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Avodah Zarah, 15

1) THE PROHIBITION OF "AMIRAH L'NOCHRI"

QUESTION: The Mishnah (14b) states that it is prohibited to sell a Behemah Gasah (a large domesticated animal, such as a cow) to a Nochri. The Gemara explores the reason for this prohibition and proposes that it is because the Nochri will make the animal work on Shabbos. The Gemara responds that this is not a valid reason to prohibit selling the animal to a Nochri, because once the Nochri has bought it, it no longer belongs to a Jew and it is permitted to work on Shabbos! RASHI (DH Keivan) explains that there is no prohibition of "Lifnei Iver" involved with selling an animal to a Nochri who will make the animal work on Shabbos, because the Nochri has no Mitzvah to observe Shabbos.

Rashi asks, however, that if a Nochri has no Mitzvah to observe Shabbos, then why is it prohibited for a Jew to tell a Nochri to do a Melachah for him on Shabbos? Rashi explains that it is prohibited because of the verse that says with regard to Shabbos, "If you honor it by not engaging in your own affairs, nor pursuing your own business, nor speaking of vain matters (v'Daber Davar)..." (Yeshayah 58:13). The Gemara in Shabbos (153b) teaches that the words "v'Daber Davar" refer to telling a Nochri to do Melachah on Shabbos.

The TESHUVOS PNEI YEHOSHUA (YD 2) quotes HA'GA'ON RABEINU REBBI HESHEL who asks that Rashi's words seem contradictory to the Gemara in Bava Metzia (90a). The Gemara there asks whether or not a Jew may tell a Nochri to muzzle the Jew's animal and use it to thresh the grain. The Jew himself is prohibited from muzzling his animal while it is threshing because of the prohibition of "Lo Sachsom" (Devarim 25:4). The Gemara there is asking whether the prohibition of telling a Nochri to do something which the Jew himself is prohibited from doing applies only to Shabbos, which is very severe (desecrating Shabbos is punishable by Sekilah), or whether it also applies to other prohibitions. The Gemara answers that it is forbidden to tell a Nochri to do *any* act which the Jew himself is prohibited from doing, because the Nochri is acting as the Shali'ach of the Jew (a Nochri is considered to be able to become a Shali'ach for matters of l'Chumra).

The Gemara there implies that the reason why a Jew may not tell a Nochri to do a Melachah for him on Shabbos is *not* because of the verse in Yeshayah that discusses Shabbos, because if that were the source, then the prohibition should apply *only* to Shabbos and not to other Isurim! What, then, is the source for the prohibition of "Amirah l'Nochri?" Furthermore, how are we to understand the words of Rashi here?

ANSWERS:

(a) The BEIS MEIR (#5) and CHASAM SOFER (OC 84) answer that with regard to doing a Melachah on Shabbos, it is not possible to make the Jew liable for a Melachah done through Shelichus at all. Only when the very action itself constitutes a repulsive act before Hashem is the Nochri's act on behalf of the Jew attributed to the Jew. The act of a Melachah on Shabbos, though, is not an intrinsically repulsive act. Melachah is forbidden on Shabbos in order for a Jew to rest on Shabbos from constructive labor ("l'Ma'an Yanu'ach"). For this reason, it is permitted mid'Oraisa to place a pot of raw food on the flame before Shabbos in order that it cook on Shabbos. Hence, when a Nochri does a Melachah at the behest of a Jew, it cannot be prohibited because he is acting as the Shali'ach of the Jew, because the Jew himself is resting from Melachah and is fulfilling the requirement of "l'Ma'an Yanu'ach," and thus the Jew has done no Aveirah. Therefore, it is necessary to have a special prohibition of "Amirah l'Nochri" on Shabbos, which, according to Rashi, is learned from the verse in Yeshayah. (See Insights to Bava Metzia 71:2.)

(b) The KEHILOS YAKOV (Avodah Zarah #8) suggests that there are indeed two reasons why a Jew may not tell a Nochri to work on Shabbos. One is the verse in Yeshayah of "v'Daber Davar," and the other is the reason that the Nochri is acting as the Shali'ach of the Jew to do a prohibited act. The Gemara in Bava Metzia is discussing the second reason, while Rashi here is discussing the first.

Why, though, do we need a special reason to prohibit "Amirah l'Nochri" on Shabbos, if the prohibition of "Amirah l'Nochri" applies to all Isurim?

The Kehilos Yakov answers that both reasons are necessary. If we would have had the verse of "v'Daber Davar" and not the reason of Shelichus, then we would have thought that the verse prohibits such speech only on Shabbos itself; only on Shabbos itself it is prohibited to tell a Nochri to do a Melachah, but *before* Shabbos it is permitted to tell a Nochri to do a Melachah later on Shabbos. However, we know that this is also prohibited (by the majority of Poskim; see BEIS YOSEF OC 307). The prohibition to tell a Nochri, before Shabbos, to do a Melachah on Shabbos can be due only to the reason of Shelichus. On the other hand, if we would have had only the reason of Shelichus, then we would have thought that it is forbidden only to tell the Nochri to do our work for us *on Shabbos*, but that it is permitted to tell him, on Shabbos, to do work for us *after* Shabbos. The verse of "v'Daber Davar," therefore, teaches us that this type of speech is forbidden on Shabbos altogether, even if the Melachah itself will not be done until after Shabbos.

(c) The Kehilos Yakov suggests an additional reason for why we need the verse of "v'Daber Davar." The TOSFOS RID, SHACH (CM 292) and others discuss the concept that a person cannot be a Shali'ach to transgress a sin for someone else such that the sin will be attributed to the other person; if such a Shali'ach transgresses a sin, the sin is attributed to him. Even though it is considered the Shali'ach's sin, nevertheless the sender still has partial guilt; it is considered as though he did part of the sin.

Accordingly, without the verse in Yeshayah, we would not have known that the concept of Shelichus prohibits a Jew from telling a Nochri to do a Melachah on Shabbos. This is because there is a Halachah regarding Shabbos that two people who together perform a forbidden Melachah are not guilty of transgressing the Torah's prohibition ("Shenayim she'Asu"), because the Torah only prohibits a person from doing the Melachah himself. Doing the Melachah with another person is prohibited only mid'Rabanan. This means that, according to these opinions, Melachah done on Shabbos by a Nochri at the behest of a Jew would be only a "Shevus d'Shevus," a rabbinical-level transgression of a rabbinical decree (that is, telling the Nochri to do Melachah is prohibited only mid'Rabanan, and the Melachah that one is telling him to do is only an Isur d'Rabanan, since it is considered as though two people are doing the Melachah together). The verse is needed, therefore, to reveal to us that telling a Nochri to do Melachah on Shabbos is categorized as only one act of "Shevus" and is forbidden. (Y. Montrose)

15b

QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Rabah sold his donkey to a Jew who was suspected of selling donkeys to Nochrim. When questioned about his conduct, he explained that since he sold it to a Jew and not to a Nochri, it was permitted. The Gemara later, though, concludes that it is forbidden to sell an animal to a Jew when that Jew will sell the animal to a Nochri.

The Gemara earlier (14a) quotes a Tosefta which teaches that although it is generally forbidden to sell Levonah (frankincense) to an idol worshipper, one *is* permitted to sell a large quantity, a "bundle" (Chavilah), of Levonah to an idol worshipper. RASHI explains that since he is buying a large bundle, he most probably wants it for commercial purposes and not for idol worship. The Gemara asks that perhaps the idol worshipper who is buying the bundle of Levonah will then go and sell some of it to others who will use it for Avodah Zarah, and, therefore, how is it permitted for a Jew to sell to an idol worshipper even a large quantity? Abaye answers that we are commanded not to do something that will cause another person to sin -- "v'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol" -- "Do not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Vayikra 19:14), but we are not commanded not to do something that will cause another person *to cause another person* to sin ("Lifnei d'Lifnei").

TOSFOS here (DH l'Oved) asks that according to the Gemara earlier, the Gemara here should *permit* a Jew to sell his animal to another Jew, even when the other Jew is suspected of selling animals to Nochrim! Since selling the animal to that Jew constitutes only "Lifnei d'Lifnei," it should be permitted!

ANSWERS:

(a) TOSFOS quotes RABEINU ELCHANAN who answers that when Abaye says that we are not commanded to avoid doing an act of "Lifnei d'Lifnei," it is referring only to when one is causing a *Nochri* to cause someone else to do an Aveirah. Since a Nochri has no prohibition of "Lifnei Iver" forbidding him to sell to another Nochri an object that he can use for Avodah Zarah, a Jew does not have to be careful about "Lifnei d'Lifnei." The Gemara here, though, is discussing selling an object to a *Jew* who might sin by selling the object to a Nochri. We are commanded not to cause another Jew to do *any* sin as a result of our actions. Since the second Jew might sin (by selling the animal to a Nochri) as a result of the first Jew's sale, the first Jew is not allowed to sell the animal to the suspected Jew. This is also apparently the way the MINCHAS CHINUCH (#232) understands Tosfos.

It seems, then, that Tosfos is saying that the case of our Gemara is not a case of "Lifnei d'Lifnei," but rather there is only one "Lifnei." By selling the animal to the suspected Jew, the first Jew is causing the second Jew to do an Isur himself (the Isur of selling the animal to a Nochri).

(b) Tosfos answers further and says that the first Jew is transgressing "Lifnei Iver" (and not "Lifnei d'Lifnei") by selling the animal to the second Jew, because the second Jew is going to sin by lending or renting the animal to a Nochri (which is Asur because of "Shevisas Behemto").

It is not clear, though, what the difference is between these two answers of Tosfos. Both answers seem to be saying that the first Jew may not sell the animal to the suspected Jew because there is only one "Lifnei" involved, since it is the second Jew himself who will be sinning. In what way are these two answers different? (See CHAVOS YA'IR #185, and MINCHAS YITZCHAK 3:79, and see also RITVA (14a, DH Tana). See RAN, and CHIDUSHEI ANSHEI SHEM and SEDER YAKOV's understanding of the Ran.)

The KEHILOS YAKOV (#4), therefore, understands Tosfos in an entirely different way. He explains that Tosfos is unsure whether or not the prohibition of "Lifnei Iver" applies to an Isur d'Rabanan, such as this one (selling an animal to a Nochri). The Kehilos Yakov explains that Tosfos initially assumes that when the first Jew sells the animal to the Jew who is suspected of selling it to a Nochri, it is considered as though the first Jew himself has transgressed the prohibition of selling the animal to a Nochri. Based on this understanding, Tosfos asks that we see from the Gemara earlier -- which says that there is no prohibition of "Lifnei d'Lifnei" -- that the action done by the buyer (selling the animal to a Nochri who will use it for Avodah Zarah) is *not* considered as though it was done by the first seller, the Jew! Why, then, does our Gemara say that the first Jew is not allowed to sell the animal to the second Jew? This is the question of Tosfos.

Tosfos answers that the Gemara's reason for prohibiting the first Jew from selling the animal to the second, suspected Jew is not as Tosfos initially assumed. It is not because the action done eventually by the second Jew is attributed to the first Jew, because the concept of "Lifnei d'Lifnei" tells us that the first Jew's act should certainly be permitted. The problem is that the suspected Jew will eventually transgress an Isur d'Rabanan because of the first Jew who sold him the animal. Tosfos concludes that the prohibition of "Lifnei Iver" means that every Jew is commanded to ensure that he causes no other Jew to sin in any way, and, therefore, "Lifnei Iver" applies even when the Isur that the second Jew might do is only an Isur d'Rabanan.

The Kehilos Yakov points out that according to this explanation, the text in Tosfos should be altered slightly so that it reads, "she'Lo Yavo Yisrael li'Ydei *Shum* Takalah" ("so that a Jew should not be caused to do *any transgression*") instead of "she'Lo Yavo *Shum* Yisrael li'Ydei Takalah" ("so that *no* Jew should come to do a transgression"). Such a reading would emphasize that a Jew must be careful not to cause another Jew to transgress even an Isur d'Rabanan. (This is similar to Tosfos later (22a) who cites this Gemara as a proof that "Lifnei Iver" applies to an Isur d'Rabanan.)

The Kehilos Yakov explains that the second answer of Tosfos argues with the first. The second answer is suggesting that perhaps "Lifnei Iver" does *not* apply to an Isur d'Rabanan. The reason why it is prohibited for the first Jew to sell the animal to the second Jew is because the second Jew might also transgress an *Isur d'Oraisa* of "Shevisas Behemto" by lending or renting the animal to a Nochri, and thus the Isur of "Lifnei Iver" applies to the first Jew. (Y. Montrose)