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1)

(a) When Rav Yehudah Amar Rav says 'Eid Zomem Meshalem L'fi Chelko', he cannot mean to say that each of the false witnesses must pay a half - because we already know that from a Mishnah later 'Meshalshin be'Mamon ... '.

(b) The word 'Meshalshin' there might mean that Beis-Din become a third party to divide the sum equally among the Eidim Zomemin, or it might mean to divide equally (irrespective of how many people are involved).

(c) We object to the the suggestion that what the Tana means is that if ...

1. ... only one of the witnesses becomes a Zomem, he is obligated to pay the second witness's portion too - because one witness cannot become an Eid Zomem (as we learn in a Beraisa).
2. ... one of them confesses that he testified falsely (and that Reuven does not really owe Shimon the money at all) - due to the principle 'Keivan she'Higid, Shuv Eino Chozer u'Magid' (once a witness has testified, he cannot retract).
3. ... one of them admits that thy both testified in another Beis-Din and were declared Zomemin - because that would not conform with the opinion (according to whom most S'tam Mishnah's go), who holds that Eidim Zomemin is a K'nas (as we learned above), and the witnesses cannot therefore obligate themselves to pay.

(d) In the above-mentioned case where one of the witnesses confesses that he testified falsely (and that Reuven does not really owe Shimon the money at all), he would be Chayav to pay - because of Diyna de'Garmi (directly causing the defendant a loss). It would not really be a case Eidim Zomemin at all - but the Tana would then merely be using a borrowed term.

3)

(a) Our Mishnah discusses a case where two witnesses claimed that Reuven had divorced his wife, and were then proven to be Zomemin. The monetary loss they are now obligated to pay is - the Kesuvah (which they tried to cause Reuven).

(b) The problem we have with assessing it - is that the loss will prove to be absolute only in the event that Reuven's wife dies before he does; should Reuven die first, or decide to divorce his wife, he will have to pay her her Kesuvah anyway, in which case the witnesses will not have caused him a loss at all. So how do we assess the loss?

(c) We therefore assess it - by evaluating its saleable value (how much a potential buyer would be willing to pay for it bearing in mind the risl factor that we just described).

(a) The stakes that Reuven has in the Kesuvah are more than those of his wife - because a. he is currently Muchzak in it, and b. because he eats the Peiros of the Karka that he has designated for her (whilst, other being able to sell it, which he can too) she gains nothing out of it as long as she is married to him).

(b) We cannot extrapolate from the Tana, who says 'she'Im Nis'armelah ... ', that the Eidim Zomemin must pay the equivalent of the woman's stakes in the Kesuvah - because it is Reuven whom they are causing a loss, not his wife.

(c) 'Z'chus S'feikah' to which the Tana seems to be referring (and which Rav Nasan bar Oshaya actually learns) is - the stakes that she has in the Kesuvah (regarding its sale), deducted from the total value of the Kesuvah.

(d) The opinion that is the more stringent is that of Rav Nasan bar Oshaya, who says 'ba'Ishah' - because the amount involved is minimal, and, when deducted from the Kesuvah's full value (as we just explained), comes to far more than 'Z'chus S'feiko'.

(a) When Rav Papa adds 'ba'Ishah u'vi'Kesuvasah', he comes to preclude - the woman's Nechsei Milug (whose Peiros Reuven had a right to eat) ...

(b) ... because they can say that they were coming to make Reuven lose the Kesuvah, and not his rights in his wife's Nechsei Milug, which they did not know existed.

(c) We might also interpret ...

1. ... 'be'Ba'al' to mean - that we assess the woman's Tovas Hana'ah of Reuven's property whatever it is, Idis, Beinonis or Ziburis.
2. ... 'be'Ishah u'vi'Kesuvasah' to mean - that if Reuven designated a certain field for his wife's Kesuvah, then we assess that field alone.

(d) We reject this explanation however, a. because it is not the woman whom the witnesses caused a loss but the husband (as we explained earlier [see Hagahos ha'Bach); b. then Rav Chisda ought to have said 'be'Nechsei ha'Ba'al' (rather than 'be'Ba'al'); and c. Why does Rav Chisda argue in the case where Reuven deisgnated a field for his wife's Kesuvah?

7)

(a) A debt that is not claimable, is not subject to release in the Sh'mitah - because the Torah writes in Re'ei "Lo Yigos" ('Do not claim the debt'). Sh'mitah then, cancels the right to claim, nothing more.

(b) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules, regarding a ten-year loan, which is not yet payable at the termination of the Sh'mitah - that Sh'mitah nevertheless cancels the loan, since "Lo Yigos" is not determined by its current situation, but in the long term. Consequently, since "Lo Yigos" will apply when the time falls due, it falls under the category of "Lo Yigos" and is canceled by the Sh'mitah.

(c) The problem Rav Kahana has with this is - from the case in our Mishnah, where the Eidim Zomemin pay for the extension of the loan from thirty days to ten years. Seeing as the debt extends beyond the Sh'mitah, why are they not obligated to pay for the entire loan, which their testimony would have canceled?

(d) Rava answers by establishing our Mishnah like thes Mishnah in Shevi'is, which rules - that if someone lends money against a security or who hands his documents to Beis-Din (Hillel's P'ruzbul) - the Sh'mitah does not cancel it.

(a) In the second Lashon, Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel holds - that Sh'mitah does not cancel a ten-year loan (because "Lo Yigos" is determined by the current situation).

(b)

1. Rav Kahana now tries to prove this from our Mishnah - using the same argument that he just used to ask on Rav Yehudah's first Lashon.
2. ... Rava refutes Rav Kahana's proof - by establishing our Mishnah like the Mishnah in Shevi'is (i.e. when the defendant borrowed against a security or when the creditor handed his Sh'tar to Beis-Din) just like he did in the first Lashon, to answer Rav Kahana's Kashya.

(a) Initially, we explain the statement of Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel 'ha'Omer la'Chavero al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni Shevi'is, Meshametes' - on the principle 'ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Kayam'.

(b) The problem with this is from another ruling of Shmuel, who argues with Rav (according to whom, if Reuven sells Shimon an object 'al-M'nas she'Ein Lecha Alai Ona'ah, Ein Lo Alav Ona'ah') and says - 'Yesh Lo Alav Ona'ah (because he holds 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil').

(c) Based on a statement of Rav Anan, Shmuel draws a distinction between a case where he says ...

1. ... 'al-M'nas she'Ein Lecha *Alai* Ona'ah' - where his condition is valid, and where he says 'Ein *Bo* Ona'ah' - where it is not.
2. ... 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni *ba'Shevi'is'* - where his condition is valid, and where he says 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni *Shevi'is'* - where it is not.

(d) 'al-M'nas she'Ein Lecha Alai Ona'ah' and 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni ba'Shevi'is' is permitted - because (as opposed to 'al-M'nas she'Ein Bo Ona'ah ... ', which is simply not true), the borrower and the purchaser are Mochel the Ona'ah and the cancellation of Sh'mitah (respectively [Tosfos]).

(a) We learned in a Beraisa that if Reuven lends Shimon money S'tam, he may not claim the money before thirty days. Rabah bar bar Chanah confined this ruling to a Milveh bi'Shtar - because one does not tend to write a Sh'tar for a lesser period.

(b) Rav, however, quoted his uncle, who specifically stated - that there was no difference.

(a) Shmuel instructed Rav Masna to find the reason for the Tana's ruling, adding - that he was not to sit down until he had the answer.

(b) Rav Masna extrapolated the reason from the Pasuk "Karvah Sh'nas ha'Sheva Sh'nas ha'Shemitah", from the superfluous words "Sh'nas ha'Shemitah", which hint to another 'Sh'mitah' (period that one cannot claim), namely, the first thirty days following the loan. Why thirty days? Because the Torah also writes ''Sh'nas", and, based on the principle of Mar ...

(c) ... 'Sheloshim Yom ba'Shanah Chashuv Shanah', Shanah sometimes incorporates thirty days.

(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav also said that someone who creates an opening for the neck in a shirt on Shabbos - is Chayav Chatas.

(b) Opening the lid of a barrel that has been cemented to the barrel, on the other hand - is permitted.

(c) When Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehudah to explain the difference - he replied that whereas the former is considered joined, the latter is not (since it is specifically made to break open.

(d) This Sugya (as well as the next one) is brought here - because it follows the pattern set above, where Rav Yehudah first quotes Rav, and then answers Rav Kahana's query on Rav's ruling.

(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav rules that a Mikvah if three Lugin of water into which a Kortov (a small measure) of wine fell, then fell into it - is Kasher ...

(b) ... provided the three Lugin of water look like wine (and not water).

(c) If three Lugin of colored water fell into a Mikvah however - the Mikvah would be Pasul.

(d) When Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehudah to explain him the difference - he replied that whereas the former is called 'wine' (which does not invalidate a Mikvah), the latter is merely called 'colored water' (which does).

(e) Rava reconciles Rav with the Beraisa quoted by Rebbi Chiya which rules that the Mikvah is Pasul - by establishing the latter like the Rabbanan, and Rav like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri. (We will now elaborate).