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1)

(a) When Rebbi Yehudah Nesi’ah asked Rebbi Tarfon how much the lamb of Pidyon Chamor ought to be worth, the latter replied – that for a miserly person it is one Shekel (which is generally two Dinrim [of which there are four in a Sela]), for a generous one, a Sela and for a regular person, ‘be’ Ragya’.

(b) The Halachah, said Rava, is be’Ragya, which is - three Dinrim. Roughly translated, it means half way in between.

(c) To reconcile this ruling with Rava’s previous one, permitting a Kol she’ Hu – we establish the later ruling to someone who comes to ask what he should do, and the earlier one to someone who redeems his firstborn donkey without asking.

(a) Rebbi Yitzchak Amar Resh Lakish ruled that someone who has a firstborn donkey, but no lamb to redeem it with – must redeem it with something that is worth its full value.

(b) We establish this ruling like Rebbi Shimon – because according to Rebbi Yehudah, the Torah insists that one redeems his firstborn donkey with a lamb (as we learned earlier).

(c) This is not quite correct however – since that is the Havah Amina (the initial assumption in Rebbi Yehudah there), but not how we concluded.

(a) This is Rav Acha’s version. The problem Ravina has with establishing Resh Lakish like Rebbi Shimon is – that it goes against the tradition of always ruling like Rebbi Yehudah when he argues with Rebbi Shimon.

(b) When he said ‘ve’Sasam Lan Tana ke’Rebbi Yehudah - he was referring to our Mishnah, which forbids a Peter Chamor be’Hana’ah before one has redeemed it with a lamb.

(c) He therefore explains – that there is no reason for Pidyon Peter Chamor to be more stringent than Hekdesh (which one can redeem with money for its full value. Consequently, when Rebbi Yehudah said that the Torah insists on redeeming it with a lamb, he must have meant that this is the only way of avoiding having to pay the full value of the donkey.

(d) Rav Nachman (or Rav Nechemyah) b’rei de’Rav Yosef used to redeem his firstborn donkey with – well-cooked herbs (to the full value of the donkey).

(a) Rav Shizbi Amar Rav Huna rules – that if Reuven redeems Shimon’s firstborn donkey, the donkey is redeemed.

(b) We ask on this – whether the donkey now belongs to Reuven or to Shimon.

(c) This is not a problem according to Rebbi Shimon, who permits the Peter Chamor be’Hana’ah – in which case the donkey obviously belongs to Shimon.

(a) The She’eilah is confined to Rebbi Yehudah, who forbids the Peter Chamor like Hekdesh. The source for the Halachah that Hekdesh belongs to whoever redeems it is the Pasuk in Bechukosai “ve’Nasan ha’Kesef ve’Kam Lo” (though these are not the exact words used by the Pasuk).

(b) In spite of the Pasuk, the redeemed donkey might belong to the owner (even according to Rebbi Yehudah) – because the fact that the owner is able to redeem it and earn the balance between the donkey and the lamb (as we learned earlier) indicates that the donkey is his personal property, and not Hekdesh.

(c) We resolve the She’eilah from the Beraisa, which obligates someone who steals a Peter Chamor to pay double to the owner. The Tana adds ‘Af-al-Pi she’Ein Lo Achshav, Yesh Lo le’Achar mi’Kein’. The author must therefore be Rebbi Yehudah, because according to Rebbi Shimon, he is permitted to benefit from the donkey immediately.

(d) This proves – that, even according to Rebbi Yehudah, it is the owner who is considered the Ba’alim of the donkey, because if Hekdesh was the owner, there would be no Din of paying double (due to the Pasuk “ve’Gunav mi’Beis ha’Ish” [from which Chazal extrapolate ‘ve’Lo mi’Beis Hekdesh’]).

(a) The Beraisa discusses our Mishnah ‘Nichnas le’Dir Lehis’aser’. This cannot refer to a lamb that the owner already gave to the Kohen (even if the Kohen has returned it to him) – because of the Mishnah in ‘Ma’aser Beheimah’ which exempts a purchased animal or one that is given as a gift, from Ma’ aser Beheimah.

(b) It therefore refers to – ten lambs that the owner set aside to redeem ten Safek Pitrei Chamor (and the same would apply to one such lamb).

(c) This Beraisa supports a statement of Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah. Rav Nachman ...

1. ... said in this regard – exactly the same as the Beraisa (of which he had not been aware).
2. ... also said that if a Yisrael inherited ten Pitrei Chamorim from his maternal grandfather who was a Kohen, who had in turn, inherited them from his maternal grandfather, who was a Yisrael – he must separate ten lambs to redeem them, but he may retain them himself.

(d) He is Patur from giving the lambs to a Kohen – because his grandfather, who was a Kohen, would not have had to do so, and a recipient always inherits from the donor whatever monetary rights he had in the article.

(a) Rav Nachman issues the same ruling concerning Tevel that has already had Miru’ach – (flattening the pile of corn after the winnowing) done to it.

(b) He found it necessary to repeat the Halachah in both cases. Because had he confined the ruling to ...

1. ... Peter Chamor, we would have thought that it does not apply to Tevel – where we might apply the principle ‘Matanos she’Lo Hurmu ke’Mi she’ Lo Hurmu Damyan’ (the Ma’asros that are contained in Tevel only assume the status of Ma’asros once they have been separated), whereas the lamb that he gives to the Kohen is already separated.
2. ... Tevel, we would have thought that it does not apply to Pidyon ha’ en – which (unlike Tevel, from which one separates part of itself) has to be redeemed from an external source.

(c) When Rav Nachman adds the fact that the Kohen inherited it from his maternal grandfather who was a Yisrael - it is not because otherwise, he would be Patur from separating Ma’asros altogether (because a Kohen too, is obligated to separate Ma’asros, only he is not obligated to give them to another Kohen).

(d) And the reason that he mentioned it – is to teach us that, in spite of that, the Kohen’s grandson is permitted to retain the Ma’asros himself, because it is as if he (the grandfather, had separated them himself).

8)

(a) Rebbi Shmuel bar Nasan Amar Rebbi Chanina rules that someone who purchases Tevel that has already had Miru’ach done to it – is obligated to Ma’aser it, but may retain it himself.

(b) When he says ‘ve’Hein she’Lo’, he means – that he may eat the Ma’asros, but that he is permitted to give the Terumos to any Kohen he wishes.

(c) He cannot be speaking when it was the Nochri who performed the Miru’ ch – because from the Pasuk ”Reishis *Degancha*”, we learn “Degancha”, ‘ve’ Lo Digun (Miru’ach) Nochri’ (although not all Tana’im agree with this D’ rashah, as we shall see shortly).

(d) In that case, it must have been a Yisrael who performed it. Seeing as he was neither the owner nor a purchaser, he must have been – the Nochri’s Aris (sharecropper).

(a) Even though the purchaser bought it from a Nochri, he is nevertheless Chayav to Ma’aser it – because we maintain that a Nochri cannot own part of Eretz Yisrael (to exempt it from Ma’asros).

(b) Yet he is permitted to keep the Ma’asros – because he can say to the Kohen that he received it from someone from the Kohen would not have been able to extract it anyway (though we will later retract from this reason).

(c) When the Mishnah in D’mai rules that if someone deposits his (Ma’asered) fruit with a Kuti or with an Am ha’Aretz, ‘Chezkasan ...

1. ... le’Ma’asros, it means – we do not suspect that he swapped them for his own fruit, and that the owner must therefore Ma’aser it again.
2. ... ve’li’Shevi’is’, it means – if this took place in the sixth year, and the fruit is only returned in the seventh, we do not suspect that the Kuti ... swapped the fruit for Sh’mitah produce, which will become Asur when the time of Biy’ur arrives.

(d) But where he deposits the fruit with a Nochri, the Tana Kama - declares the fruit like the Nochri’s own fruit, in which case, the owner is obligated to Ma’aser it again.

(a) He is not Patur mi‘Mah Nafshach, since the Nochri performed the Miru’ ch – because this Tana holds that the Miru’ach of a Nochri does not exempt the fruit from Ma’aser.

(b) Rebbi Shimon argues with the Tana Kama in this case, referring to the fruit that the owner gets back from the Nochri as D’mai, by which he means – a Safek (whether the Nochri swapped the fruit with his own or not. It has no connection with the regular term ‘D’mai’, which is how Chazal refer to the fruit that one buys from an Am ha’Aretz).

(c) Rebbi Elazar (ben P’das, the Amora) explains that even according to Rebbi Shimon, the owner is obligated to separate Ma’asros, and their bone of contention is – whether he is obligated to give it to a Kohen (the Tana Kama) or not (Rebbi Shimon).

(a) When Rav Dimi repeated Rebbi Elazar’s interpretation of the Machlokes, Abaye extrapolated from the fact that the Tana’im argue in a case where it is not known for sure that the Nochri exchanged the Yisrael’s fruit with his own – that if it was, even Rebbi Shimon would agree that the owner would be Chayav to give the Terumah to the Kohen.

(b) A problem with Rebbi Shmuel bar Nasan Amar Rebbi Chanina – who learned above that the owner may retain it himself.

(c) Abaye therefore suggests that maybe the Mishnah in D’mai is speaking about Terumah Gedolah - and Rebbi Chanina, about Terumas Ma’aser.

(d) This reminded Rav Dimi what he heard in the name of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who learned from the Pasuk “ve’el ha’Levi’im Tedaber ve’Amarta Aleihem, ki Sikchu me’es B’nei Yisrael ... “ – that it is only Tevel that a Levi receives from a Yisrael that is subject to Terumas Ma’aser, but not Tevel that he (or a Yisrael) receives from a Nochri (though this is not the reason that we originally gave to explain Rebbi Chanina).

(a) Our Mishnah concludes ‘ve’Im Meis, Nehenim Bo’. The Tana cannot be referring to there the lamb died in the domain of the Kohen – because that would be obvious.

(b) So we establish it there where it died in the domain of the Yisrael, which is not so obvious – because we might have thought that until the lamb actually reaches the hand of the Kohen, it is not his.

(c) So the Mishnah teaches us – that as soon as the owner designates the lamb, it is already in the domain of the Kohen.