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1)

(a) The Beraisa discusses a case where Reuven hires Shimon to work for him for the duration of the barn-season, and he fixes payment at a Dinar a day, which he pays in advance. When the barn-season - which lasts thirty days, arrives, the work will be worth (i.e. he could have hired himself for) a Sela a day.

(b) He pays him only one Dinar - for the benefit of getting paid in advance.

(c) The Tana forbids Reuven to benefit from Shimon's work - because it now looks as if Shimon is paying Reuven an extra Dinar's work as payment for the money he received in advance.

(d) In a case where Reuven hired Shimon starting from that day, paying him a hundred Dinrim at a Dinar a day, for a hundred days, including the duration of the barn-season - the Tana permits Reuven to benefit from Shimon's work.

(a) The Seifa is similar to 'Hin bi'Sheneim-Asar Sela'im, Lug be'Sela' - because there too, Reuven added 'at a Dinar a day'.

(b) This poses a Kashya on Rav and Shmuel - because, according to them, Reuven only acquires each day's work as it is paid for, in which case, Shimon is permitted to retract any time he wishes. Consequently, the first days and the last days are unconnected. That being the case, when the barn-season arrives, there seems to be no reason why Reuven should be permitted to benefit from Shimon's work.

(c) Rava answers 'Zilzuli bi'Sechirus Mi Asir', by which he means - that min ha'Torah, there is no Isur Ribis with regard to hiring (or to the purchase of an article that is available now), since there is no Isur in renting, or buying something that is available now, at a reduced price (see Shitah Mekubetzes), irrespective of when he pays for it.

(d) And the reason the Tana forbid Reuven to derive benefit from Shimon's work in the Reisha is - only because, seeing as Shimon will only begin to work some time after he received the money, it looks like Ribis.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that if the purchaser detatched a small amount of flax that was growing in the field, he acquires the flax. The problem with this is - that it is not feasible that one should acquire all the flax in the field by picking just a small amount of it.

(b) We therefore explain the Mishnah to mean - that when the owner instructed the purchaser to pick some of the flax, he meant that he should improve the field (by making it fit for plowing [which constitutes a Chazakah), thereby acquiring the entire field, and at the same time, he should acquire all the flax growing in it.

(a) Our Mishnah discusses Reuven who sells wine or oil to Shimon, and the price rises or drops as he is in the process of selling it. Reuven is the one to benefit or lose from the change - if it occured before the measure is full; Shimon, if it occurred afterwards.

(b) This Halachah - extend to fruit as well. The Tana presents it in the case of wine and oil only because of the Din concerning the three drops that will be discussed shortly.

(c) The Tana is speaking - after the parties fixed the price (because beforehand, the Kinyan cannot come into effect under any circumstances, as we learned earlier).

(a) If the Sirsur (the middle-man who buys from Reuven and sells to Shimon) poured the wine or the oil into his barrel, and the barrel broke - it is he who must bear the loss.

(b) The Tana is coming to teach us - that the Sirsur is his own agent and not the Sheli'ach of the purchaser.

(a) If, after Reuven emptied the wine or the oil into Shimon's barrel plus the three drops that the Tana obligates him to add, more wine or oil subsequently accumulates in the barrel (which is known as 'Mitzis') - the seller takes it, because the purchaser has despaired of receiving any more out of the barrel.

(b) The same will apply to the Rechinah - the wine that gathers when he tips the barrel.

(c) The Tana Kama absolves a store-keeper from adding the three drops that a private individual is obligated to add - because he is busy with his customers, and therefore Chazal did not trouble him to do so.

(d) Rebbi Yehudah - absolves him on Erev Shabbos just before Shabbos enters (this will be explained in the Sugya).

(a) In the Reisha of the Mishnah (which differentiates between whether the measure is full or not), the Tana cannot be speaking about a measure that belongs to ...

1. ... the purchaser - because then, why would the seller be considered the owner before the measure has been filled?
2. ... the seller - because then, why would the purchaser be considered the owner after it has been filled?

(b) The measure must therefore belong to - the Sirsur.

(c) True, the Seifa speaks about a case where the barrel belongs to the Sirsur (implying that the Reisha doesn't) - but the Seifa speaks when the Sirsur is there too (to teach us that he is not the Sheli'ach of the purchaser, as we explained); whereas the Reisha speaks when he is not there (to teach us that the seller and the purchaser are not his Sheluchim, but that the barrel belongs to one of *them* as we explained).

(d) We did indeed learn this very Din in the Beraisa of four Dinim that we disussed above - however it is Rebbi's way to teach us briefly in a Mishnah what the Tana of the Beraisa teaches us in detail.

8)

(a) When, upon his arrival in Eretz Yisrael, Rebbi Elazar asked Ze'iri for a Tana who learned Midos, he was looking for - an Amora who was expert in the Mishnos that Rebbi taught in connection with measurements.

(b) Ze'iri introduced him to Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi, who reconciled our Mishnah, which grants the Mitzis and the Rechinah to the seller, with the Mishnah in Terumos, which declares the Terumah - by attributing the reason in our Mishnah to the fact that the purchaser has despaired (as we already explained), a reason that will not apply to the Din of Terumah, which belongs to the realm of Isur, and not to that of personal ownership.

(c) We are not sure whether, when Rebbi Yehudah rules 'Erev Shabbos Im Chasheichah Patur' (from the three drops), he is referring to the Reisha of the Tana Kama's previous statement, or to the Seifa. If he is referring to ...

1. ... the Reisha - then he is qualifying the Tana Kama's obligation to leave three drops, confining it to the week, but not to Erev Shabbos.
2. ... the Seifa - then he is confining the Tana Kama concession to a store-keeper to Erev Shabbos ... , but obligates him like everybody else, the rest of the week.

(d) The outcome of the She'eilah is - based on a Beraisa, where Rebbi Yehudah explicitly states 'Erev Shabbos Im Chasheichah, ha'Chenvani Patur ... ' (like the second side of the She'eilah).

(a) Our Mishnah discusses a case where Reuven sent his small son to the store with a Pundiyon to buy an Isar's worth of oil. When the child gave the store-keeper the Pundiyon, he received an Isar change?

(b) After the child left the store - he lost the change, broke the bottle and spilt the oil.

(c) The Tana found it necessary to present a case where the child had to receive change (rather than when his father sent him with an Isar) - because most private people dealt in Pundiyonim, and not in Isrim.

(a) There is another text that reads 've'Nasan Lo Tinok es ha'Isar (and not 'es ha'Pundiyon'), in which case, 've'Avad es ha'Isar' would refer (not to the Isar change, but) - to the Isar-worth of oil.

(b) We reject this version however, on the grounds - that it is not the way of the Mishnah to speak in this way, and besides, it is clear from the opening Kashya of the Sugya that there was an Isar change.

(c) The Tana Kama obligates the store-keeper to pay the father for the Isar, the bottle and the oil. According to Rebbi Yehudah - he is Patur, because he assumes that the father sent him in order to fetch the oil and bring it home.

(d) In a case where the store-keeper poured the oil into the bottle without taking it from the child's hand (though this will be discussed in detail later in the Sugya), the Chachamim concede - that he is Patur on the bottle.

(a) We already explained the logic behind Rebbi Yehudah's ruling. The Chachamim hold that no father would send a little child to fetch a bottle of oil, and it is clear - that he only meant to place an order with the store-keeper (who should therefore have had more sense than to hand the oil and the change to the child.

(b) This explanation will not however, hold with regard to the bottle - which is an Aveidah mi'Da'as (a willful loss on the part of the father, who gave it to the child in the first place).

(c) The money is not also 'Aveidah mi'Da'as' - because although the father gave his son the initial Pundiyon, it is the store-keeper who have him the Isar change.

(d) Alternatively, we might explain the Sugya in a way that circumvents this problem altogether - by establishing it when the father had already paid the storekeeper earlier, and he was now sending his son with the bottle to fetch his order (or to clarify his order).

(a) To answer the Kashya on the bottle, Rav Hoshaya establishes the case when the father was a bottle-seller. When he adds that the store-keeper then took the bottle to examine it, he means that he took it with the intention of buying it (even though he subsequently decided not to do so, and poured the oil into it instead). This immediately makes him liable, as we shall see shortly?

(b) We will then have to establish - that the price of the bottle was fixed and known to the purchaser for there to have been a potential sale (as we learned above).

(c) We base this on a statement of Shmuel, who rules that someone who takes a vessel from a craftsman in order to inspect it - is liable for damages until he has returned it (even in the event that he decides not to purchase it).

(d) Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of Shmuel's Din. Consequently - even if the store-keeper took the bottle from the child in order to examine it with a view to purchasing it, he would not be held liable (unless he actually decided to purchase it).

(a) And the Chachamim concede in the Seifa - that even if the store-keeper took the bottle from the child's hand (see Tosfos DH 'Ela'), he would not be liable (because it is an Aveidah mi'Da'as, as we explained).

(b) We refute this explanation (connecting the reasoning with regard to the bottle with Shmuel) however - because we consider Shmuel's opinion to be unanimous, and not subject to a Machlokes Tana'im.

(c) So Rabah and Rav Yosef establish that it is the store-keeper (rather than the father) who is a bottle-seller, and the basis of the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim is - as we explained with regard to the oil and the change (whether the father intends the store-keeper to hand the oil and the change to the child (Rebbi Yehudah) or not (the Chachamim).

(d) he problem with this explanation from the Seifa of the Mishnah ('u'Modim Chachamim ... ') will then be - why the Chachamim should concede to Rebbi Yehudah there (seeing as it the store-keeper who placed it in the child's hands).