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1)

(a) We suggest that accepting the testimony of one witness to permit a woman to remarry is a S'vara. Why is it obvious that a piece of fat which is Safek Cheilev, Safek Shuman becomes permitted if someone testifies that it is indeed Shuman?

(b) On what grounds do we reject the comparison between the two cases? Why should the woman nevertheless remain forbidden?

(c) What will be the Din if one witness testifies that a piece of fat that we know to be Cheilev, is Shuman?

(d) And on what grounds do we reject the comparison of our case to *that* case too?

(a) So we try and compare our case to Tevel, Hekdesh and Konamos.
Why is a person believed to say that his Tevel has been rectified?

(b) Why might he not be believed if he testifies that someone else's Tevel has been rectified?

(c) Why will he be believed if he says that his Hekdesh which was ...

1. ... Kedushas Damim is now Chulin?
2. ... Kedushas ha'Guf (Mizbei'ach) is now Chulin?

(d) What will be the Din if he testifies that someone else's animal that was Kedushas ha'Guf is now Chulin, because the owner had the Hekdesh nullified?

(a) What are Konamos?

(b) What is the meaning of ...

1. ... 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos'?
2. ... 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos'?

(c) Would the owner be believed to say that the object was no longer forbidden, were we to hold ...

1. ... 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos?
2. ... 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos'?

(d) Assuming that we hold 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos' would he be believed to say that someone else's object is no longer forbidden?

(a) Then on what basis do all the above Mishnahs accept the testimony of one witness, in spite of the fact that it does not lie in his power to rectify matters, and it is a Davar she'be'Ervah (a matter concerning marriage)?

(b) And on what basis did Chazal take such a lenient view with regard to Eishes Ish?

(c) Do the Chachamim have the power to override Torah law in this manner (see Tosfos DH 'Mitoch' and Tosfos Yeshanim 'Mishum')?

(a) How did the people of Eretz Yisrael react when they heard of Rav's ruling that if the woman remarried on the basis of the testimony of *two* witnesses, and the husband returned, then she may remain with her second husband?

(b) How do we justify Rav's statement?

(c) How do we establish Rav, in order to differentiate between one witness (in which case she must leave the second marriage) and two (when she may remain)?

(d) On what do we base the phenomenon of not recognizing a close acquaintance?

6)

(a) What is the penalty for living with a Safek Eishes Ish?

(b) Then how can Rav permit the woman who after all, is a Safek Eishes Ish, to remain with the second man?

(c) Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi in a Beraisa, rules that if two witnesses testify that a woman's husband died or that he divorced her, and two other witnesses testify that he did not, then, even after the woman subsequently marries one of the first pair, she is forbidden to remain with him.
What do the Rabbanan say?

(d) Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi concedes that if they were already married, she may remain with him.
What then, is Rav's Chidush, according to ...

1. ... the first Lashon?
2. ... the second Lashon?

(a) What does the Beraisa learn from the Pasuk in Emor "ve'Kidashto"? What is the case?

(b) Why must the Tana be referring to a case of Safek (as above) where she married one of her witnesses?

(c) Initially, in order to reconcile this Beraisa with Rav, we differentiate between ordinary Arayos and Isurei Kehunah, where the Torah is more stringent. Alternatively, how do we interpret 'Dafno' differently, in order to avoid differentiating between them?

(d) In the third answer, we establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi.
What does he say? How does this reconcile Rav with the Beraisa?

(a) Rav Ashi offers a new slant to the Sugya by reinterpreting Rav's statement 'Lo Seitzei'.
How does he now explain it?

(b) But did he not already teach us that, when he ruled like the Tana of our Mishnah who said 'Niseis she'Lo bi'R'shus, Muteres Lachzor Lo'?

(a) According to Shmuel, when our Mishnah rules 'Teiztei', that is only as long as she does not contradict the witness, but if she does, she may remain with her second husband.
How do we know that the Tana is talking about one witness, and not two?

(b) Why is a second witness not believed to contradict the testimony of the first witness who said that her husband died? What principle did Ula teach in this regard?

(c) So, according to Shmuel, we establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Nechemyah in a Beraisa. What does Rebbi Nechemyah say? How does this explain our Mishnah (see Hagahos ha'Gra)?

(d) According to the second Lashon, Rebbi Nechemyah speaks when the first witness was a woman.
In which point does the second Lashon argue with the first?

(a) It is obvious that the return of the woman's husband automatically invalidates the second marriage.
What reason does Rav Huna give to explain why our Mishnah requires a Get from the second man?

(b) How do we initially explain the Seifa, which permits the woman to return to her husband if the second man only betrothed (but did not marry) her? Why are we not worried there too, that people might say that a betrothed woman does not require a Get?

(c) How can the Tana permit a man to take back his wife, once she has been betrothed to somebody else?

(d) On what grounds do we refute the current interpretation of the Seifa (that she does indeed require a Get)? Perhaps a Get mi'de'Rabbanan of this nature will not invalidate a woman from the Kehunah?

(a) So how do we finally explain the Seifa? Why *do* we permit the betrothed woman to return to her husband without a Get from the second man?

(b) Then why does she require a Get in the Reisha, seeing as there no logical reason to differentiate between marriage and betrothal in this matter?

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