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Zevachim, 106

1) AN "AZHARAH" FOR THE OBLIGATION TO BRING A KORBAN

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one is not permitted to slaughter a Korban, or offer the limbs of a Korban, outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara says that there is an explicit verse which provides an Azharah (warning), and there is another verse which states the Onesh (punishment), for one who offers the limbs of a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. However, the verse only states the Onesh, but not the Azharah, for one who slaughters a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Gemara attempts to find the Azharah.

Why is the Gemara concerned with finding an Azharah for one who slaughters a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash? As the Gemara itself mentions, the Torah clearly states that such a person receives Kares! Why, then, do we need to find an Azharah? The act is clearly forbidden by the Torah.

ANSWERS:

(a) RASHI (DH Ela) says that the Gemara is asking how the transgressor brings a Korban Chatas for accidentally slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. A Korban Chatas is brought only for an unintentional violation of a Lav that is punishable with Kares. The unintentional failure to perform a Mitzvas Aseh that is punishable with Kares when intentionally neglected, such as the Mitzvah to bring the Korban Pesach and the Mitzvah of Bris Milah, does not warrant a Korban Chatas. Only a Lo Sa'aseh which is punishable with Kares is subject to the obligation of a Korban Chatas when transgressed unintentionally. The Gemara is searching for an Azharah in order to justify the Mishnah's law that accidentally slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is indeed a Lo Sa'aseh and warrants bringing a Korban Chatas. (According to some Acharonim, the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shegagos 1:2) is also of the opinion that a Korban Chatas is brought only for a sin which has an explicit Azharah; see KEREN ORAH, in contrast to the AMUDEI OR 41:11.)

TOSFOS (DH Azharah) challenges Rashi's explanation. The Gemara in Makos (13b) seems to conclude that an Azharah is not a prerequisite for the obligation to bring a Korban. Rava states that in order for a person to be punished with Kares, an Azharah is not necessary, because we find that the Mitzvos of Korban Pesach and Milah do not have an Azharah, and yet they are punishable with Kares. The Gemara asks that perhaps the fact that they do not have an Azharah is because they do not obligate the transgressor to bring a Korban Chatas, and thus an Azharah *is* necessary to obligate one to bring a Korban Chatas. The Gemara answers that the reason these two Mitzvos do not warrant a Chatas is for an entirely different reason, and not because there is no Azharah written in the Torah for them. We compare all Korbanos to the accidental transgression of Avodah Zarah, which is committed only in an active manner, as opposed to Korban Pesach and Milah which are transgressed passively (by *not* doing them).

Tosfos asks that we see from the conclusion of the Gemara there that the lack of an Azharah is not the reason why one does not bring a Korban Chatas for transgressing the Mitzvos of Korban Pesach and Milah. Rather, the reason one does not bring a Korban Chatas for transgressing those Mitzvos is because they do not entail active transgressions. How, then, can Rashi state that the reason why our Gemara is looking for an Azharah is to justify the obligation to bring a Korban Chatas when one accidentally slaughters a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash?

(b) TOSFOS maintains that the Gemara's search for an Azharah is in order to explain the Mishnah in Makos (13a), which lists slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash among the transgressions for which one receives Malkus.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES in Kerisus (2a) sides with Tosfos that becoming obligated to bring a Korban does not need an Azharah. Rashi in Kerisus is careful to show how each of the transgressions listed in the Mishnah has an Azharah which justifies the bringing of a Korban. Based on the aforementioned Gemara in Makos, the Shitah Mekubetzes writes that he does not know why Rashi needs to show us that all of those transgressions have Azharos! This shows the Shitah Mekubetzes agrees with Tosfos.

Tosfos rejects a possibility that many commentaries (TESHUVOS YEHUDAH YA'ALEH #113, TESHUVOS IMREI ESH OC 35, and others) conclude is the basis for the opinion of Rashi. In Makos, Ravina is of another opinion that could hold that a Korban does need an Azharah. The KEHILOS YAKOV in Makos (#12) points out that there are actually many more Gemaras that apparently hold that a Korban does need an Azharah. Rashi maintains that our Gemara is following the opinion that a Korban does need an Azharah. (Y. Montrose)

106b

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Abaye's answer regarding the source for the Azharah against slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. He learns the Azharah from the Azharah (quoted earlier in the Gemara) against slaughtering a Korban which was designated before the Isur of Bamos took effect. If there is an Azharah for slaughtering such an animal outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, even though there is no punishment mentioned, then certainly (Kal v'Chomer) slaughtering an animal that was designated to be a Korban when the Isur of Bamos *was* in effect -- which the Torah says is punishable with Kares -- has an Azharah. Ravina says that we see from here that we cannot derive Azharos from logic. If Azharos could be derived through logic, we would not need an Azharah for the prohibition of Chelev, for which no punishment is stated, because we could learn it from Neveilah, for which a punishment is stated. Rava refutes this challenge to Abaye's answer, explaining that the reason why we could derive an Azharah for Chelev from Neveilah is because the Isur of Neveilah is more severe than the Isur of Chelev. Rava explains that we cannot derive the Azharah for Chelev from a number of other Isurim for the same reason -- all of those Isurim are more severe than Chelev for one reason or another.

Among the Isurim from which we might have derived the Azharah for Chelev is the Isur of Shevi'is. Rava says that we cannot derive the Azharah for Chelev from Shevi'is because Shevi'is is such a severe Isur that it even the money that is used to buy fruits of Shevi'is becomes Kadosh with Kedushas Shevi'is. The RASHASH explains that the Gemara must be referring to the prohibition against eating fruit of Shevi'is in a way that violates the rules of Shevi'is. The Gemara is not referring to the prohibition against working the land during Shevi'is, because that prohibition is no different than many other prohibitions, and thus Rava would not have mentioned that prohibition in particular. The reason Rava mentions the Isur of Shevi'is is because it constitutes a prohibition against eating a forbidden food item, which is similar to Chelev and all of the other Isurim that are mentioned. In addition, Rava discusses the transfer of the Kedushah from fruit of Shevi'is onto the money that is given for it; he clearly is not discussing the Isur of working the land.

However, the Rashash is left with a difficulty. We do not find an explicit Azharah in the Torah for the Isur against eating fruits of Shevi'is! What is the source for the Azharah against eating these fruit?

ANSWERS:

(a) The TESHUVOS MAHARSHAM (7:200, see there at length) was asked this question by the ADERES. He responded that we find in Chulin (114b) that Rav Ashi maintains that the verse, "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah" -- "Do not eat any abominable thing" (Devarim 14:3), prohibits eating a mixture of milk and meat. Rav Ashi understands that the verse is saying that anything that we may not eat anything that Hashem has made abominable to us, which includes a mixture of milk and meat. Accordingly, this verse is not only an Azharah against eating a mixture of milk and meat, but it is also a general Azharah not to eat anything that Hashem considers abominable. In addition, RASHI in Sotah (29b, DH ha'Tzad ha'Shaveh) calls Chametz which a person saw in his possession during Pesach (transgressing the Isur of "Bal Yera'eh) an object "with which an Aveirah was done," showing us that even a *passive* transgression, such as not getting rid of one's Chametz on Pesach, makes the object into an object of sin which is a "To'evah."

Accordingly, the Maharsham says that it is possible that fruit of Shevi'is that was not destroyed after the time of Bi'ur is also considered included in the category of "To'evah," which, according to Rav Ashi, is prohibited by the Azharah of "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah." This is the Azharah for the Isur of Shevi'is that the Gemara here is discussing.

The KEHILOS YAKOV (46:16) says that it is a very forced answer to say that the Gemara is referring to the Azharah of "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah." Moreover, if the Gemara's intention is to suggest this Isur as the Azharah from which to learn the Azharah for Chelev, then why does it mention the specific Isur of Shevi'is? The Azharah of "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah" includes many other Isurim! The Gemara should have mentioned explicitly the Isur of "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah."

(b) The Kehilos Yakov answers that the source of the Azharah is the verse, "And if you will say, 'What will we eat in the seventh year? Behold, we cannot plant nor gather our produce (v'Lo Ne'esof)'" (Vayikra 25:20). The Toras Kohanim explains that the verse is addressing the concern that we cannot plant during the seventh year, and the produce that we do harvest must eventually be destroyed before the time of Bi'ur. This shows us that "v'Lo Ne'esof" is an Azharah against eating (and possibly keeping in one's possession) fruit of Shevi'is. Even though the Torah is not directly commanding us in this verse, but rather relating what we might say, this still can be considered an Azharah. We find a similar prohibition against eating Ma'aseros in a state of Aninus in the verses that one recites as Viduy Ma'aseros (see Devarim 26:14). The Kehilos Yakov writes that it was later brought to his attention that this explanation is also suggested by the OLAS SHLOMO. (Y. Montrose)