QUESTION: Rebbi Oshiya taught a Beraisa in which Rebbi Meir and the
Chachamim argue about a case of a sheep born to a goat, or a goat born to a
sheep. The Gemara suggests that the Beraisa is discussing a case of a goat
born to a female sheep and a male goat, or a lamb born to a female goat and
a male sheep. Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim are arguing whether or not the
offspring is considered to be related to its father. Rebbi Meir maintains
that we take into account the father, and thus the offspring is considered
to be related to its father, and if one slaughters the father and the child
on the same day, he transgresses the Isur of "Oso v'Es Beno" (Vayikra
22:28). The Chachamim maintain that we do not take into account the father,
and thus the offspring is not considered related to the father and is not
subject to the Isur of "Oso v'Es Beno."
According to this explanation, the argument involves only the relationship
between the father and its offspring. Why, then, does the Beraisa mention
the fact that the *mother* was a sheep or a goat? The species of the mother
is not related to the argument at all!
ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH b'Rachal) explains that even according to this
explanation of the argument, the Beraisa needs to mention the species of the
mother. The Beraisa is teaching that even though the father's contribution
effects a change in the offspring's appearance (making it look like a goat
rather than like its mother's species, a sheep), the Chachamim still do not
take into account the contribution of the father.
QUESTION: The Mishnah (17a) discusses a case in which a sheep gives birth
(for the first time) to twin lambs whose heads emerge from the mother
simultaneously. Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili rules that both lambs are considered to
be the Bechor and must be given to the Kohen. The Rabanan argue and maintain
that it is impossible for both lambs to emerge simultaneously -- "Iy Efshar
l'Tzamtzem." One lamb must have emerged first and is the sole Bechor. The
owner, therefore, must give only one animal to the Kohen, and he keeps the
other animal.
The Gemara relates that it was taught in Rebbi Yanai's Yeshiva that
according to Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili -- who maintains that perfect precision can
occur in natural events (such as twin lambs being born simultaneously) --
certainly perfect precision can be obtained in human actions, where there is
deliberate intention guiding the outcome of the action.
The Gemara continues and says that even though the Rabanan maintain that
perfect precision cannot be achieved in natural events, perhaps this is only
because there is no deliberate intention guiding them. Perhaps they agree
that in the actions of humans, it is possible to achieve perfect precision,
since there is deliberate intention guiding the outcome of the action.
There seems to be an obvious proof in the Torah that it is possible to
achieve perfect precision in human actions. The Torah (Shemos 30:32)
prohibits preparing the Shemen ha'Mishchah for any purpose other than
anointing the Mishkan, but this prohibition applies only when one prepares
it with the exact measurements that the Torah commands to be used in the
Mishkan. RASHI there writes that if one uses more, or less, of the amount of
an ingredient specified by the Torah, he does not transgress the
prohibition.
This seems to prove that it is possible to achieve precision in human
actions, because if it was "Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem," then it would be
impossible to transgress the prohibition of preparing the Shemen ha'Mishchah
for mundane purposes! One would never be able to put the exact measurement
into the mixture, and thus one would always be exempt!
Why does the Gemara not mention this proof?
ANSWER: The MINCHAS CHINUCH (#109) answers as follows. Even if it is "Iy
Efshar l'Tzamtzem" in human actions, the prohibition of preparing the Shemen
ha'Mishchah still applies. If "Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem" applies to preparing
the Shemen ha'Mishchah, then not only is it impossible to transgress the
Isur of making the Shemen ha'Mishchah for mundane purposes, it should also
be impossible to prepare the Shemen ha'Mishchah for the anointing of the
Mishkan! We cannot suggest that the preparation of the Shemen ha'Mishchah
for the Mishkan was accomplished through the assistance of a miracle,
because the Torah does not give Mitzvos that can be fulfilled only through
the assistance of a miracle.
Rather, it must be that since "the Torah was not given to Mal'achei
ha'Shares" (Berachos 25b, Yoma 30a, Me'ilah 14b), whenever the Torah
commands that a Mitzvah be performed with a specific weight or measurement,
the Torah intends that the Mitzvah be performed according to human
capability. If a person performs the Mitzvah as accurately as he can, then
he fulfills the Mitzvah. Accordingly, when a person prepares the Shemen
ha'Mishchah to the best of his ability, the Shemen ha'Mishchah may be used
for the Mishkan. Similarly, if he prepares it, to the best of his ability,
for a mundane purpose, then he transgresses the Isur.
The Minchas Chinuch writes that the Gemara here teaches this principle. The
Gemara attempts to prove that for human actions it is possible to achieve
perfect precision from the fact that the Torah commands us to construct the
vessels in the Beis ha'Mikdash with exact measurements. This demonstrates
that the Torah assumes that human actions can achieve perfect precision.
The Gemara refutes this proof, arguing that when the Torah commands us to
construct the vessels with exact measurements, it is commanding us only to
make every effort to meet those measurements; it does not expect us to
achieve perfect precision. The Minchas Chinuch explains that this is because
the Mitzvos of the Torah were given to us according to our capabilities.
In contrast, when two lambs are born simultaneously, this is not the
inevitable way that babies are born. In such a case, the Rabanan maintain
that it is "Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem." When the Torah commands us to give the
Bechor to the Kohen, it is not referring to such a case. Similarly, when a
corpse is found between two cities, this is not the case the Torah refers to
when it gives the Mitzvah of Eglah Arufah. The Mitzvah applies to a case in
which the corpse is found closer to one city than to any other city.
Therefore, in such a case the Rabanan maintain that the rule of "Iy Efshar
l'Tzamtzem" applies. (See also KEHILOS YAKOV.) (D. Bloom)
QUESTION: The Rabanan in the Mishnah maintain "Iy Efshar l'Tzamtzem" with
regard to natural events -- it is impossible for two natural events to occur
simultaneously (such as for two lambs to be born to the same mother at
exactly the same moment). The Gemara says that even though the Rabanan
maintain that perfect precision cannot be achieved in natural events,
perhaps this is only because there is no deliberate intention guiding them.
Perhaps they agree that in the actions of humans, it is possible to achieve
perfect precision, since there is deliberate intention guiding the outcome
of the action.
The Gemara attempts to prove that the Rabanan agree that "Efshar l'Tzamtzem"
with regard to human actions from the fact that the Torah commands us to
construct the vessels in the Beis ha'Mikdash with exact measurements. This
demonstrates that the Torah assumes that human actions can achieve perfect
precision.
The Gemara refutes this proof, arguing that when the Torah commands us to
construct the vessels with exact measurements, it is commanding us only to
make every effort to meet those measurements; it does not expect us to
achieve perfect precision.
The Gemara then cites the verse, "All of this is in writing by the hand of
Hashem, Who gave me understanding to know" (Divrei ha'Yamim I 28:19), which
relates how David ha'Melech informed his son, Shlomo, that the plans for the
Beis ha'Mikdash were given by Hashem.
Why is the Gemara quoting this verse here? What is the Gemara trying to
prove from the verse? It does not seem to be related to the Gemara's
discussion at all.
ANSWERS:
(a) RASHI (DH ha'Kol) writes that this verse does not belong in the text of
the Gemara and should be omitted.
(b) RABEINU GERSHOM writes that this verse is proving the Gemara's assertion
that when the Torah instructs us to build the vessels with exact
measurements, it is commanding us only to *try* to achieve exact
measurements. If the exact measurements are not achieved, the vessels
nevertheless become sanctified. The Gemara quotes the verse in Divrei
ha'Yamim to proving this assertion.
Rabeinu Gershom, however, does not explain what the proof is from the verse.
Perhaps the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim is teaching us how to interpret the
verses in the Torah. It is teaching that since a blueprint of the Beis
ha'Mikdash and its vessels, bearing the descriptions of the measurements of
the Beis ha'Mikdash and all the holy vessels, was passed down by the
prophets, we may rely on the tradition that the measurements do not have to
be perfectly exact.
(c) The BRISKER RAV explains that although the Gemara says that the
measurements do not need to be exact, this answer applies only to all of the
vessels, and to the dimensions of the building, *except* the Mizbe'ach. The
Mizbe'ach must be exact in its dimensions, as the RAMBAM writes (Perush
ha'Mishnayos to Midos 3:2). The Gemara therefore quotes this verse to teach
that the Mizbe'ach indeed was built with perfect precision through Ru'ach
ha'Kodesh, as the Midrash (see RASHI to Erchin 10b, DH Al) derives from this
verse.