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1)

(a) With regard to the Beraisa that we just cited Rebbi rules that in the case of Nechasai Lach, ve'Acharecha li'Peloni, ve Yarad Rishon u'Machar ve'Achal, ha'Sheini Motzi mi'Yad ha'Lekuchos'.
Why is that?

(b) What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?

(c) How does Resh Lakish establish the Machlokes?

(d) How will this explanation help us resolve what would otherwise be a contradiction in Halachos?

(a) In another Beraisa, Rebbi authorizes Rishon to sell.
What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?

(b) What problem does this Beraisa pose?

(c) We resolve the S'tirah in Rebbi by establishing the first Beraisa when Rishon sold the Guf, and the second, when he only sold the Peiros (to which he is entitled).
How do we resolve the S'tirah in Raban Shimon ben Gamliel?

(d) Seeing as Raban Shimon ben Gamliel holds 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf (or that 'Acharecha' indicates that it is a Kinyan ha'Guf to begin with), why should Rishon not then be permitted to sell the property Lechatchilah?

(a) To whom did Abaye refer as a 'Rasha Arum'?

(b) What does 'Arum' mean?

(c) Why did he say this about the advisor and not about the seller himself?

(a) After ruling like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, Rebbi Yochanan adds 'u'Modeh she'Im Nasnan be'Matnas Shechiv-Mera, Lo Asah K'lum'.
Who gave the Matnas Shechiv-Mera?

(b) What does Rebbi Yochanan mean by 'Matnas Shechiv-Mera'?

(c) What reason does Abaye give for Rebbi Yochanan's statement?

(a) According to Abaye, a beneficiary acquires a Matnas Shechiv-Mera at the point of the Shechiv-Mera's death.
What does Rava say?

(b) According to Abaye, who ought then to receive the property in the previous case?

(c) How do we reconcile Abaye's latter ruling with his interpretation of Rebbi Yochanan?

(a) What does the Mishnah in Gitin say about someone who says 'Zeh Gitech Im Meisi, Zeh Gitech Im me'Choli Zeh, Zeh Gitech le'Achar Miysah'?

(b) How do we prove from there that Abaye must have retracted from his latter ruling, and not from the former one?

(c) Why does Rebbi Zeira Amar Rebbi Yochanan need to rule like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in a case where the gift includes Avadim Cana'anim, whom Rishon subsequently sets free? Why might we have thought otherwise?

(d) And why does Rav Yosef Amar Rebbi Yochanan need to rule like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in a case where Rishon designated part of the property as shrouds for a dead person?

(a) Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda connects the case of 'Esrog Zeh Nasun Lecha be'Matanah ve'Acharecha li'Peloni; Natlo Rishon ve'Yatza Bo' with the current Machlokes Tana'im.
Why, according to ...

1. ... Rebbi, is Rishon not Yotze the Mitzvah of Esrog?
2. ... Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, is he Yotze?

(b) What objection does Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak raise with Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda's interpretation? Why does he hold that Rishon will be Yotze even according to Rebbi?

(c) When do Rebbi and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel argue by Esrog, according to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak?

(d) Why do we need to be presented with this Machlokes in respect of an Esrog, seeing as we already it from the Beraisa (on the previous Amud) with regard to Karka?

8)

(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna discusses a case of brothers who purchased an Esrog from Tefusas ha'Bayis to use on Sukos.
What is 'Tefusas ha'Bayis'?

(b) Under what conditions will they be able to fulfill the Mitzvah with that Esrog?

(c) Why is this case worse than the previous one, where Rishon fulfilled the Mitzvah even though he was not permitted to eat the Esrog according to Rebbi?

(d) In view of Rabah bar Rav Huna's ruling, how can we permit the use of a communal Esrog, whereby each member of the community in turn, uses the Esrog?

(a) Considering that the basis of this Halachah is the Pasuk in Emor "u'Lekachtem *Lachem* ba'Yom ha'Rishon P'ri Eitz Hadar", why do we not permit a jointly-owned Esrog (or Lulav ... ), like a jointly-owned garment is Chayav Tzitzis (from "al Kanfei Bigdeichem") and jointly-owned dough is Chayav Chalah (from "Arisoseicham")?

(b) Rava rules that if Reuven receives an Esrog as a 'Matanah al-M'nas le'Hachzir' to use on Sukos, and fails to return it, he has not fulfilled the Mitzvah.
What is a 'Matanah al-M'nas le'Hachzir'?

(c) What is the reason for Rava's ruling?

(d) What is he coming to teach us?

(a) Based on the opinion of Rebbi Meir in Kidushin, what did Shmuel (in Gitin) institute with regard to the wording in the Get of a Shechiv-Mera?

(b) According to Shmuel then, what ought to be the Din in the above case, where the owner of the Esrog did not make a T'nai Kaful?

(c) How will we then reconcile Rava with Shmuel?

(d) Should something happen to a Matanah al-M'nas le'Hachzir before the beneficiary has returned the article, is he liable ...

1. ... for Onsin?
2. ... for Geneivah va'Aveidah?
3. ... for anything?

(a) Why did that woman give Rav Bibi bar Abaye the date-palm that she owned in the latter's field for the duration of his lifetime?

(b) What did Rav Bibi hope to gain by donating it to his small son?

(c) But did we not learn that even Raban Shimon ben Gamliel forbade selling it Lechatchilah?

(d) We erase the Lashon 'Katan from the text, even though there are ways of explaining it.
How might we justify its inclusion?

(a) What did Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua mean when he commented 'Mishum de'Asu mi'Mula'i, Amrisu Mili Mulyasa'?

(b) What is the basis of this comment? Why would even Raban Shimon ben Gamliel concede that in this case, by giving the tree to his son, Rav Bibi would not have achieved anything?

(a) What does Rava Amar Rav Nachman say in the case of Reuven, who declares Hekdesh an ox which Shimon gave him as a Matanah al-M'nas le'Hachzir?

(b) Why does this episode really belong after the ruling of Rava ('Esrog Zeh ... ['before that of Rav Bibi bar Abaye])?

(c) What was Rava's objection to his Rebbe's statement?

(d) How did Rav Ashi therefore qualify Rav Nachman's ruling?

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