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1)

(a) Rava asked whether Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's Din is confined to a Shechiv-Mera, or whether it also extends to a Bari. The reason that it might not extend to a Bari is - because unlike the former, he is not yet in the category of "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav".

(b) 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' is - the condition that a husband writes in the Kesuvah, promising that the sons that his wife bears him will inherit her Kesuvah (over and above their regular portion of his inheritance), in the event that she dies before he does.

(c) The Mishnah in Kesuvos says that in the event that the Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin was omitted from the Kesuvah - the wife's sons will nevertheless receive it.

(d) Rebbi Nasan extrapolates from that Mishnah that Rebbi learned his Mishnah like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah - because the Tana cites the Lashon of Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin as 'B'nin Dichrin di'Yehavyan Lichi Mina'i, Inun *Yarsun* Kesef Kesuvasech' (permitting a man to bequeath to one of his sons at the expense of the others.

(a) Rebbi answered 'Yasvun' T'nan' - meaning that 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' is a Matanah and not a Yerushah (in which case, even the Rabbanan will agree that this is permitted.

(b) He retracted however, on the basis of a ruling that the sons are not permitted to claim 'K'suvas B'nin Dichrin from Meshubadin'. He expressed his retraction with the words - 'I behaved childishly and spoke arrogantly against Nasan the Babylonian'.

(c) That ruling would clash with his amendment - inasmuch as if the wording was 'Yasvun' (implying a Matanah from now, as opposed to 'Yarsun', which implies only after his death), then why could the sons not claim from Meshubadim, any less than the rest of the Kesuvah, which their mother may claim from Meshubadim.

(d) The problem now is - that Rebbi Nasan's Kashya remains.

4)

(a) Rav Papa pointed out to Abaye that irrespective of the wording, there is another problem with the entire institution of Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin - inasmuch as it is a 'Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (which is not Koneh).

(b) Neither can we circumvent it by establishing the Mishnah like Rebbi Meir, who holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' - because here it is also *to* someone who is not yet born, in which case even Rebbi Meir agrees.

(c) Rav Papa therefore answers both Kashyos with one swoop - by reminding us that we are speaking about a Takanas Chachamim, who have the power (of 'Hefker Beis-Din Hefker') to give one person's property to someone else even if it, or he, is not yet in the world; and we use the same explanation to establish the Mishnah in Kesuvos even like the Rabbanan, who will admit, for the same reason, that here, the father may bequeath his property to one of his sons.

(a) Abaye initially attempted to justify Rebbi's ...

1. ... reply to Rebbi Nasan - by explaining that he was only answering Rebbi Nasan's use of the Lashon 'Yarsun', which suggests that he holds like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah.
2. ... retraction - by explaining it to mean that he needed to use the word 'Yasvun' (not because he needed to answer Rebbi Nasan's Kashya, but), because of Rav Papa's Kashya (from 'Ein Adam Makneh ... ').

(b) He changed his mind however, by quoting the Seifa of the Mishnah, which states 'Lo Kasav Lah B'nan Nukvan di'Yehavyan Lichi Mina'i Yehavyan Yasvan be'Veisi ad de'Tilakchun le'Guvrin' - with regard to the Takanah of Mazon ha'Banos.

(c) This now obviates the need to answer Rebbi Nasan at all - because the Lashon of the Seifa is one of Matanah, giving the Mishnah the format of 'la'Zeh bi'Yerushah, ve'la'Zeh be'Matanah', and we already learned that in such a case, even the Rabbanan concede that both are valid (even when it is to two people, such as here, the sons and the daughters).

(d) We did indeed concluded earlier that when the Yerushah and the Matanah involve two people, they require 'Toch K'dei Dibur' - but that is no problem, since here, seeing as the two Takanos were made simultaneously, it is considered 'Toch K'dei Dibur'.

6)

(a) Rav Nechumi (or Rav Chananyah bar Minyumi) queried Abaye on his previous assumption that the two cases in the Mishnah in Kesuvos constitute 'Toch K'dei Dibur'. He asked him whether the two Takanos could not have been established in two different Batei-Din, negating that assumption.

(b) Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah in the Mishnah in Kesuvos, learned that a daughter's rights to Mezonos only take effect after her father's death - from Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin, which is a Yerushah, and can only take effect after their father's death.

(c) Abaye tried to prove from there - that the two Takanos must have been instituted by the same Beis-Din (simultaneously). Otherwise, how could Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah learn one from the other.

(d) We reject Abaye's proof however - on the grounds that even if they were instituted by two different Batei-Din, it is possible that the one modeled its Takanah on the other (to avoid people asking why the Chachamim instituted them at different times).

(a) What we have now achieved is - to vindicate Rebbi, who is forced to amend the Mishnah of B'nin Dichrin from 'Yarsun' to 'Yasvun', in order to establish it like the Chachamim too (and not just like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, even though he rules like him anyway, as we learned on the previous Daf).

(b) This does not affect our proof that Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's ruling extends to a Bari - which is evident already from Rebbi Nasan's Kasha?

(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules that if someone writes all his property to his wife - he has merely appointed her as an Apotropus (a guardian) over his estate.

(b) Shmuel is speaking about a Shechiv-Mera (who is concerned that his children should respect their mother.

(c) What prompted Chazal to institute this Takanah was - the assumption that a father would not leave his sons penniless giving everything to his wife, in which case, he must have he meant to appoint her the guardian of his estate, so that she should gain prestige in the eyes of her children.

(d) Nevertheless, we will later classify this as one of the three Halachos without a logical reason - because in spite of the reasoning, we would not normally ignore a written document on the basis of a S'vara.

(a) This Halachah is cited here - because Rava will shortly repeat the She'eilah that he asked with regard to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's opinion 'be'Bari Mai'?

(b) It is obvious that Shmuel's Takanah extends to one's oldest son, though we are not sure whether it also extends to a younger son - because whereas, on the one hand, a father definitely would like the brothers to show respect to their older brother, it is not certain that he would wish the same for a younger brother (and if not, then the Matanah remains a Matanah).

(c) We resolve the She'eilah by citing Rav Chanila'i bar Idi Amar Shmuel, who states - that the above ruling even extends to a baby in his cot (clearly incorporating a younger brother).

(a) By 'Peshita B'no ve'Acher, Acher be'Matanah, u'Beno Apotropus', we mean - that if a Shechiv-Mera leaves his property to a anyone other than a son, it is considered a Matanah, whereas if he leaves it to his son, he appoints him an Apotropus.

(b) Initially, we refute the suggestion that it speaks in one case, where a man writes half his property to his son and half to someone else - because then, seeing as he did not leave all his property to his son, why should the third person take all?

(c) We could resolve this problem - by adding that there were other sons, in which case, Shmuel's ruling might apply, since the father left nothing for the remaining sons.

(d) Yet we insist on rejecting that explanation - because it will then differ from the She'eilos that follow, which are all two separate case and not one, as we shall now see.

(a) We erase the text 'Ishto ve'Acher, le'Acher be'Matanah, ve'Ishto Apotropus', because since, as we just explained, all the dual cases are two independant cases, it would be pointless to repeat what Shmuel has already taught specifically.

(b) Shmuel concedes that 'Ishto Arusah ve'Ishto Gerushah, be'Matanah' - because he loves neither of them sufficiently to want his children to respect them.

(c) In a case where a Shechiv-Mera left everything to his son, if he also left behind ...

1. ... a wife but no other sons - then he has given him a Matanah (because a man does not expect his wife to respect his son).
2. ... a wife and sons - then he has appointed him an Apotropus, since he wants his brothers to pay him respect, as we learned earlier.

(a) We already issued a ruling in the case of a betrothed woman and a divorced wife, and we now ask what the Din will be if a Shechiv-Mera leaves all his property to one of three women; two of them, a daughter when there are sons (her brothers), and a daughter when there are brothers (her uncles). The third She'eilah concerns - a case where he leaves all his property to his wife when he leaves over his sons from another wife (her step-sons).

(b) The basis of these She'eilos is - whether a man would want his sons to respect his wife who is not their mother but their sister, their niece or their step-mother.

(c) Ravina states that all the above five women do not acquire except for a betrothed woman and a divorced wife. The only two that do not, according to Rav Ivya in the name of Rava are - when there are brothers and when there are step-sons (i.e. it is not feasible for a man to want them to respect their niece and their stepmother, though he does expect them to respect their sister.

(d) The sole case over which they therefore argue is -the latter one, whether he expects his sons to respect their sister (Ravina) or not (Rav Avira).