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Beitzah 33

1) USING TWIGS ON YOM TOV FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN FUEL FOR A FIRE

QUESTION: The Gemara records a Machlokes whether wet twigs are Muktzah or not on Yom Tov. RASHI explains that according to the opinion that wet twigs are Muktzah, this is because of the principle that "Lo Nitnu Etzim Ela l'Hasakah" -- the sole purpose of wood on Yom Tov is as fuel for a fire, and therefore a wet twig, which cannot be used as fuel for a fire, is Muktzah, because it has no use at all now. The other opinion says that it may still be used for a very large fire, and therefore it is not Muktzah.

The Gemara implies that the twig could be moved for other purposes, even not for a fire; since it is fit for a fire, it may be used for any purpose. RASHI (DH b'Retiva), and as quoted in TOSFOS (DH v'Hilchasa), says that this is true according to the opinion that "Lo Nitnu Etzim Ela l'Hasakah." But according to that principle, it should *only* be permitted to use the twigs for a fire! Why is it permitted to use the twigs for other purposes?

ANSWER: Rashi does not mean that this opinion literally holds that "Lo Nitnu Etzim Ela l'Hasakah." Rather, Rashi means to say that this opinion holds that since the main purpose of wood is for a fire, if it is not fit for its main purpose, then it is not on a person's mind and it is Muktzah, and may not be used for any purpose. But if it is fit for its main purpose, then it may be used for any purpose.

QUESTION: Rava rules that a woman may not take a piece of wood from a broken utensil to use as firewood, since it was not prepared for such use before Yom Tov. The Gemara infers from here that Rava must hold like Rebbi Yehudah, who prohibits items like this as Muktzah on Yom Tov. The Gemara questions this, though, from another statement of Rava. Rava, on Yom Tov, told his servant to roast a goose and throw the intestines to a cat. The Gemara learns from this that Rava rules in accordance with Rebbi Shimon, who argues with Rebbi Yehudah and permits moving an item on Yom Tov for the sake of animals even though it was designated for human use, and not for animals, before Yom Tov.

Rashi (DH Kivan d'Mesrechi) writes that the goose intestines were still fit for human consumption on Yom Tov.

How can it be inferred from Rava's ruling that he holds like Rebbi Shimon? Perhaps Rava agrees with Rebbi Yehudah and not with Rebbi Shimon; Rebbi Yehudah prohibits giving animals an object designated for humans *only* when the object is *no longer fit* to be used by a person. (Because the object is no longer fit for its originally designated use, of feeding humans, it is considered Nolad and is Muktzah). But if the object can *still* be used by a person (that is, it is fit for its designated use), then even Rebbi Yehudah agrees that it is not Muktzah and it may be given to animals! Why, then, does the Gemara say that Rava's action shows that he rules like Rebbi Shimon? The goose intestines were still fit for humans!

The type of Muktzah that our Sugya is discussing is usually referred to as "Muchan l'Adam Eino Muchan l'Behemah." It is important to remind ourselves that there are two distinct types of Muktzah which are included in this expression: (1) When the laws of Shabbos or Yom Tov prevent man from using an object -- for example, on Shabbos a live animal is not fit for human use since it is forbidden to slaughter an animal on Shabbos -- that object is Muktzah and may not be used for any purpose. Even though live animals are sometimes fed to dogs, since this animal is not fit for humans at present it is Muktzah (even according to Rebbi Shimon) and may not be fed to dogs. (This is a type of Mutkzah Machmas Isur.) (2) When something happens to an object on Shabbos that makes it unfit for man, it may not even be fed to dogs (this is a type of Nolad). For example, if the animal was alive before Yom Tov (and was fit for man, since he could slaughter and eat it on Yom Tov) and then it died on Yom Tov, becoming unfit for man, it remains Muktzah and may not be fed to dogs.

In Rava's case, the intestines of the animal fit into neither category! There is no law of Yom Tov preventing the intestines from being used by man, and nothing happened to the intestines making them unfit for human use.

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI (here and in Shabbos 142b) explains that goose intestines are not fit for man *not* because any change occurred to them, but because it is Yom Tov, and it is not the normal manner to eat goose intestines on Yom Tov. Therefore, it is considered as if the laws of Yom Tov prohibit this item from human use (category (1) above), and that is why it would be prohibited to give them to animals according to Rebbi Yehudah.

(b) TOSFOS (here, DH v'Shadi, and Shabbos 29a, DH Achlan) challenges Rashi's explanation from the Gemara in Shabbos (128a) which states that it is permitted to move raw meat on Shabbos because it is possible for people to eat the meat in such a state. Certainly it is not the normal manner to eat raw meat on Shabbos, and yet it does not become Muktzah! Tosfos therefore explains that goose intestines are edible as soon as the goose is slaughtered (*before* Yom Tov); however, shortly thereafter (*on* Yom Tov) the intestines spoil and become inedible. Since the intestines are no longer fit for man, they become Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah. (Tosfos understands that they fall into the second category mentioned above, which is Asur due to Nolad.)

Perhaps Rashi maintained that goose intestines cannot be compared to raw meat for the following reason. Rava slaughtered the goose because he intended to eat its meat, and the intestines are secondary to the meat. Relative to the meat, the intestines are not fit for use on Yom Tov. Raw meat, though, stands by itself and is not secondary to anything else, and therefore it is not Muktzah. (M. Kornfeld)

33b