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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
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Bava Basra 92
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Questions
***** Perek ha'Mocher Peiros *****
1)
(a) If Shimon plants the fruit that Reuven sold him and it failed to grow,
the Tana Kama exempts Reuven from responsibility. At the time of the sale -
Reuven did not stipulate anything.
(b) The basis of this ruling is - that there are always two reasons why a
person might sell fruit; either for eating or for planting, in which case
the seller is entitled to claim that he sold it for eating.
(c) And this Halachah - extends to flax, even though most people sell flax
to plant, because (as Shmuel will teach us shortly), we do not follow the
majority in order to extract money from the defendant ('ha'Motzi me'Chavero
overrides the Din of Rov)
2)
(a) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel precludes garden seeds from this ruling - since
they are not fit to eat, in which case one only buys them to plant, and it
is obviously a false sale.
(b) This is even more obvious than one where Reuven sells Shimon wine and it
turns out to be beer (where the sale is also invalid) - because here the
seeds are not fit to eat at all, whereas there, some people would want to
purchase vinegar and not wine.
(c) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel is not coming to argue with the Tana Kama, but
to explain his opinion - in which case there is no Tana who disagrees with
him.
(d) In spite of the fact that there is nothing he can do with the seeds
other than burn them, Shimon is not obligated to pay Reuven the price of
firewood - because, it would seem, garden seeds do not make very good fuel.
3)
(a) According to Rav, if Reuven sells Shimon an ox which turns out to be a
goring ox, the sale is invalid - because that is not what he bought (much in
the same way as someone who purchases wine that turned out to be vinegar).
(b) Shmuel claims - that the seller can say that he sold it to Shecht and
eat.
(c) Even Sumchus, who rules Cholkin (in Bava Kama, in the case where an ox
gored a cow, and we find a stillborn calf beside the dead cow), will concede
here that the sale is valid - since whereas there, we are in doubt as to
when the calf was born, here all the facts are known, in which case we go
after the one with the strongest argument (the seller in this case, because,
since we do not follow the majority, the onus lay on the purchaser to
stipulate that he was buying the animal for plowing and not for eating.
(d) According to Shmuel, this is different than 'Yayin ve'Nimtza Chometz',
where the sale is invalid - because there, the purchaser specifically said
that he wants wine, whereas here he did not stipulate.
4)
(a) In other cases it would help to ascertain whether Reuven usually sells
for eating or for plowing (whether he is basically a butcher or a farmer) -
but we are speaking in a case where he is known to be a bit of both, who
sometimes sells for the one, and sometimes for the other.
(b) The price might indicate what he sold it for - because the price of an
animal that is for plowing is generally much higher than one that is for
eating.
(c) In the previous Perek, in the case where Reuven sold a plow, and the
price indicates that the ox was included in the sale - the Rabbanan do not
consider the price as an indication.
(d) Here however, they will they concede that it is - because in addition to
the fact that the Shimon paid a high price, he is probably from the majority
of people who purchase an ox for plowing (and, as we concluded, Reuven sells
for plowing too); whereas there, having established the case where some
people call an ox an ox, and not a plow, the price cannot determine that the
purchaser is from the other group (and he should have stipulated that
himself).
5)
(a) We do not look at the price in our case to determine whether Shimon
bought the ox for eating or for plowing - because we are speaking when the
price of meat jumped dramatically, so that there is no difference between
the price of an ox for plowing and an ox for Shechting.
(b) Despite the fact that, as we just explained, the purchaser received what
he paid for, he might claim that the sale is invalid and that he wants his
money back - to spare him the trouble of having to sell the meat.
6)
(a) Rav and Shmuel must be speaking when Reuven actually has money with
which to pay - because otherwise he could anyway force Shimon to accept the
animal, as we learned in Bava Kama (the debtor can pay with any goods he
wishes, and is not obligated to sell his Metaltelin in order to pay cash).
(b) We can extrapolate from here Rav Huna's D'rashah "Yashiv", 'le'Rabos
Shaveh Kesef ke'Kesef' (permitting the debtor to pay with whatever he wishes
[the source of the previous D'rashah]) only applies when he does not have
cash with which to pay, but when he does, he is obligated to pay cash.
(c) We cannot confine this extrapolation to the actual money that Shimon
paid Reuven (whereas other money that Reuven had would not preclude him from
the right to pay Metaltelin) - because (bearing in mind that money is to
spend) there is no S'vara to differentiate between the money that he
received and other money.
(d) The Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel now is - whether we go after the
majority (of those who sell their animals for plowing [Rav]), or not (Shmuel
[because, in his opinion, we only follow the majority in matters of Isur,
but not of Mamon]).
92b---------------------------------------92b
Questions
7)
We just concluded that Rav and Shmuel argue over whether a Rov can extract
money from the defendant. Even Shmuel agrees however, that a Rov determines
in matters of Isur, such as the case of nine shops - where someone purchased
meat and did not remember from which butchery he bought it. Assuming there
that nine of those butcheries sold Kasher meat and one of them non-Kasher
meat, the meat is Kasher.
8)
(a) The Mishnah in Kesuvos rules - that if a widow or a divorcee claims that
she was a Besulah when she married (and is therefore entitled to a Kesuvah
of two hundred Zuz), whereas the husband claims that she was a widow (who
only receives a hundred) - she claims two hundred Zuz, but only if witnesses
testify that she married in the manner that Besulos do.
(b) This implies however - that without witnesses, she is only entitled to a
Manah, despite the fact most women marry as Besulos (a Kashya on Rav).
(c) Initially, we answer that most women marry as Besulos and *all Besulos
have a Kol* that they did, and that consequently, since the woman under
discussion did not have a Kol, unless she has witnesses, she only receives a
hundred Zuz (since the fact that there is no Kol outweighs the Rov). We
refute this answer however, on the grounds - that if that were so, why would
we even believe witnesses, who must be false, since there was no Kol.
(d) So we amend the previous answer to read (not all Besulos have a Kol that
they did, but) - that *most Besulos have a Kol* that they did (the lack of
which negates the Rov, but not witnesses).
9)
(a) The Beraisa rules that if Reuven sold Shimon an Eved who turned out to
be ...
1. ... a Ganav or a kidnapper - the sale is valid.
2. ... an armed robber or a murderer who is wanted by the government - the
sale is not valid.
(b) According to Shmuel (who does *not go after the majority* in
money-matters) the sale ought to be invalid in the Reisha too - because
someone who pays money for an Eved expects a healthy one, not a sick one (in
body or in mind).
(c) The reason that the sale is valid, is (not because *the majority of
Avadim* are Ganavim and kidnappers, and we go after the majority, but) -
because *all Avadim are Ganavim and kidnappers*.
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