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1)

(a) 'Rav Huna Amar Rav, Halachah ke'Divrei Chachamim. Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba Amar Shmuel - Halachah ke'Divrei Rebbi Akiva'.

(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba said in front of Rav many times 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva', yet he remained silent - because he (Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba) had switched the opinion of Rebbi Akiva and the Chachamim, quoting Rebbi Akiva as saying that a seller sells begrudgingly (see Rashash).

(c) Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel rules that if brothers distribute their father's property, one does not have a path on the other - by which he means that the brother who receives the inner field does not have right of way through his brother's field to get to his own (even using the path that his father used to use).

(d) He does not say that the brother who receives the outer field purchased with an Ayin Ra'ah - because the question whether one sells generously or begrudgingly is confined to the seller, and has nothing to do with the purchaser.

(a) When Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel adds that one brother does not have on the other ...

1. ... windows, he means - that the brother who received a house cannot prevent the one who received the Chatzer from building a wall in the Chatzer, even though it blocks out the light from his windows of his house.
2. ... ladders, he means - that the brother who received an attic does not have the right to place his ladder in the Chatzer of the brother who received the house and the Chatzer, in order to climb up to his attic.
3. ... a stream of water, he means - that one brother does not have the right to carry the water that he draws from the stream through his brother's field to get to his own.

(b) According to Rav - in all of these cases, the brother does have the right.

(c) Ravina suggested that Rav and Shmuel followed their reasoning in the previous ruling (regarding a sale), and that we would know one ruling from the other - because brothers dividing their father's property is similar to a sale.

(d) Rav Ashi countered that we would not know ...

1. ... Rav's first ruling from the second one - inasmuch as in the latter case, the brother can claim that he expects to use the property in the same way as his father did (an argument that will not hold water by an ordinary sale).
2. ... Shmuel's second ruling from the first one - because, by the same token, in the case of brothers, Shmuel might well concede to Rav that the brother does reserve the right.

(a) We quote the Pasuk "Tachas Avosecha Yih'yu Banecha" - in support of the S'vara that we just gave to explain the need to issue both sets of rulings.

(b) When Rav Nachman asked Rav Huna like whom the Halachah was (like Rav Huna Amar Rav or Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel), he replied - like Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel, because he was close with the Resh Galusa (he was actually his son-in-law), and therefore came into contact with many Dayanim (or Dinim - Rabeinu Chananel), making him Halachah-oriented.

(a) If Reuven who has two fields, gives the outer field as a gift to Shimon, and the inner one ...

1. ... he sells to Levi - Levi certainly has no right of way through Shimon's field to get to his, because it is obvious that a gift is given with more goodwill than something that is sold.
2. ... he gives to Levi, or he sells them both to the same two people - Levi does not have right of way through Shimon's field, even according to the Rabbanan, because it is only with regard to what the seller retains for himself that they hold that he sells begrudgingly, but not vis-a-vis what he sells to another purchaser.

(b) They thought that in a case where Reuven sells the outer field to Shimon, and gives the inner one to Levi, Levi does not have right of way, like in the previous cases. The correct ruling however is - that he has.

(c) This ruling is based on a Mishnah later in the Perek, where the Tana rules that someone who gives his friend a field as a gift and retains the water-pit, say for himself - must purchase a path to his water-pit, even according to the Rabbanan ...

(d) ... because even they agree that when someone gives a gift, he does so generously.

(a) The Mishnah states that someone who sells a room, has automatically sold the door, the fixed mortar and the wooden frame that surrounds it - but not the key, the moveable millstone or the millhopper (a large funnel through which the grain is channeled).

(b) Neither does the purchaser automatically acquire the stove or oven - because they are moveable. The principle that governs these rulings is - that whatever is attached to the ground is automatically included in the sale, whereas whatever is detached is not.

(a) If the seller were to add 'Hu ve'Chal Asher be'Socho' - then the sale would also incorporate all the Metaltelin listed above, which are generally designated for that house exclusively, but not other Metaltelin, because we are assuming that he is not moving far from the Shechunah and still has a need for them.

(b) The Tana later will differentiate between this case and someone who sells a Chatzer - whose sale incorporates all Metaltelin, with the exception of wheat and barley (stocks of food [because he clearly intends to move further afield, and no longer has any need of his Metaltelin]).

(c) Alternatively, this distinction might even apply in a case where the seller was moving house to another area - because we could also differentiate between the vesssels listed in our Mishnah, which one does not tend to lend due to their heaviness (or in the case of the key, because it is of no real value anywhere else), and other vessels, which are easily moveable. And it is the latter which are not included in the sale in our Mishnah (irrespective of where the seller is moving to), but are included in the sale of a Chatzer.

(d) Whereas someone who sells a town - sells everything in it, even animals and Avadim, and certainly wheat and barley (either because of the excessive trouble in moving them, or because the bigger the sale, the more its accessories are Bateil to the main object being sold).

7)

(a) We suggest that the author of our Mishnah cannot be Rebbi Meir, who holds that the accessories of a vineyard are included in the sale of the vineyard. Rebbi Meir's ruling seemingly clashes with our Mishnah - which precludes a moveable mortar from the sale of a house, whereas Rebbi Meir includes moveable items, such as canes to suppport the vines, in the sale of a vineyard.

(b) The problem with establishing our Mishnah not Rebbi Meir is - that it is a S'tam Mishnah, and we have a principle 'S'tam Mishnah Rebbi Meir' (although admittedly, there are many exceptions to this).

(c) In order to try and reconcile Rebbi Meir with our Mishnah, we establish his ruling - by permanent accessories, which are not moved under any circumstances, whereas the mortar in our Mishnah is not a permanent fixture.

(d) We refute this explanation however, in view of a key, which (although it is moveable) is a permanent fixture, and which our Tana precludes from the sale. And we know that a key is a permanent fixture - because the Mishnah contrasts it with a door, which is definitely a permanent fixture (when it could have otherwise differentiated between two kinds of keys, one that is permanent and one that is not).

(a) The Beraisa, listing what is, and what isn't sold together with the house, adds a Nagar and a Man'ol to the door in our Mishnah (which is not sold). A 'Nagar' - is fixed to the wall, and a 'Man'ol' - to the door.

(b) A carved mortar is sold with the house, but not one that is fixed. The former is - actually carved out of a rock which juts out of the wall of the house, whereas the latter is carved when it is detached and then fixed to the wall.

(c) If the seller stipulated 'Hu ve'Chol Asher be'Socho', all of the above are included. It does not however, include a Bor, Dus or Yatzi'a (refer to opening Sugya of the Perek) despite the fact that they are attached to the ground - because they are not built as part of the house.

(a) Rebbi Eliezer states that whatever is fixed to the ground is like the ground (and is sold with the house).
He disagrees with the Tana Kama - who makes a distinction between a mortar that was built into the wall and one that was attached only later. According to him, both are automatically sold with the house.

(b) The author of our Mishnah (which does not make a distinction between one mortar and the other, is therefore Rebbi Eliezer.

(a) The problem with a manufactured pipe that feeds rain-water into a Mikveh is - the fact that the water becomes 'Mayim She'uvin' (which invalidates the Mikveh).

(b) If the water flows into the Mikveh via a natural ditch - the Mikveh is Kasher (because 'Mayim She'uvin' by definition pertains to a man-made vessel exclusively).

(a) The Beraisa renders a pipe that is manufactured first and then fixed to the Mikveh - Pasul (because it is considered She'uvin), whereas vice-versa - it is Kasher (because it is no worse than a Mikveh that is carved out of the ground).

(b) Rebbi Eliezer might well be the author of the Beraisa of Mikveh (which differentiates between the two kinds of pipe), even though in the Beraisa of mortar, he does distinguish between the two. This is - because maybe his reason there is based on the S'vara that a seller sells generously (like Rebbi Akiva his Talmid), and has no bearing on the Din of Mikveh.

(c) The author of the Beraisa of Mikveh - could in fact be the Rabbanan of Rebbi Eliezer ...

(d) ... and when we say 'Lo Rebbi Eliezer ve'Lo Rabbanan' - we are not referring to the Rabbanan of Rebbi Eliezer.

(a) We do not ask 'Which Rabbanan', like we ask 'Which Rebbi Eliezer' - because it is not the way of the Gemara to become so involved.

(b) We only make the statement 've'Rabbanan Savri Mocher be'Ayin Ra'ah Mocher' - in order to balance Rebbi Eliezer. In fact, the author of the Beraisa can certainly be the Rabbanan.