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1)

(a) The Tana of Mishnah requires someone who forbids his son-in-law Hana'ah, and who then wishes to give his daughter money, to stipulate that her husband is to have no jurisdiction over it, and to then add - that she will only acquire it after she buys with it food and places it in her mouth ('Ela Mah she'At Nose'es ve'Nosenes be'Fich').

(b) The father needs to add this - because the author of Mishnah is Rebbi Meir, who holds that the hand of a woman is like the hand of her husband, in which case the first condition of the father is meaningless. It is only when she acquires the food that is already in her mouth (which it is practically impossible for her husband to acquire) that it is possible to prevent him from acquiring it.

(c) Consequently - there is no way to give her clothes that will prevent her husband from acquiring them (see last answer on the Daf).

(d) The Tana then presents the case of a father giving his daughter money with which to buy food, and not about giving her food directly - because then the husband would not acquire it, because even if she were to hold back some of the food that she receives from her husband, she would be entitled to keep, certainly food that she receives from others!

3)

(a) Rav confines the Tana's concession to when the father added 'Ela Mah she'At Nose'es ve'Nosenes le'Fich', but not to when he said 'Mah she'Tirtzi Asi' - because there is no more reason for her husband not to acquire the money there, than when he just said 'u'Vilevad she'Lo Yehei le'Ba'alech Reshus Bahen'.

(b) Shmuel says - that even if he said 'Mah she'Tirtzi Asi', her husband will not acquire the money.

(c) Shmuel can hardly argue with Rav with regard to explaining our Mishnah (which specifically says 'Ela Mah she'At Nose'es ve'Nosenes le'Fich') - he argues with Rav inasmuch as Rav rules like our Mishnah (Rebbi Meir), whilst *he* holds like the Rabbanan, who do not agree that the hand of a woman is like that of her husband.

(d) In a case where the father only said 'u'Vilevad she'Lo Yehei le'Ba'alech Reshus Bahen' - Shmuel will therefore hold that his daughter will acquire the money.

4)

(a) The courtyards surrounding a Mavoy arrange a Shituf Muva'os by placing a barrel of wine and declaring that it is on behalf of all the members of that Mavoy. He is permitted to transfer it to them via his Jewish servant, his grown-up children or his wife, because they all have a Yad to acquire.

(b) This poses a Kashya on Rav - who said that whatever a woman acquires goes straight to her husband.

(c) Rava resolves this problem - by drawing a distinction between a third person who gives a woman a gift (in which case her husband acquires it immediately), and her husband, who withdraws his ownership when he gives it to her.

(a) Another Beraisa informs us that the person arranging the Eiruv is not permitted to transfer the Eiruv to the residents of the courtyard via his small children, his Eved Kena'ani or his Shifchah Kena'anis - because they do not have a Yad to acquire.

(b) This Tana include the man's wife in his list, which appears to contradict what the Tana of the previous Beraisa taught us (that the man's wife is eligible to acquire on behalf of the residents of the Mavoy - and place a spoke in the wheel of Rava's answer).

(c) To resolve this discrepancy, Rav Ashi establishes the first Beraisa when the woman possessed her own courtyard in that Mavoy. She acquired the courtyard without her husband having any rights in it - by virtue of the fact that he specifically withdrew his rights from it in her favor whilst they were still betrothed.

(d) Granted, her husband only withdrew from *her* personal rights, and not what she would acquire on behalf of others. Nevertheless - since ('Migu') the Chatzer acquires for her personally, it will also acquire for her when she acquires on behalf of others.

(a) When Rav argues with Shmuel, the Halachah, when they argue in ...

1. ... matters of Isur - is like Rav.
2. ... money-matters - is like Shmuel.

(b) Despite the fact that their Machlokes *here* (whether a man may give his daughter, who has forbidden Hana'ah on her husband, money, on the exclusive condition that her husband is to have no jurisdiction over it or not) concerns Nedarim, which falls under the category of Isur, Rav Amram Gaon and the Ramban nevertheless rule like Shmuel - because their basic Machlokes concerns money-matters (whether 'Yad Ishah ke'Yad Ba'alah' or not).

(c) Another good reason to rule like Shmuel (besides the fact that in other places in Shas, Shmuel's opinion is cited) - is that Rav rules like Rebbi Meir, whereas Shmuel roles like the Chachamim.

(d) Rabeinu Tam however, as well as the Ra'avad, rules like Rav - because *here* they are arguing over Isur, as we explained earlier.

(a) The Rambam rules like Shmuel, yet he holds that 'Mah she'Tirtzi Asi' only helps in conjunction with 'Ein le'Ba'alech Reshus Bahen' - because, according to him, they Rav and Shmuel both follow the opinion of our Mishnah (Rebbi Meir). What they are arguing about is whether 'Mah she'Tirtzi Asi' helps in conjunction with 'Ein le'Ba'alech Reshus Bahen' (in place of 'Ela Mah she'At Nose'es ve'Nosenes le'Fich' [Shmuel]) or not (Rav).

(b) We explained earlier that 'Mah she'Tirtzi Asi' does not appear to add anything to 'Ein le'Ba'alech Reshus Bahen' (which, according to our Mishnah, is certainly ineffective). The Rambam however, explains that when her father said 'Mah she'Tirtzi Asi', he meant that the money will only become hers if and when she spent it for herself. Note: In that case, it ought to be effective even with regard to clothes (and not specifically food), as we explained in our Mishnah.

(a) We hardly require a Pasuk to teach us that the Nedarim of a widow or a divorcee stand (seeing as there is neither a father nor a husband to annul them). So the Tana explains the Pasuk "ve'Neder Almanah u'Gerushah Yakum Alehah" - when the widow or divorcee undertook to become a Nazir after thirty days, but got married before the thirty days elapsed.

(b) And if a married woman undertakes to become a Nezirah in thirty days time, and the husband annuls her Neder immediately, and then divorces her or dies within thirty days - her Neder is annulled, because we always go after the time that she declared the Neder, not when it is due to come into effect.

(a) If a married woman made a Neder, and her husband divorced her and remarried her all on the same day, her husband is not permitted to annul her Neder - because a husband cannot annul Nedarim that his wife made before they were married (even if she made them whilst they were previously married).

(b) Assuming that her husband only *betrothed* her the second time - he is not permitted to annul her Nedarim in conjunction with her father, because, once a woman marries (which the woman had been the first time), her father loses jurisdiction over his daughter.

(c) Once a girl marries, her father loses his rights to annul any of her Nedarim - even those that she declared in the morning of the same day, before she was married (or even betrothed).