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1)

(a) If an animal is having difficulty giving birth, and prior to being Shechted, the fetus sticks out and withdraws ...

1. ... its leg - the fetus becomes permitted via the Shechitah of its mother.
2. ... its head - the fetus is considered born, and is not affected by its mother's Shechitah.

(b) In the latter case - if the baby is found to be alive, it requires its own Shechitah, whereas if it is dead, it has the Din of a Neveilah.

(c) The Tana permits a piece of fetus that one severed before the mother's Shechitah and left inside the mother, but forbids a piece of spleen or kidney in the same circumstances (as we already discussed in the previous Perek).

(d) The principle that the Tana presents in this regard is - that part of the animal's body remains forbidden after the mother's Shechitah, whereas whatever is not part of the animal itself is permitted.

(a) Regarding the opening case in our Mishnah, Rav Yehudah Amar Rav forbids the leg itself (even though the rest of the animal is permitted) - based on the Pasuk in Mishpatim "u'Basar ba'Sadeh Tereifah Lo Sochelu", from which we Darshen that any Basar that left its boundaries becomes forbidden.

(b) We also learn from this Pasuk - that an animal of Kodshim that leaves its boundaries (the Heichal [in the case of Kodshei Kodshim] or the Azarah [in that of Kodshim Kalim]).

(c) Even though, as Rav Yehudah is forced to explain, 'Mutar ba'Achilah', in the above case, refers to the rest of the animal, the Tana nevertheless needs to add the clause 'Ve'hichzirah' (even though the animal is permitted whether it withdrew its foot or not) - because he wants to add it in the Seifa ('Hotzi es Rosho'), to teach us that even though the fetus withdrew its head, it is nevertheless forbidden.

(d) And the Chidush in the Seifa is - that once the animal has stuck out its head, it is considered as if it was born (as we explained in the Mishnah), in which case it can no longer become permitted through its mother's Shechitah, even if it withdraws its head.

(a) The Mishnah in Bechoros rules that a child who is born after a still-born twin - is a Bechor with regard to inheriting a double portion of his father's property, but not with regard to Pidyon ha'Ben.

(b) The Tana refers to two cases. One of them, where the first live eighth-month baby stuck out his head and withdrew it - the other, where it was a dead ninth month baby.

(c) We can extrapolate from the latter case that, if the first twin had stuck out his head alive before withdrawing it - then he would have been the Bechor in all respects.

(a) The problem is - why we need two Mishnahs to teach us that the head emerging from the mother's womb renders a. an animal, and b. a human, a Bechor.

(b) We initially suggest that the Tana needs to teach us both cases, because we cannot learn one from the other. Even if we know that the head emerging from the womb renders it/him a Bechor in the case of ...

1. ... an animal, we would not know it by a human being - because the former has no P'rozdor (corridor) thighs, allowing the birth of a head to be clearly visible, whereas a woman does.
2. ... a human being, we would not know it by an animal - because the face of a human being (which is made in the image of Hashem) is Chashuv, whereas that of an animal is not.

(a) The Mishnah later rules that once part of the placenta has emerged from the mother's womb, the baby is forbidden - because we are afraid that the head emerged, and once it did, the animal is considered born, like a human baby.

(b) This poses a Kashya on Rav Yehudah Amar Rav - since we now have a Mishnah which teaches us that once the head of a fetus emerges, it is considered born, negating Rav Yehudah's explanation, that our Mishnah learns the Reisha on account of the Seifa, which teaches us the same thing (as we just explained).

(c) If not for him, we would have explained - that the Chidush lies in the Reisha, and that the Tana learns the Seifa on account of the Reisha.

(d) We nevertheless establish our Mishnah with regard to the Ubar (like Rav Yehudah Amar Rav), and to answer the original Kashya on Rav Yehudah, we establish it like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (with regard to another Mishnah), who explains - that the Tana is speaking with regard to the location where the leg has been severed, which does indeed become permitted together with the rest of the fetus, only after it has been withdrawn.

6)

(a) We query Rav Yehudah from a Beraisa, where the Tana rules that in a case where, in similar circumstances to our Mishnah, the baby stuck out a leg ...

1. ... and withdrew it before the mother's Shechitah - it is permitted to eat.
2. ... and withdrew it after the Shechitah - it is forbidden.
3. ... which was severed before the mother's Shechitah - the leg is Tamei (because of Eiver min ha'Chai (as we will explain in 'ha'Or ve'ha'Rotav'), whereas the rest of the fetus remains Tahor - because a live animal is not subject to Tum'ah.

(b) In the latter case, where the leg is severed after the Shechitah, Rebbi Meir considers the Ubar, Maga Neveilah (which is a Rishon le'Tum'ah). According to the Rabbanan - it is considered 'Maga Tereifah Shechutah' (as will be explained later in the Perek).

(c) The problem with establishing the first case ('Mutar ba'Achilah') by the Ubar (rather than by the leg itself) is - why it is then Asur in the Seifa ('Shachat es Imo ve'Achar-Kach Hichziro).

(d) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak resolves this problem - by establishing it with regard to the location of the cut (which does indeed remain Asur in this case even after it has been withdrawn).

(a) When the Beraisa cited by Avimi says 'Parsah Hichzir, Achol, Parsos Hichzir, Achol' it means - (with reference to the two Pesukim "Mafreses *Parsah*" and "Sh'tei *Perasos*") that a fetus that is inside a Kasher animal ('Beheimah bi'Veheimah") whose two feet or one foot which it stuck out, became forbidden, become permitted again if it withdrew it/them.

(b) The problem with explaining 'Hichzir Parsah, Achol' on the Ubar (like Rav Yehudah) - is why the Tana then needs to speak about a case where the fetus withdrew its leg, since the rest of it is permitted anyway (like we asked above).

(c) That is why Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, in order to reconcile Rav Yehudah with the Beraisa , establishes 'Hichzir' - with regard to the location of the cut, which becomes permitted when the animal withdraws its leg (as long as it does so before the Shechitah).

(d) The problem with the fact that the Tana quoted two Pesukim ("Parsah" and "Parsos") is - assuming that one comes to permit Ubar (as we just explained), and not the other, the limb itself, this still leaves us with a Kashya on Rav Yehudah. This is because there is obviously no difference whether the fetus withdraws one foot or two feet, in which case we presume that if "Parsah" teaches us that the Ubar is permitted, "Parsos" must becoming to teach us that the leg is permitted too.

(a) We answer this Kashya- by establishing the Pasuk of "Parsah" (not with regard to permitting the leg too, but) - with regard to permitting a fetus whose hooves are not split, that one finds inside a mother whose hooves are.

(b) And we establish the author as Rebbi Shimon, who forbids a Kalut ben Parah - once it is born.

(c) Rav Yehudah counters Ula Amar Rebbi Yochanan who holds that the leg itself is permitted in principle, by citing Rav and Shmuel - who maintain that it is forbidden.

(a) With due respect to Rav and Shmuel, Ula cites Rebbi Yochanan, who proves his point from a Chatas that left its boundary - which we know is forbidden even if it returned - from Moshe's conversation with Aharon, following Nadav and Avihu's death, and the subsequent discovery that the Sa'ir of Rosh Chodesh had been burned. Moshe asked Aharon whether it was burned because it left the Azarah (even though it was returned).

(b) Rebbi Yochanan extrapolated from there - that apart from Kodshim, other cases of animals or parts of animals that left their boundaries and returned are permitted.

(c) We query Ula however, from a Beraisa, which discusses the Pasuk "u'Basar be'Sadeh Tereifah Lo Socheilu" (the source of the prohibition of all things that left their boundary). If not for the word "Tereifah", we would learn from Bikurim and Ma'aser Sheini - that all things that left their boundaries and returned are permitted.

(d) But from "Tereifah" we learn - that like "Tereifah", all of them have no Heter (including the leg of a fetus) proving Ula wrong.

(a) We learn that Bikurin and Ma'aser Sheini revert to their previous Heter once they are returned to their respective boundaries - from the Lashon of the Pasuk forbidding them initially "Lo Suchal Le'echol bi'She'arecha Ma'asar Degancha ... ", which implies that if they returned, they are permitted.

(b) In Eretz Yisrael, they cited the Machlokes between Rav and Rebbi Yochanan differently. According to them, Rav holds 'Yesh Leidah le'Eivarim' - which means that once a limb leaves the womb it is considered born, and is forbidden.

(c) Rebbi Yochanan says 'Ein Leidah le'Eivarim'.

(d) The difference between the two Leshonos is - regarding a case where the animal stuck out a majority of a limb, with regard to the minority that remains inside, which becomes forbidden according to the second Lashon, but permitted according to the first.

(a) We ask whether, according to Rabbi Yochanan - a fetus that stuck out one limb at a time before withdrawing it, until eventually, it had done so with most of its limbs (first one leg then the other, then the spine ... ), is considered to have been born or not.

(b) Perhaps it is not, even though most of it did emerge from its mother's womb - because once a limb has returned, it is permitted (and can no longer combine with other limbs that leave the womb.

(c) Assuming the second side of the previous She'eilah, we ask what the Din will be in this regard if, instead of the fetus withdrawing its limbs - they are severed one by one as they emerge, whether perhaps the animal is only considered born if the majority emerges from the womb in one go, but not in this way.

(a) We recite our Mishnah 'Zeh ha'K'lal Davar she'Gufah Asur *ve'she'Einah Gufah Mutar*') - which we assume, is coming to teach us that the animal is not considered born if its limbs are severed as they emerge.

(b) We refute this suggestion however, by establishing the Chidush in the case of a Kalut in the stomach of a cow (according to Rebbi Shimon, as we explained earlier).