation that appears in Rashi DH Lechayavo) as an alternative approach ("Lishna Achrina") to the Gemara. At this point, Rashi did not yet fully accept the suggestion that Rebbi Yochanan's use of the word "Isho" implies that he is discussing a case of a fire that is owned by the person who caused the damage with it. That is why Rashi preferred the first approach, wherein Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish do not argue about an Esh that does not belong to the person who damages with it. (This is indeed the way Rashi's commentary appears in the London and Parma manuscripts.) Later, Rashi decided that it was the more correct approach, and that the original approach was incorrect, and he removed his first Lashon (which we no longer have in our text of Rashi) and he rewrote his commentary to the Gemara in accordance with his second, new explanation. It was at that point that he added what he wrote in DH v'Chi Me'achar. (Indeed, the London and Parma manuscripts of Rashi omit his comment of DH v'Chi Me'achar, and in the Rome manuscript of Rashi, Rashi's comments in DH v'Chi Me'achar are written in a marginal addition.) Our text of Rashi was copied from both the new version of Rashi (the marginal addition in the Rome manuscript) and the old version of Rashi (the London and Parma manuscripts). That is why we now see Rashi repeating part of his commentary about "Isho." (A similar combination can be found in the Cambridge manuscript of Rashi.)

(d) When Rashi wrote that "the first Lashon seems correct to me," he was referring to the first Lashon that we no longer have in our texts, because Rashi retracted it in favor of the second Lashon, the Lashon that does appear in our text. (Rashi erased, as well, these words of "Lashon Rishon Nir'eh Li," but these words were included in our text by the scribes who copied Rashi's words from his Mahadura Kama. Indeed, these words are omitted in the Cambridge manuscript of Rashi, which includes Rashi's final explanation -- the version that appears in our text of Rashi.)

(The manuscript versions of Rashi are printed in Rav Shabse Frankel's SEFER SHINUYEI NUSCHA'OS.)

23b

QUESTION: The Gemara proves that the case in our Mishnah is a case of a dog that takes a Chararah and eats it in the Chatzer of the owner of the Chararah. The Mishnah teaches that the owner of the dog must pay for the Chararah because it is Shen in the Reshus of the Nizak. The Gemara attempts to prove from here that the mouth of an animal is considered like the Chatzer of the Nizak, in which the animal is standing, and not like the Chatzer of the Mazik who owns the dog. If it would be considered like the Chatzer ha'Mazik, then the owner of the dog should not be Chayav in the case of the Mishnah, but rather he should be able to say to the owner of the Chararah, "What is your Chararah doing in my dog's mouth?"

The Gemara asks how can we question whether the mouth of an animal is considered Chatzer ha'Nizak or Chatzer ha'Mazik? If it would be considered Chatzer ha'Mazik, how would one ever be Chayav for damages of Shen? The Gemara answers that one would be Chayav for Shen only when the animal damages by causing an object to be consumed without putting it in its mouth (for example, by rubbing its back on a wall and rubbing away the pictures inscribed on the wall, or by rubbing itself on fruits until they are irretrievably lost in the mud).

Why does the Gemara wait until this Mishnah to prove whether or not the mouth of an animal is like Chatzer ha'Nizak? If the mouth of an animal is not like Chatzer ha'Nizak, then one should never be Chayav for Shen when an animal eats someone else's fruit! We should be able to prove that the mouth of an animal *is* like Chatzer ha'Nizak from any of the previous Mishnayos (such as 19b) that mention eating fruit as a description of the damage of Shen!

In addition, how can the Mazik complain to the Nizak, "What is your Chararah doing in my dog's mouth," if his dog entered the Nizak's Reshus without permission?

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS HA'ROSH and TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ explain that the Gemara originally thought that Shen is Chayav even when the fruit was not eaten in Reshus ha'Nizak, as long as it was *taken* from Reshus ha'Nizak. Therefore, even if the mouth of an animal is like the Chatzer ha'Mazik, the owner of the dog will be Chayav since his dog took the food from Reshus ha'Nizak.

What, then, is the question of whether or not the mouth of an animal is like Reshus ha'Nizak? The question would arise in a case where the dog did not take the food from Reshus ha'Nizak, but rather the food was taken by a Cheresh, Shoteh, Katan, or Nochri from the Reshus ha'Nizak and placed into the dog's mouth. (The RASHBA cites the RA'AVAD who suggests that the question would arise in a case where the animal took the food from a third party's Reshus ha'Yachid, and then it ate it in the Reshus of the Nizak.)

How, then, can it be proven from the Mishnah that discusses a dog that took a Chararah that the mouth of an animal is like the Chatzer ha'Nizak? In the case of the Mishnah, the *dog* took the Chararah by itself, and thus the owner is certainly Chayav, because the Chararah was taken from the Reshus of the Nizak by his animal!

Tosfos explains that the Gemara's proof is not from the Mishnah, but rather from the short Sugya that precedes this point of the Gemara. The Gemara asks why is the owner of the dog Chayav if the dog ate the Chararah in any place other than the Reshus ha'Nizak? The Gemara concludes that the dog indeed ate the Chararah in the Reshus ha'Nizak. From this Sugya it is clear that it does not suffice for the dog to take the Chararah from the Reshus ha'Nizak, but that it must also *eat* the Chararah in the Reshus ha'Nizak in order for the dog's owner to be Chayav. Thus we see that the mouth of the animal is like the Chatzer ha'Nizak.

According to this explanation, the Mishnayos which describe Shen as an animal that eats food in the Reshus ha'Nizak do not prove that the mouth of an animal is like the Chatzer ha'Nizak, since they are discussing an animal that *took* food from the Reshus of the Nizak. Why does the Gemara ask where will one be Chayav for Shen if the mouth of an animal is like the Chatzer ha'Mazik? One will be Chayav for Shen when the animal takes the food by itself directly from the Reshus ha'Nizak, in which case it makes no difference where it eats the food! Tosfos answers that the verse implies that the animal not only took the food from Reshus ha'Nizak, but even ate it there as well. Therefore, the Gemara asks that if the mouth of an animal is considered the Chatzer ha'Mazik, then how will we explain the verse that implies that the owner is Chayav for Shen when the food is consumed in the Chatzer ha'Nizak.

(b) RABEINU YESHAYAH in the Shitah Mekubetzes explains that the Gemara knew that if one sends the animal into another's Reshus, he is Chayav even if his animal eats the food in a different Reshus. The question was whether he is Chayav when the animal goes by itself into another's Reshus. The Gemara proves that one is Chayav even if the animal goes by itself, because its mouth is like the Chatzer ha'Nizak, from the fact that one is Chayav when one's dog eats the Chararah (as our Mishnah says). The Mishnah is referring to a case in which the dog went by itself and ate the Chararah, as the Mishnah says, "a dog that *took* a Chararah...." This is clear from the Gemara which requires that the dog eat the Chararah in the Reshus of the owner of the Chararah in order for the dog's owner to be Chayav. (If the owner had sent the dog there, he would be Chayav regardless of where the dog eats the Chararah, according to Rabeinu Yeshayah.)

When the Gemara asks that if the mouth of the dog is like the Chatzer ha'Mazik, then in what case will the Torah be Mechayev one for Shen, it knew that one would be Chayav for Shen when he *sends* his dog into the Chatzer ha'Nizak. The Gemara's question was, as we explained earlier (3a), that the Torah obligates him even when he does not send the dog into the Chatzer ha'Nizak but it goes by itself. How, though, can one be Chayav in that case if the dog's mouth is like Chatzer ha'Mazik? That is the Gemara's question.

The RASHBA cites the RA'AVAD who offers a similar explanation. The Gemara knew that when the animal picks up the food in the Chatzer ha'Nizak, the owner is Chayav even if the animal eats the food in a different Reshus. The question was whether the owner is Chayav when the animal takes the food from the Reshus of a different person (who does not own the food) and eats it in the Reshus of the owner of the food. If the mouth of the animal is like Chatzer ha'Nizak, then one is Chayav, but if it is not, then one is not Chayav. The Gemara proves that one is Chayav when the animal takes the food from a Reshus that belongs to someone other than the owner of the food and eats it in the Reshus of the food's owner (because its mouth is like the Chatzer ha'Nizak) from the fact that one is Chayav when one's dog eats the Chararah (as our Mishnah says). The Mishnah is referring to a case in which the dog took the Chararah from the Reshus of a different person and ate the Chararah in the Reshus of the owner of the Chararah, as the Mishnah says, "A dog that took a Chararah *and went to* a Gadish and ate [the Chararah there]." This is clear from the Gemara which requires that the dog eat the Chararah in the Reshus of the owner of the Chararah in order for the dog's owner to be Chayav. (If the dog had taken the Chararah from the Reshus of the owner of the Chararah, then the owner of the dog would be Chayav regardless of where the dog eats the Chararah, according to the Ra'avad.)

(This interpretation of the Mishnah answers the first question of TOSFOS DH v'Lechayav, and this might be the intention of RASHI DH Hachi Garsinan and DH v'Lechayav, unlike the BACH #2.)

According to the Ra'avad, when the Gemara asks how is one ever Chayav for Shen, the Gemara does not know that one is certainly Chayav when the animal takes the food from the Reshus of the food's owner. The Gemara answers its question according to the understanding of the questioner.

The difference between Tosfos' explanation (in (a) above) and the explanation of the Rabeinu Yeshayah and the Ra'avad is that according to Tosfos, the Gemara concludes that the animal always has to both *take* the food and *eat* the food in the Reshus of the Nizak in order for its owner to be Chayav. According to Rabeinu Yeshayah and the Ra'avad, this is not true; the owner could be Chayav if the animal only *takes* the food from the Reshus of the Nizak and does not eat it there, when the owner sends the animal there to eat it (Rabeinu Yeshayah), or when the animal takes the food from the Reshus of the Nizak (Ra'avad). (See TOSFOS 20a, DH Misgalgel.)

(c) The RADVAZ cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes and the MAHARACH OR ZARU'A (#109) explain that the question of the status of the animal's mouth applies only when the Nizak does not properly protect his fruit from coming into the mouth of the animal. For example, the Gemara teaches (23a) that the owner of the Chararah did not protect his Chararah properly from dogs, since dogs are known to dig under gates (see TOSFOS DH b'she'Shimer). In such a case, the owner of the animal has a valid claim when he says, "What is your food doing in my animal's mouth." What he means is that the Nizak should have protected his food from coming into the mouth of the animal of the Mazik. On the other hand, perhaps the mouth of the animal is considered like the Chatzer ha'Nizak, meaning that the Nizak is not responsible for keeping his food out of the Mazik's animal, as long as the food is in the Nizak's Reshus.

The Gemara's proof that the mouth of the animal is like the Chatzer ha'Nizak is from the Mishnah which says that the owner of the dog is Chayav to pay for the Chararah even though the Chararah was not properly protected from dogs. When the Gemara asks how will one be Chayav for Shen in Reshus ha'Nizak if the mouth of an animal is like Reshus ha'Mazik, the Radvaz explains that the question is that most fields are not properly guarded to prevent animals from entering, and therefore the verse would seem to be Mechayev the owner of the animal even if the Nizak did not take proper care to keep the animal out. (The Maharach Or Zaru'a explains that the proof is from Shen b'Reshus ha'Rabim in which the Torah teaches that Shen is Patur. Why does the Torah need to teach that Shen is Patur in Reshus ha'Rabim? In any case Shen should be Patur there since the Nizak -- who kept his food in Reshus ha'Rabim -- did not take care to keep it out of the mouth of the Mazik's animal!)

(d) The TOSFOS RID and RASHI seem to explain the Gemara in its most straightforward sense, that if the mouth of an animal is like Reshus ha'Mazik, then one is *never* Chayav for what one's animal eats. They might have learned that whenever the word "Achlah" appears in the Mishnah referring to Shen, it is not referring to consumption through eating, but rather to consumption through other means (such as rubbing off inscriptions on walls). Our Mishnah, which discusses a dog which takes a Chararah in its mouth and then eats it, implies that even if the animal literally eats it, the owner is Chayav.